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The importance of education for individual well-being, social 
cohesion and economic growth is widely accepted by researchers and 
policymakers alike.  Yet there exist vast numbers of people around the 
world, largely poor, who continue to lag behind wealthier people, often 
within their own nations. Conditional cash transfer programs were 
created to encourage investments in education and health by 
subsidizing their cost and changing household preferences. The 
programs increase short-term income as well as future wage potential, 
thus decreasing short-term and long-term poverty, as well as the 
poverty that is passed from generation to generation. Begun in Mexico 
and Brazil, the conditional cash transfer model is being replicated in 
many countries, but its replicability across socioeconomic and political 
contexts is far from clear. The present study adds to the research on 
conditional cash transfer programs through a comparative quantitative 
  viii 
analysis of the effects of two programs on key educational outcomes in 
Nicaragua and Colombia.  
Using secondary panel data for the Nicaraguan Red de Protección 
Social and the Colombian Familias en Acción programs, a model 
reflecting demand constraints to education is used to determine the 
relative impacts of individual and household characteristics in the 
schooling decision, as well as to measure program impact in some of 
the most impoverished communities in the two countries.  The 
empirical analysis is situated within a description of the historical, 
political and demographic contexts into which the programs were 
introduced. The results indicate that both programs increased 
enrollment and attendance, with lesser but still positive effects on 
retention. These effects were stronger for boys in Colombia, as was 
the importance of schooling expectations in determining enrollment. 
The study suggests that conditional cash transfer programs should be 
effective in other settings in which low educational attainment is 
caused largely by a lack of household resources. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Although much progress has been made worldwide in decreasing 
poverty, increasing access to education, and locating synergies 
between the two, there remains a large amount of poverty in the 
world. The incidence of poverty more often than not is correlated with 
low levels of literacy, educational attainment and other measures of 
human development. Despite growing agreement that basic education 
is a human right, in many countries primary and secondary enrollment 
are significantly less than 100%. Educational attainment can often be 
attributed to a lack of supply of schools but in many places, despite 
adequate supply, one finds significant percentages of school-aged 
children who do not attend school. Given the link between education 
and increased quality of life for individuals and their descendents, 
underinvestment in education among the poor remains a serious 
problem. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
This dissertation addresses a relatively new family of social and 
educational programs designed to alleviate poverty in the nations in 
which they are implemented. Conditional cash transfer programs 
(CCTs) subsidize the costs of schooling and provide incentives to 
invest in human capital (health, nutrition, and schooling) to address 
short-term, long-term, and intergenerational poverty. Originally 
developed for implementation in Brazil and Mexico, these programs 
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have been replicated all over the developing world, particularly in Latin 
America. The model is currently under pilot in New York City, a rare 
case of policy diffusion from developing to developed countries. Yet the 
extent to which the model: 1.) is truly successful in meeting its aims 
and 2.) can be implemented across diverse contexts has not been fully 
determined. 
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
Although income has increased in many undeveloped countries, 
the increases have not been equally distributed. In fact, those at the 
lower economic end of the spectrum have experienced an increase in 
poverty as opposed to a decrease. Though impoverished people and 
low-income communities can be found all over the world, there are 
regions in which poverty and particularly income inequality have been 
especially pernicious. Latin America, the setting for the programs 
discussed in this study, has the second highest level of income 
inequality of any region of the world. The inequality is based in history, 
but has been perpetuated through various institutional, political and 
cultural practices (e.g. Arnove & Torres, 2003; Hanson, 1995).  
In addition to income inequality, Latin America retains great 
inequalities in education, low educational mobility between 
generations, and unequal health outcomes.  
For the most part, Latin American educational provision has 
never rivaled that of the United States, due to a variety of factors. 
First, unlike in America, local communities have not broadly 
championed the cause of education. It has traditionally been left up to 
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the central government to make these investments, but because 
universities are the institutions that serve the interests of the 
government most directly, it is this level of education that has received 
the most attention and funding (e.g. deFerranti et al, 2004; Patrinos, 
2001). At the primary level, the wealthy have always had access to 
private schooling, and so have had little impetus to advocate for broad 
access to schooling. Thus, while some countries like Mexico and Brazil 
have been able to achieve high levels of school participation and 
literacy overall, the lowest income people within those countries have 
not shared in this benefit. The intervention of the international 
community via such initiatives as the Jomtien Education for All 
initiative and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals has 
helped to call attention to the stratification and has reinvigorated 
governments to take responsibility in this arena (Colclough & Lewin, 
1993). At the same time, non-government organizations (NGOs) and 
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund have increased efforts to provide funding to 
governments that wish to implement educational reforms, particularly 
those with a focus toward increasing access to underrepresented 
groups. 
Currently the inequalities in education are narrowing among 
children under 12 (de Ferranti et al, 2004; World Bank, 2001; Sen, 
1999). However, the secondary and tertiary enrollment gaps have 
grown, and the quality of schooling remains highly stratified in Latin 
America, as in other parts of the world. The gap in literacy and 
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schooling attainment between the poorest and richest income quintiles 
for Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and Nicaragua are presented in Appendix 
4. As an example, while 99% of Brazilian adults in quintile 5 reported 
being fully literate in 2000, only 67% of adults in quintile 1 were 
literate (de Ferranti et al, 2004). A similar 30% disparity existed in 
Mexico and Nicaragua. As discussed in depth below, the gaps in 
educational enrollment, attainment and quality have a serious impact 
on human capital development, and thus on the returns to education 
in the form of wages. Other factors such as race, gender, and place of 
dwelling - urban versus rural - continue to affect the quality of 
education as well as job prospects. Indigenous and African-descendent 
people receive the least education and are less likely to be able to 
convert education to earnings. These in turn are thought to contribute 
to low educational mobility. Low-income parents cannot afford to send 
children to school, and have low expectations for future earnings, so 
they do not invest in schooling (deFerranti et al., Patrinos, 2001, 
Becker, 1981). This in turn contributes to maintaining a level of 
inequality even in the face of equalizing educational opportunity. In 
other words, even as the supply of education has become more 
available, demand has not responded in many marginalized groups.  
Reform since the 1990s has been shown to be in many contexts 
oriented toward shoring up the public sector as a whole. In Brazil, for 
instance, Presidents Cardoso and Lula have sought to modernize and 
integrate the nation into the world economy through economic 
stabilization, development of the social infrastructure, and more 
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resilient institutions for taxation. Colombia has taken similar measures. 
In each of these countries, the shift to widespread social welfare has 
been part of the overall transition toward a modern, more developed 
society. 
On a macro scale, in addition to increasing broad support of 
education for efficiency purposes, policy makers have begun to target 
expenditures to the most vulnerable populations. On the supply side, 
programs have been designed to build facilities and supply more 
teachers and school materials as well as to provide bilingual 
instruction, for instance to indigenous students. On the demand side, 
scholarships and other cash transfer programs are designed to 
increase equity by reducing the constraints on schooling faced by 
impoverished households. 
PURPOSE 
The purpose of the current study is twofold: 1.) To provide a 
quantitative analysis of the impact of conditional cash transfer 
programs on educational outcomes in Nicaragua and Colombia and; 
2.) To compare and situate these analyses in deeper social and 
historical context than they have traditionally received in the CCT 
literature. Analysis is focused on the comparison of program outcomes 
through regression, using panel data to measure the effects of the 
interventions across multiple individuals over a number of years of 
some of the most marginalized populations in each country. A 
selection of independent variables reflecting human capital theory is 
used, including individual, household, and community-level 
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characteristics. The outcome variables of interest are: school 
enrollment, attendance, retention and schooling expectations. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.)  What has been the effect of the Nicaraguan and Colombian 
CCT programs on schooling outcomes (enrollment, attendance, 
and expectations) for individual children?  
2.)  What has been the effect of the Nicaraguan and Colombian 
CCT programs on aggregate schooling outcomes (enrollment, 
attendance, and expectations) on participant communities?  
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 The current study adds to the investigation of conditional 
cash transfer programs in a number of ways. First, while the Mexican 
and Brazilian programs have been studied fairly extensively, 
subsequent programs have not received the same amount of 
attention. Where most have had an external evaluation team to collect 
and analyze the data and produce an impact evaluation report, the 
extensive time investment required to carry out these studies has 
limited the pool of researchers. For the programs discussed in this 
study, a very small number of individuals have produced the literature. 
The comparative approach taken here is unique. The conditional cash 
transfer programs in Nicaragua and Colombia, while similar in concept, 
have been implemented in vastly different contexts, and program 
design has reflected local constraints. The analysis of such distinct 
contexts in the framework of one study increases the relevance for 
policy replication. Additionally, the fates of the programs within the 
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countries have been quite different, and in themselves provide a 
fascinating context for considering aspects of policy implementation.  
Lastly, from the perspective of the researcher, accessing and 
analyzing the information used in this study has the benefit of not only 
investigating the impact of the implemented programs and policies, 
but also shedding light on the populations involved. These are 
individuals and families who have in many ways been invisible for 
generations, particularly to the Western world. Although time 
constraints required the use of secondary data, having access to the 
survey instruments as well as the responses of individuals through the 
data sets allowed for a detailed picture of the life circumstances of the 
individuals served by each program. The fact that these programs 
have focused on the very poorest and most marginalized members of 
society within countries both relatively wealthy and extremely poor 
leaves the possibility that they could also be used to address 
constraints facing equally marginalized populations within very rich 
countries like the United States. At the same time, the successes and 
failures of implementation, when addressed seriously, can help to 
increase the success and to minimize negative effects on the 
communities involved. 
LIMITATIONS 
There are two major categories of limitations to be addressed at 
the outset: theoretical limitations and data limitations. With regard to 
the former, as with any theory, the theory of human capital focuses on 
certain variables and leaves out others. Since human capital theory is 
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highly valued in some fields and less valued in others, programs and 
research that use it as a basis for analysis are often subjected to harsh 
criticism. It is used in this investigation partially because it is the 
theory that informed the development of the programs in question. 
This allows for an analysis of how well the program assumptions bear 
out empirically in these programs. It has also been widely documented 
that a major reason that poor children in particular do not attend 
school is the need to work or that the cost of schooling is too high 
(e.g. Glick & Sahn, 1997; Sen, 1999; Arnove & Clements, 2003). Since 
this is a fundamental assumption of human capital theory, it is natural 
to evaluate the data using that framework. It is recognized that there 
are other possible frameworks for evaluating the effects of the 
programs, as well as determining the ultimate sustainability of the 
educational and other outcomes. 
The data limitations merit more extensive discussion, to be 
taken up in the chapters devoted to methodology and the specific 
programs. In general, since it was necessary to rely on secondary 
data, it was also necessary to accept that some questions were not 
asked, or were asked in a different way than would have been optimal 
for the current analysis. The information was gathered by survey; and 
while this offered a far more detailed description of the communities 
served than in many cases had ever been carried out in these places, 
it allowed room for considerable error, both due to self-reporting and 
to mistakes in interviewing and recording. Data collection in Third 
World contexts provides its own set of challenges, including 
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accessibility and the often low level of educational attainment in the 
target population. In spite of these limitations, the data has allowed 
for adequate investigation of the research questions.   
ORGANIZATION OF FOLLOWING CHAPTERS 
The remaining chapters are organized as follows: Chapter 2 is a 
literature review describing human capital theory and the economics of 
conditional cash transfer programs, as well as a review of the major 
literature on the Mexican and Brazilian CCT programs. Chapter 3 is a 
general explanation of the methodology common to both the 
Nicaraguan and Colombian data sets. Chapter 4 is an in-depth 
presentation of the historical context, demographic environment at the 
beginning of program implementation, and detailed program 
information for the Nicaraguan Red de Protección (RPS) program and 
the Colombian Familias en Acción program. Chapters 5 and 6 present 
descriptive statistics and findings for Nicaragua and Colombia 
respectively. Chapter 7 concludes with the policy implications and 
future research suggested by the study. Detailed supplementary 
information can be found in the appendices. 
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CHAPTER 2:  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This chapter begins with an explanation of conditional cash 
transfer programs and the theory that motivates their design. This is 
followed by a presentation of the limitations of the theory when 
applied to empirical research and how these influence program design. 
The last two sections of the chapter are devoted to providing a brief 
history of the first two major conditional cash transfer programs and a 
review of the research generated around them.  
CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS 
Policy to increase educational attainment in developing countries 
has generally focused on supply-side interventions. Assuming that the 
major impediment to use of schools is a lack of the facilities and 
personnel to manage them, such programs have failed to achieve 
significant improvements in educational outcomes (Skoufias, 2001). 
The shortcomings of such reforms have led researchers and policy-
makers to devise a different sort of program, shifting the focus to 
demand-side interventions that address the consumption behavior of 
those that would receive the services. In poorer communities, in which 
the long-term returns to schooling are less well known and objectively 
less certain, the immediate cost of schooling is thought by human 
capital theorists to be one of the most critical factors in the decision to 
attend or not attend school.  
Though implemented in many different nations and communities, 
all conditional cash transfer programs have as a primary objective to 
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decrease the intergenerational transmission of poverty and have 
identified education as the means by which this will be accomplished. 
Following from the assumption that cost is the chief factor keeping 
poor children out of school, each program relies strongly on financial 
incentives to decrease the short-term costs of enrolling in school (De 
la Brière and Rawlings, 2006; Skoufias, 2001) by providing cash 
transfers to poor families. In order to encourage school enrollment and 
investments in other productive forms of human capital, cash receipt is 
conditioned upon keeping children in school, making regular visits to 
health clinics, and attending nutritional talks by health professionals. 
Developed in Brazil and refined and expanded in Mexico, CCTs have 
been replicated throughout Latin America with the help of the World 
Bank and other multilateral institutions as well as NGOs, and are being 
tested for replication in Africa and the United States. In general, these 
programs have been designed by central governments in collaboration 
with the international aid community, and involve participants selected 
by central survey instruments. They also tend to consolidate in one 
ministry a number of functions typically performed by several, for 
example health, nutrition and education. 
From a macroeconomic perspective, social assistance reaps 
greatest dividends for a country when it helps individuals to contribute 
to society in a productive way by encouraging human capital 
accumulation (e.g. Farrington & Slater, 2006). Social assistance should 
be efficient, delivering the greatest benefit using the least possible 
resources. Transfers to the poor have traditionally often been in-kind, 
  12 
providing for example food to poor families. Policy-makers originally 
thought that these allowed better specification of resources and 
provided less opportunity for corruption than would cash transfers. It 
was thought that given cash, families might not purchase goods such 
as food, but rather spend it on less productive goods, such as 
cigarettes, alcohol, or televisions. In recent years, however, in-kind 
transfers have been criticized for inefficiency, in particular the costs of 
administering their distribution (Farrington and Slater, 2006). This has 
enhanced the desirability of cash transfers in the policy debate. In 
addition to greater efficiency, cash transfers have the potential to 
contribute to overall productivity in a way that transfers of products 
might not: through increased demand for a range of goods and 
services, or through possible investment of the additional cash in 
productive enterprises by beneficiaries themselves. Though much of 
the cash generally goes to consumption (e.g. Hoddinott & Skoufias, 
2004; Moore, 2009), especially in the most impoverished families, 
there is still some expected margin of investment and increased 
productivity. 
Economic foundation of conditional cash transfers 
The design of conditional cash transfer programs is based 
primarily on human capital theory, originally developed by Gary Becker 
(1965, 1975, 1993), Jacob Mincer and Theodore Schultz. The general 
principle of human capital theory is that just as investments can be 
made in goods, or physical capital, they can also be made in humans. 
In fact, it is argued that in order to increase the economic output of a 
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society, investments must be made not only in physical infrastructure, 
but also in the human participants (Becker, 1994). These investments 
may take several different forms, principally in health, education, and 
training; and as with any investment, that which is put into human 
beings can yield returns in the future. A characteristic peculiar to 
human capital is that it cannot be sold or given away (Schultz, 1971), 
nor can it be transferred. If an individual leaves the job or country in 
which he or she has received education or training, that education will 
leave with that individual to benefit the next firm or country. This has 
practical implications for the way in which educational investments are 
funded, and the way that incentives are used to encourage them. This 
theory has both micro and macroeconomic consequences and over 
time has become a central part of neoclassical growth theory 
(Langelett, 2002). Investment in human capital contributes to greater 
productivity in the labor force, which in turn leads to greater economic 
growth. 
Assumptions of human capital theory 
The classic formulation of human capital theory embodies 
several major assumptions. One that has had great implications for 
educational development in impoverished communities is that in 
aggregate, genetic endowments and intellectual promise are 
distributed evenly across groups and nations, so differences in 
productivity are due not to these endowments, or even fully to the 
availability of natural resources or infrastructure, but rather to lesser 
investments in human capital (Psacharopoulos, 1987; Langelett, 2002; 
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Sen, 1997, 1999). This finding was inspired by, and evidenced in the 
greater economic progress in some equally impoverished communities 
between and within nations. 
The key decision-making unit in human capital theory is the 
individual, assumed to make rational decisions based on knowledge of 
the consequences of those decisions. A driving principle behind human 
capital theory is that individuals will always seek to “maximize their 
well-being as they accumulate human capital over their lifetime” 
(Becker, 1981, 5). In other words, they will choose the amount, 
nature, and timing of education, training and other such investments 
based on calculation of costs and benefits. As human capital is 
considered the chief determining factor in raising income, the theory 
places the individual as the key decision maker with regard to his or 
her own standard of living.  
At the aggregate level, there is an assumed social benefit to the 
individual decision to invest in human capital. Langelett (2002) 
summarized the key ways economists have determined over the past 
four decades that human capital accumulation in individuals, 
particularly education, contributes to overall societal advancement:  
 
• Education allows for the more efficient use of existing 
resources; 
• Education/literacy is correlated with better health, higher 
life expectancy and lower infant mortality; 
• Education creates greater research capabilities, which lead 
to technological innovation; 
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• Education raises the productivity of the workforce and 
generally increases the likelihood that workers will seek 
additional training; 
• Education increases people’s adaptability to 
change/growth; 
• As educational levels increase for women, the opportunity 
cost of staying home to raise a family rises, thus reducing 
the fertility rates for women and increasing labor force 
participation rate; and 
• Education contributes to moral and mental growth and 
greater social cohesion. (Becker, 1993) 
 
The implication of the social benefits of human capital is that 
firms and/or governments have a stake in promoting and coordinating 
its development by providing opportunities and influencing the choice 
of individuals to invest in themselves: i.e. to coordinate the private 
decision such that it favors the whole.  
There are many types of conditional cash transfer programs, but 
they fall into two major categories:  those designed to serve the 
chronic poor (de Janvry et. al., 2006) and decrease intergenerational 
poverty; and those whose primary function is to provide temporary 
financial relief from shocks such as natural disasters. The former is the 
focus of the research presented in this dissertation, specifically those 
programs that include education as a significant component.  
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Effects of conditional cash transfers on household behavior 
In order to devise policies to influence household behavior, it is 
first necessary to understand the decisions facing households. Various 
researchers on CCTs (e.g. Skoufias, 2001; Behrman et al., 2005) have 
placed the programs in their economic framework, providing a rigorous 
explanation of the possible effects on the household budget, and via 
that mechanism, on school enrollment. The framework will be 
sketched here as briefly as possible while still providing a thorough 
enough treatment for present purposes. Skoufias’ explanation mirrors 
and refers to Becker's (1981) formulation of human capital decisions 
for the household level, as well as to other more recent research. 
At the household level, households are assumed to have 
preferences summarized by a welfare function and bound by 
constraints, chiefly income, and time. The general task of any 
household is to maximize its welfare within the present constraints. 
The particular behavior of the household welfare function has been 
theorized in different ways. Becker's original (1981) model was of a 
unified household whose preferences follow that of the head. Becker 
further assumed that the head was altruistic, and allocated resources 
efficiently and equitably among members. 
The basic production function describing human capital 
investment in a child is: 
 
H = h(tcH, tmH, X; µ, K)  
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where tcH, tmH, and X are the major inputs, and µ and K variables 
that can affect those inputs. 
  
X - purchased goods for human capital investment (e.g., 
books, medical care). 
K - parental education, community characteristics, 
knowledge. 
µ - biological characteristics of the child (e.g. intelligence, 
health) 
tcH and tmH - time contributed to human capital formation 
on the part of the mother and the part of the child, 
respectively 
As mentioned above, differences in earnings are thought not to 
be due as much to genetic variation as to differing investments in child 
human capital. Much of the household utility for education is derived 
from expected future earnings of the children. While parents are 
assumed to want to maximize these future earnings, they are also 
constrained by the number of children and the maintenance of some 
level of household consumption. The parental welfare function is as 
follows: U = U(E,Y), where E represents the child’s future earnings and 
Y represents household consumption. The role of the parents with 
regard to human capital investment and household consumption is to 
choose the level of purchased goods for human capital investment (X 
above) and the consumption of all other goods (Y), and to allocate 
child and parental time across activities: 
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At the optimum households equate the marginal rate of 
substitution between adult children's earnings and household 
consumption… with the marginal cost (MC) or ‘shadow price’ of 
investing in the human capital of a child. In addition, households 
will allocate child time (tcH), parental (tmH) time and market 
resources (X) to equalize the marginal costs associated with 
each activity and resource. (Skoufias, 2001, p.15). 
 
Marginal cost is generally defined as the cost to produce one 
additional unit of output; in this case, it refers to the cost of 
contributing more of the child and mother's time to schooling. Also 
known as shadow price, marginal cost is a key determinant of the 
investment decision. The equation to summarize this condition is as 
follows: 
 
MUc1(W1-ps) = βMUc2t2W’2(S) 
 
where W1 represents the child wage rate, ps represents the subsidy 
(transfer) paid for schooling, β the discount rate of future earning, t2 
the amount of time spent working as an adult, W’2 the adult wage 
rate, and S the amount of schooling. Here, the left side contains the 
total cost of schooling, both direct and indirect1 and the right side the 
marginal benefit in increased future wages. The decision to invest or 
not invest in education revolves around the profitability of the 
                                   
1 Due to foregone wages 
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investment or rate of return.2 In order to choose education, there 
must be a real or perceived higher return, in terms of real earnings, 
from learning than the present value cost of the learning (Becker, 
1981, 59).3 The higher the expected wage, the higher the tolerance for 
investing in education. This partially explains the greater usual 
investment of families in boys’ education, as men are expected to earn 
higher wages than are women (Behrman et al, 2005) as well as the 
commonly observed discrepancy between urban and rural educational 
attainment. The use of a higher subsidy for girls in some CCTs and the 
focus on rural areas in others reflects this understanding.  
Moving from equilibrium, any change to the human capital 
production function can lead to a change in the shadow prices of 
various commodities and thus to a change in household behavior. 
Additional income in pure cash should shift the demand curve without 
changing preferences, i.e. change the production function of the 
household, but simply increase the amount of each commodity equally 
(Becker, 1981; Skoufias, 2001). However, changes in the factors 
affecting the marginal cost of inputs to human capital – namely, time 
or goods - may cause substitutions among goods and activities to 
minimize overall costs. If marginal cost of an input increases, its use 
will decrease, and vice versa. 
                                   
2 This statement assumes perfect information on the part of the individual. In 
actuality, it is the perceived profitability or rate of return that underlies the decision 
to invest in schooling. This will be discussed in more depth below.  
3 Becker noted that internal rate of return may be more accurate way of measuring, 
as it equates the present value of returns to present value of costs. This more 
accurately reflects the day-to-day calculus of a real individual making the decision 
to invest or not invest. 
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The theoretical effects of conditional cash transfers on different 
types of households are summarized in the following diagram:  
 




















The x-axis (S) represents the amount of the child’s time that is 
devoted to schooling and the y-axis all other goods, since time spent 
schooling equates to lost goods due to lost wages. At lower amounts of 
time in school, this graph assumes that work time fills the time not 
devoted to schooling.4  At the far left of the x-axis, a child would be 
working all the time and devote no time to school (unenrolled). At the 
                                   
4 This is somewhat problematic in the case of many girls, as the trade-off for school 
time is often not wage labor, but rather household activity. See Lincove, 2006 for a 
discussion and example. Skoufias (2001) explains this by assuming that work at 
home is perfectly substitutable for market work. 
V 
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far right, the child would be enrolled with 100% attendance at school, 
so that all non-leisure time was devoted to school and none to work. 
For any child dividing time between work and school, the line AV 
describes the opportunity set of the households, with the slope of the 
line equal to the real market wage (W) of the child, the number of 
goods that can be purchased with the wages earned in one hour. This 
represents the trade-off between schooling and other goods available 
to the household, as for each extra hour devoted to school, W units of 
additional goods are sacrificed. 
The diagram represents two different types of households 
classified according to the amount of time that the child spent in 
school before the implementation of the program, or receipt of a cash 
transfer. (T) represents maximum attendance in school, where all non-
leisure time is devoted to school or homework. (V) represents the 
initial amount of labor income received (very low), or amount of other 
goods available in the household when the child devotes all time to 
school. (A) and (C) represent households with children: 
 
(A.) Child initially not enrolled in school 
(C.) Child initially attending school at near 100% attendance 
rate 
 
A cash transfer will have different effects on the behavior of 
households with children at these two states of initial attendance. As 
the graph implies, there is a minimum conditional cash transfer that 
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will be required in order to encourage a household to send a child to 
school, and the size of this cash transfer will depend on the 
household’s initial location along the budget line.5 
On the graph, Smin represents the time devoted to schooling at 
the attendance rate required for a CCT (e.g. 80 - 85% in the case of 
the programs discussed below). Z’ is the intersection of household A’s 
indifference curve with Smin, so the amount of total income required 
to make the household just indifferent between sending the child to 
school and sending the child to work instead. Z represents the actual 
amount of income that Household A would receive, without a subsidy, 
if it were to send the child to school the minimum amount required by 
a CCT program. As can be seen, this amount (Z) falls below the 
income desired by the household; the amount of other goods that 
could be purchased is too low to produce the desired utility for that 
household. Thus, without additional income, the household will not 
invest in education. The difference between Z’ and Z represents the 
minimum amount of transfer needed to cause the household to send 
the child to school.  
This particular graph assumes that the employment 
opportunities, and thus market wage, for each household are similar.6 
Thus, the slope of the budget line for each household is considered the 
                                   
5 Definition: the budget line represents the maximum amount of goods household 
can afford, particularly the rate of trade-off between one and the other, in this case 
schooling and everything else.  
6 As, for example, in one community, or in communities that are similar 
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same. The indifference curves7 at A and A’ and C and C’ represent the 
households of the children previously described. For the family 
including child C, with near perfect attendance at the beginning of the 
program, the initial constraints on human capital investment are not 
binding. In this case, a cash transfer will not change the behavior of 
the family in terms of enrollment, but will simply provide an income 
effect, perhaps allowing the child to devote more time to study, by 
offsetting that much more of the opportunity cost due to lost wages. 
A’V’ shows the budget line for this household after receipt of a cash 
transfer. The transfer results in a shifted budget line within a region 
between T and Smin, with no change in the slope (W). The income 
transfer raises the amount of non-labor income (or goods available), 
as represented by V’. (V’ – V) represents the maximum amount of 
benefits available to a household that complies with all requirements of 
the program. By way of comparison with the household already 
enrolling the child in school, the dotted line shows that for a household 
not already enrolling, the cash transfer reduces the marginal cost of 
schooling, thus reducing the shadow wage and changing the budget 
line8 such that the price of schooling relative to other goods decreases. 
As with Household C, an income effect is observed, but for Household 
C, the income effect is coupled with a substitution or price effect, the 
substitution of schooling for some other goods. 
                                   
7 Definition: Represents the consumption preferences of the household. Each point 
on the curve represents a different combination or “bundle” of goods that is equally 
preferable to the household as any other set of goods on that same curve.  
8 The derivation of W* and V* is mathematical, and left to other sources (e.g. 
Killingsworth, 1983, “Linearizing the budget constraint”). 
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LIMITATIONS OF THEORY FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND 
PROGRAM DESIGN 
While human capital theorists have been able to provide 
empirical data to corroborate the theory's validity over time, there are 
important tensions when confronted by the realities of empirical 
research. As acknowledged by Becker in later versions of his seminal 
work, the uncertainties mentioned above, as well as societal and 
environmental constraints, often immensely complicate the decision to 
invest in education.  
Assuming that the return to education is the most important 
consideration in the investment decision, as long as the returns 
outweigh the costs, individuals should be investing in education. 
Langelett (2002) concluded that the returns to human capital 
investment unequivocally outweigh the cost.9 Given the exceeding 
return on education, then, the finding that many do not invest in it is 
perplexing from a purely theoretical standpoint. This is the root of the 
conundrum of lower-than-expected consumption of education 
manifested practically in lower-than-expected educational enrollment 
and attainment. 
Becker (1993) divided the factors that influence the consumption 
of education into two sets: those that affect the supply of schooling 
and those that affect the demand for schooling. The supply-side 
variables are the availability and quality of schools. Demand-side 
variables address the issue of individual (dis)incentives to access 
                                   
9 There have been differing opinions over time as to the best particular investment, 
in terms of educational   type and level. 
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available resources. On the demand side, wealth/income, opportunity 
cost, returns to education, and parental preferences influence the 
consumption of education. While different models of educational 
consumption emphasize different aspects, integrated models include 
elements of both demand and supply (Lincove, 2005). Lincove 
provided the following diagram to summarize these influences. 
 




There are a number of costs associated with education, both 
indirect and direct. Direct costs include those items for which one 
might have to make concrete expenditure: tuition in countries without 
universal free education, enrollment costs and other fees, 
transportation, food for lunches, school supplies, uniforms, 
immunizations, etc. Indirect costs, or opportunity costs, particular to 
schooling are wages that could have been earned if working rather 
than at school and time that could have been spent on domestic labor 
or leisure. From an empirical perspective, in order to overcome the 
family’s reluctance to invest in schooling, the cash transfer should take 
                                   
10 Adapted from Lincove, Figure 1: Theoretical model of household decision-making 
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into account the family’s income, the total indirect and direct cost of 
schooling, the child wage rate, and the expected future wage rate due 
to increased schooling.  
Of the possible demand-side factors, Langelett (2002) argued 
that the major factor in making the educational decision is opportunity 
cost. In addition to diverting funds from short-term consumption, 
households must divert funds from longer-term investments, such as 
housing, small businesses or financial markets. In the case of the more 
affluent, the chief issue is whether the expected future return to 
education exceeds the present cost of acquiring it. In the case of the 
less affluent, particularly in developing nations, an added issue is 
whether it is possible to even afford the immediate costs of acquiring 
education.  
Based on these considerations, several explanations have been 
offered to explain underinvestment in education. In addition to the fact 
that individuals and families often lack the necessary funds to attend 
school at all, the costs for schooling are immediate, while the benefits 
occur far in the future. Due to discounting of future benefits, the utility 
of investing in education is often less than that of sending a child to 
work (Becker, 1993; Behrman et al., 2005). Additionally, not all 
schools and training opportunities are created equally, and poor 
quality schools can often discourage investment in education. In both 
developing and developed nations, once an individual has a child, the 
opportunity cost of additional school skyrockets, due to the additional 
cost of feeding and the time required to care for babies. This is 
  27 
obviously an important factor in communities in which children are 
born to young parents. Becker also noted that in economically 
depressed areas, including marginalized communities in wealthy 
countries, lower earning potential due to limited employment 
discourages individuals from investing. This is really a problem of low 
actual return to education. Lastly, educational returns do not 
necessarily accrue to the parents, who are the ones who must make 
the initial investment. 
In addition to low actual returns to education, there is the 
problem of uncertainty in calculating the return. In the third edition of 
the original work on human capital (1993), Becker acknowledged this 
uncertainty and the discrepancy this causes in observed educational 
participation. The uncertainty involved in calculating returns to 
education comes from several factors: uncertainty about length of life 
of any given human being, difficulty an individual has in assessing his 
or her own ability and future earning potential, and the long 
investment period, which makes it difficult to capture real-time data 
on the investment. All of the uncertainty increases the risk of schooling 
(Psacharopolous & Patrinos, 2002), decreasing its desirability in 
comparison to more short-term investments.  
Conditional cash transfers seek to mitigate these difficulties not 
only by increasing income as in the case of unconditioned transfers11, 
                                   
11 In theory, transfers are not needed in order to increase the welfare of a family; a 
family would simply use additional cash according to its own preferences, which 
would increase its overall utility and welfare (Behrman et al, 2005; deBraw and 
Hoddinott, 2007). The conditioned transfer alters preferences in a way deemed 
appropriate by those using them as incentives. 
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but also by lowering the marginal cost of investment in education so 
that parents will choose to do so. While increasing the time spent in 
schooling often bears a cost in terms of lost wages, there is an 
expectation that the higher future earnings will offset the cost and that 
other individual and social benefits make investment worthwhile. In 
the short-term, the conditions attached to receipt of the stipends 
change the families’ preferences in favor of schooling. Additionally, the 
other aspects and conditions of these programs (e.g. nutrition talks to 
mothers, health visits) help make the time spent on schooling more 
productive overall, as well as relative to other activities. 
DeBrauw and Hoddinott (2008) detailed the private and public 
costs and benefits to conditionality. By their account, the public 
purposes of conditioning are to: 1.) allow the government to decide 
which benefits citizens spend money on, as when it is thought that 
people will not choose as wisely themselves as the government would 
choose for them; 2.) overcome information asymmetries in the public; 
and 3.) more quickly achieve the positive outcomes that are important 
for public embrace of a program. From the standpoint of the individual 
households, conditionality: 1.) helps to limit the disagreements within 
the household over how to allocate the additional resources; 2.) 
lessens the stigma attached to welfare; and 3.) prevents households 
from trading off future well-being for current consumption.  
Distribution of funds and pooling of resources 
In recent years, debate has arisen with regard to the ‘pooling’ of 
resources, or extent to which individual members contribute resources 
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to the household as a whole. Under the more historically common 
unitary model of the household, which formed the basis of Becker’s 
analysis, each individual shares the same preferences as all others. 
Thus, regardless of to whom additional income is given, it will have the 
same effect. Evidence has shown this not to be the case in many 
situations, however (Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman, 1997; Lincove, 
2006, Schady & Rosero, 2007). This is not a purely academic concern 
in the case of CCTs. Evidence that the recipient does matter in the 
spending of additional income has had practical effects on the design 
of the CCTs discussed in this paper. In particular, numerous studies 
have shown that income earned or given directly to women is much 
more likely to be spent in such a way as to increase the welfare of all 
family members, especially children, than is money earned or given to 
men (e.g. Schulz, 2001; Duflo, 2000; Haddad, 1999).   
Another problem that human capital theory poses for program 
implementation is low investment in girls’ education. Two major 
reasons for this are: 1.) lower expected return on girls’ education, 
since women typically earn less than men do and 2.) that typically 
once a woman is married, the benefits of her education are thought to 
be passed on to her new family and the family of the husband 
(Skoufuas, 2001). In other words, since often the benefits of education 
for females are passed off to the families into which they marry, 
families have less interest in investing in their education. Though 
actually rational in many contexts and so not really a limitation of the 
theory itself, the common bias against girls poses problems for equity 
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as well as for long-term growth. To counter the bias, many countries 
that exhibit a historical under-investment in girls’ education have 
made policy modifications to increase the incentives for parents to 
send their girls to school. In the case of CCTs this has usually taken 
the form of awarding families higher benefits for girls enrolled in 
school. From a human capital perspective, this helps to give families 
some of the benefits upfront to offset the later loss. 
As mentioned, a related assumption of Becker's original 
formulation was that the head of the household, be it male or female, 
would distribute funds efficiently and equitably to the other members 
of the household. Sen (1990) detailed the fallacy in this assumption. 
From a theoretical perspective, various researchers have reviewed how 
cash transfer programs address or do not address the problem. The 
increased stipend for girls is one way of ensuring that families do not 
sacrifice education of girls for the education of boys, but does not 
ensure equity in the way that the money itself is spent. Lincove (2006) 
and Skoufias (2001) have both suggested that giving the money to the 
household might itself be problematic. Even if more cash is given for 
female enrollment, the cash itself might be redistributed to benefit 
other members disproportionately.   
Political acceptability and affordability  
In addition to issues of resource distribution within households, 
there are issues of the feasibility of program implementation. First, the 
implementation of cash transfer programs can involve costs that are 
not immediately apparent (Farrington and Slater, 2006), the cash 
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transfer, the resultant price increase due to increased demand, and 
the need for investment in infrastructure and services target including 
increased demand for whatever good or service. Increasing demand 
can be an especially pressing problem in the public sector, because the 
public domain is often slow to adapt.   
Farrington and Slater (2006) also presented examples of political 
and institutional challenges to shifting from in-kind transfers to cash 
transfers in countries that have previously relied on the former: 
strength of labor unions or sectoral resistance to the removal of 
subsidies (e.g. agriculture) and the relative inexperience of district 
level government in distributing cash versus goods. Lastly, public 
perception of the various policy alternatives plays a huge role in 
determining what is and is not feasible. Farrington and Slater, as well 
as others (e.g. Moore, 2009; de Sa e Silva, 2008) have argued that 
this last factor has been overlooked in studies of cash transfers. In 
particular, there is often a stigma associated with governmental 
handouts in developing countries just as in developed. Placing 
conditions on cash transfers is one way of minimizing public resistance 
to them and maximizing the social benefit from them. 
IMPLEMENTATION IN MEXICO AND BRAZIL: HISTORY AND 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM FIRST MAJOR CONDITIONAL CASH 
TRANSFER PROGRAMS 
It is evident how important the return to education is for the 
individual decision to invest in education. It is equally important from a 
policy standpoint, however, in which societies seek to leverage 
incentives to promote socially and economically advantageous 
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behaviors on a grand scale. In order for incentives to achieve the 
desired outcome they have to be carefully designed to respond to the 
body of research summarized above regarding costs and returns, and 
with careful attention to issues of access and equity. In this section, 
the origins and elements of two of the first major CCT programs will be 
described. This will be followed by a summary of research on them. 
 
The first major conditional cash transfer program: Brazil, Bolsa 
Familia 
The first comprehensive conditional cash transfer program was 
developed in Brazil, beginning in 1995. Brazil is a middle-income 
country (UNDP, 2007) with a wealth of natural resources and strong 
democratic institutions. However, there are large disparities in the 
distribution of wealth based on geography, race, and gender. In 2007, 
the wealthiest 1% of the population held the same amount of income 
as the poorest 50% (UNDP, 2007). Forty-four percent of the 
population is made up of African- descendent people, the majority of 
whom are concentrated in the poverty-stricken northeastern region. As 
reflected in the country comparison tables, there is almost a seven-
year difference between the educational attainment of the very 
poorest and the very richest (deFerranti et al., 2004). 
Although several impact evaluations exist on the Bolsa Familia, 
or “Family Purse” program, there is less documentation on the 
historical and policy-related events influencing its creation. Lindert et 
al (2007) provided a rationale for the formation of the program, as 
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well as its major components. The ideological foundation for this 
program was provided in the 1980 Brazilian Constitution, which 
included social assistance as a right for the needy. The concept was 
actualized through debates in the late 1980s and early 1990s around 
the realization that strategic initiatives needed to look past low current 
incomes to the underlying structural causes of poverty. Policy-makers 
began to realize the need to break the cycle of poverty passed from 
generation to generation. Legislative policy actions of the 1990s 
formalized social assistance, set a minimum income, and established 
cash transfers to counter demand-side constraints to accessing 
education and health facilities. 
The Bolsa Familia is actually a conglomeration of several 
previous Brazilian CCTs, implemented at the municipality level and 
originally funded out of municipal- level budgets. In 1995, the first two 
CCTs were formed to serve the capitol city: the Guaranteed Minimum 
Family Income Program and the Bolsa Escola. The latter is the more 
well known of the two and focused on increasing school enrollment. 
Each of these programs possessed the key characteristics of the 
programs that have followed them: they were targeted to the poorest 
of the poor through some mechanism of selection; they paid cash to 
families; and the receipt of funds was conditioned. In addition to these 
programs, several others were instituted; of which some added other 
conditions such as adult participation in community meetings and 
seminars, or literacy programs. 
  34 
The established CCTs were considered an early success (Lindert 
et al, 2007), to the extent that the Mexican government sent a 
delegation to Brazil, and then launched its own major program, 
Progresa in 1997. Also due to the success of the municipality-wide 
programs, the federal government began to take greater interest in 
them, and even to co-finance them, beginning in 1998. Then-President 
Cardoso created a program within the Ministry of Education to provide 
money to municipalities that had educational conditional cash transfer 
programs but not enough resources to sustain them. 
The year 2001 saw the introduction of the first Brazilian federal 
conditional cash transfer program, when President Cardoso scaled up 
the municipal Bolsa Escola project to the federal level and placed it 
under the management of the Ministry of Education. Under the federal 
program, families with monthly per capita incomes less than 90 pesos 
(or half of minimum wage) and children between the ages of 6 and 15 
received 15 pesos a month12, provided that the enrolled children 
maintained an attendance rate of at least 85%. 
Launched in the same year as the federal Bolsa Escola, another 
program, managed by the Ministry of Health was launched. Called 
Bolsa Alimentaçao, the major purpose of this program was to combat 
poor nutrition. While the target population for the Bolsa Alimentaçao 
was slightly different, serving lactating and pregnant women and 
young children, it served as somewhat of a sister program to the Bolsa 
Escola. The income requirements were the same, as were the 
                                   
12 Represents 1/6 of monthly income; thus, families received a 16.7% increase in 
income per month. 
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monetary benefits. Families were eligible for the BA until the child 
reached age 7, at which point the family would be considered for the 
school program instead. 
By 2003, the need and desire to unite some of the many social 
programs was clear. Under President Lula, generally considered a 
strong advocate of strengthening social welfare (Lindert et al, 2007), a 
flagship umbrella program known as Fome Zero (zero hunger) was 
created, combining over 60 programs in many ministries. This also 
marked the beginning of the consolidation of the Bolsa programs into 
one Bolsa Familia. Reform of the programs proceeded through 
discussion between World Bank president Wolfensohn, President Lula 
and a key member of the Progresa program in Mexico, which had since 
its inception become the most famous and well-respected cash 
transfer program. The year following the creation of Bolsa Familia, a 
coordinated ministry was created to facilitate the program: the 
Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Eradication. This ministry 
was and remains in charge of maintaining the household registry used 
to identify target households, the Cadastro Único. By combining 
educational, nutritional and health initiatives into one program, the 
Bolsa Familia is able to serve the whole child (Lindert et al), or from 
the human capital perspective, to encourage investment in several 
areas of human capital development at once. The early goals of the 
program were: 
To fight hunger, poverty and inequality through cash transfers 
associated with access to basic social rights and promote social 
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inclusion, contributing to the emancipation of beneficiary 
families, giving them the means and conditions to leave poverty. 
The Bolsa Familia benefit structure, like many, favored women of 
the household where possible. Approximately 93% of the recipients in 
2005 were women. Most of the original recipients were located in the 
northeastern or southeastern part of the country (Lindert et al., 2007), 
where poverty concentration is highest. One characteristic that sets 
Brazil apart from the other countries studied in this dissertation is the 
high proportion of people living in cities, and the concentration of 
poverty in urban slums. While these can be found also in Colombia, 
the focus of the other programs discussed in this dissertation was on 
the rural poor, as it is rural dwellers that make up the largest 
proportion of the impoverished in those countries. 
 
Table 1 
























1 15 13-25% $ 4.27 $3.68 
2 30 50% $ 8.54 $7.35 




3 or more 45 75% $12.81 $11.03 
0   5015 83% $14.23 $12.25 
1 65 108% $18.50 $15.93 
2 80 133% $22.77 $19.60 
Extreme 
poor 
< R$ 60 
(< US$ 
17) 
3 or more 95 158% $27.04 $23.28 
Source: Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Eradication, Brazil, 2006 
  
                                   
13 Exchange rate in 2003 was 3.513 reales/$1.00. Source: Federal Reserve. 
14 2003 inflation adjuster = 0.861 
15  Represents the “base” amount for families in extreme poverty.  . This is received 
regardless of family composition.  . Variable benefits are added in R$ 15 increments. 
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The conditions attached to remaining in the program were: 
enrollment for primary school aged children (ages 6 to 15); daily 
school attendance of 85%; and a number of health conditionalities 
including completion of vaccines, regular health checkups and growth 
monitoring for children under seven, and checkups for pregnant 
women (Lindert et al.,  2007). Unlike previous programs, failure of any 
child or mother to meet the appropriate conditions could result in 
disqualification, whether or not benefits were tied directly to that child.  
Mexico: Progresa/Oportunidades 
As with the other countries addressed in this paper, Mexico is 
highly stratified in terms of wealth. Although it is an OECD16 country 
and classified as a middle-income nation by the World Bank, about 
50% of the population lives in poverty (World Bank, 2009), a majority 
of these concentrated in rural locations, and many indigenous in 
ethnicity.17 Average schooling in the lowest wealth quintile is 3.5 
years, while in the highest it is 11 years (de Ferranti et. al, 2004). 
Approximately half of the population earns a majority of income 
through the informal sector, so social protection that is tied to the 
formal economy does not find its way to these workers. Another 
implication of the prevalence of informal work is that the government’s 
ability to collect tax on income is greatly limited.  
Officially named Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación, 
Progresa originally targeted the rural poor, but has since been 
                                   
16 OrganisationOrganization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
17 44% of indigenous are in the lowest income quintile (Molyneux, 2006;, Skoufias, 
2005; Adato, 2000). 
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extended to urban areas. As in the case of Brazil, Mexico has not had a 
history of strong support for universal welfare, or development of 
systems to provide it (Molyneux, 2006). However, state support for 
selected services has been provided since the late nineteenth century. 
By the 1960s, fueled largely by the emerging acceptance of human 
capital theory, health and education were funded by the public sector, 
but with great inequality between regions and socio-economic classes 
(Molyneux).  
The economic shocks of the 1980s revealed the tenuous nature 
of social welfare throughout Latin America. As in other Latin American 
countries, Mexico embarked on a program of structural reform: 
decentralization and privatization of social service and social benefits 
such as pensions (e.g. Molyneux, 2006; Arnove, 1986) that ultimately 
only widened the disparities between the marginalized and non-
marginalized members of Mexican society. In turning toward a new 
paradigm in addressing poverty in the late-1980s and early 1990s, the 
state embraced the concept that while welfare remained a necessity of 
government, there must be greater participation on the part of 
beneficiaries themselves, to decrease the dependency on the state. 
This allowed and required a greater role for the family, a greater role 
for the economic market itself, as well as non-governmental and 
community institutions. 
President Vicente Fox, elected in 2000 from the National Action 
Party (Partido de Accion Nacional, PAN) was the first president in 71 
years to defeat the Partido Revoucionario Institucional (PRI), and 
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made it a key component of his platform to provide greater relief to 
the poor. Progresa was the major program created to fulfill this 
mission. Expanded and renamed Oportunidades in 2002, this program 
has received greatest acclaim and achieved greatest apparent success 
to date of all conditional cash transfer programs. Most of the smaller 
programs created throughout Latin America have replicated to some 
extent the design of Oportunidades.  
Particularly important, Progresa was designed with evaluation in 
mind. Program designers took advantage of phased implementation to 
allow a randomized experiment of the program outcomes (Skoufias, 
2001). Further enhancing the credibility of evaluation, the project was 
contracted to a source external to the government, the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Also important to the success 
of Progresa has been the strong presidential buy-in, collaboration 
among the ministries involved, and a steady source of funding, both 
governmental and supplemented by loans through the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank.  
The IFPRI was charged with conducting quantitative and 
qualitative impact evaluations in Mexico, in seven states that were 
among the first states to receive the program: Guerrero, Hidalgo, 
Michoacan, Puebla, Queretaro San Luis Potosi, and Veracruz. The 
evaluation sample included a total of 24,000 households from 506 
localities, interviewed between November 1997 and November 1999 
using a survey created specifically for the purpose: Encuesta de 
Caracteristicas Socioeconomicas de los Hogares (ENCASEH). It was 
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from this survey that the eligibility status of households was 
determined. A follow-up evaluation survey Encuesta Evaluation de los 
Hogares (ENCEL) took place in March 1998, still before any benefits 
were distributed. These two surveys provided the baseline for 
evaluation. These in conjunction with repeated observations of the 
same households resulted in a comprehensive panel data set 
(Skoufias, 2001).  
The evaluation framework was a quasi-experimental design with 
randomization of localities rather than households or individuals. Of 
the 506 localities used in the evaluation, 328 were assigned to the 
treatment group - randomly selected using probabilities proportional to 
their size from a possible universe of 4,546 localities in the seven 
states - and 186 were assigned to the control group by the same 
manner. For any outcome variables for which there were observations 
made both before and after the implementation of the program, all of 
the major impact evaluations have used the difference-in-difference 
estimator to measure program impacts (Skoufias, 2001). In addition 
to the external evaluations, the resultant databases were analyzed by 
Mexican academics at Iberoamericana University and the Centro de 
Investigaciones y Docencia Economicas CIDE (Escobar, 2005), a 
research institution. 
In remaining true to the call for greater responsibility of 
beneficiaries, a key component of Progresa/Oportunidades, as stated 
in their official documentation (Molyneux, 2006; Oportunidades 
program documents), is co-responsibility, formalized through a quasi-
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contractual understanding that, in return for the entitlements proffered 
by the programme, certain obligations are to be discharged by the two 
parties, that is, the programme and the participating mother. This 
conditional form of entitlement, although well established in other 
regions, and originating in the United States, has a more recent 
presence in Latin America, but is now being widely adopted. 
(Molyneux, 434) 
The major conditions attached to the transfers are similar to 
those of the Brazilian program, with the addition of a requirement to 
provide a certain number of hours of community service.  
By 2000, the program operated in almost 50,000 localities and 
provided benefits to 2.6 million families. The relative amount of the 
stipend is 22% of monthly income, in total about 275 pesos per family 
per year. Girls receive a higher stipend for participation in secondary 
school (US$24 for boys and US$28 for girls). As with the other 
programs, because this is a demand-side initiative, it is necessary that 
participant communities be able to offer educational and health 
facilities to their beneficiaries. The budget for the program in late 1999 
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Table 2 













Educational grant per 
child 
     
3rd Grade 65 $8 $6.12 70 
4th 75 $9 $6.89 80 
5th 95 $12 $9.18 100 
Primary 
6th 130 $16 $12.24 135 
1st male 190 $23 $17.60  200 
2nd male 200 $24 $18.36 210 
3rd male 210 $26 $19.89 220 
1st female 200 $24 $18.36 210 
2nd female 220 $27 $20.66 235 
 Secondary 
3rd female 240 $29 $22.19 255 
Grant for school 
materials per child 
Primary-
September 
- - - In-kind 
 Primary-January 40 $5 $3.83 - 
 Secondary-
September 
- - - 170 
Grant for 
consumption of food 
per household 
 95 $12 $9.18 100 
Maximum grant per 
household 
 585 $71 $54.32 625 
Source: D. Hernandez, J. Gomez de Leon, 1999 and, as reproduced in Skoufias, 2001 
 
 
Health provision comes through the Mexican government, in 
particular the Ministry of Health and the IMSS-Solidaridad, which 
provides welfare to the uninsured. A promotora (health promoter) is 
assigned to each community to provide information and explain the 
program requirements and schedules to beneficiaries. Nutrition talks 
are held within each community, at local clinics or other locations. A 
food stipend of $11/month is provided for children less than 2 years of 
age, as well as to pregnant and lactating mothers, to ensure proper 
                                   
18 1998 inflation adjuster: 0.765. 
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nutrition of their babies. Compliance with the conditions is monitored 
at the school and clinic levels.  
As summarized by Skoufias (2001), some of the distinct program 
elements inspired by human capital theory important in achieving the 
aims of Progresa were: the higher stipend for girls in secondary 
school, the increase in the size of the grant through grades, and the 
adjustment of the nominal value of the educational cash to account for 
changes in the cost of living. 
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH IN MEXICO AND BRAZIL 
The Mexican CCT program has been the most thoroughly 
researched, but some researchers have done studies using the data of 
other programs or summarizing literature on all of the programs. This 
section provides a summary of the major themes in CCT research, 
beginning with the impact evaluation of Oportunidades.  
Direct Effects on Schooling  
At the level of localities as well as at the individual level, the 
evaluation team found that in all cases, Progresa had a positive effect 
on enrollment, irrespective of gender or level of schooling (Skoufias, 
2001). Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2002) showed that participation 
in the program was associated with earlier school entry, lesser 
repetition, lower dropout rates, and higher school reentry rates among 
dropouts. Coady (2000), however, found that program impacts on 
school dropout were not sustainable over time: specifically, dropouts 
who reentered school were more likely to drop out again after a year. 
This finding corroborates data indicating that much of the positive 
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impact on enrollment has been due to increasing continuation rates 
rather than reincorporating dropouts (Skoufias, 2001). 
As far as longer-term effects, Behrman, Parker and Todd (2005) 
conducted a study five years after the benefits started for Progresa 
recipients. Their focus was on those aged 9-15 in 1997, so 15-21 in 
2003. Using household surveys, they performed regressions to assess 
program effect on enrollment in the medium term. They also assessed 
achievement differences using Woodcock-Johnson tests in 2003 only. 
They found differences of about 1/5 of a grade at that time, but did 
not find any significant impact of program enrollment on achievement. 
As a possible reason for the disjunction between increased enrollment 
and achievement, the researchers suggested that lower school quality 
could be a factor, or even decreased quality as a result of the 
increased enrollment through the program.   
Escobar (2005) provided both a retrospective and prospective 
look at the program. With regard to schooling outcomes, the success 
of the program in increasing enrollment was reiterated especially for 
primary school, with enrollments nearing 100%. However, at that 
time, secondary school enrollment still hovered around 70%. The 
author suggested that there would be no further gains made in 
primary school  and that even in secondary school, 70% might 
represent a structural limit on enrollment.  
Qualitative research has also been conducted largely by IFPRI. In 
order to evaluate the educational component of the program, Adato, 
Coady and Ruel (2000) interviewed both school directors and 
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beneficiaries. School directors confirmed that the program had 
increased school enrollments, especially at the secondary level. In fact, 
as noted by Escobar, qualitative evaluation revealed that the teachers 
in secondary schools had become concerned about space limitations, 
as well as the availability of resources and educational quality.  
School directors agreed overall that the program had resulted in 
improved attitudes towards schooling among students and parents, 
including families allowing more time for their children to complete 
homework. They noted that students were still required to do their fair 
share of housework and labor both on weekends and during the 
growing season in agricultural areas, but those parental expectations 
had shifted to allow for their children's schooling. At the secondary 
level, Adato, Coady and Ruel (2000) found that lack of interest in 
schooling, especially compared to the prospect of making money, still 
remained an important factor behind non-attendance and dropping 
out. Among older girls, safety transport to and from school was also a 
major issue. Lastly, qualitative researchers (Escobar, 2005) found 
evidence that parental educational expectations rose in communities 
that had the program, both among participants and nonparticipants. 
Indirect Effects: Non-Enrollment Outcomes 
Although school quality and student performance have not been 
major foci of conditional cash transfer evaluations and the data does 
not reflect many school quality variables, qualitative researchers have 
recognized that school quality most likely does have an effect on 
enrollment, as well is on the returns to education. Like Behrman, 
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Parker and Todd (2005), Escobar (2005) found that most teachers 
believed student performance not to have changed as a result of 
Progresa, or to have fallen as a result of the influx of new students, 
many of whom were less self-motivated than those who had previously 
attended. However, Escobar found that some teachers believed that 
the attendance requirements of the program had led to improved 
performance merely through greater attendance of the students.  
Perhaps one of the greatest successes outside of the major 
intended goals has been the inclusion of groups traditionally thought to 
be unimportant, especially women and children. Women were 
empowered not only through receipt of the benefit, but also in that in 
some countries, notably Mexico and Colombia, the primary leadership 
role of liaison between the communities and the administration was 
reserved for a woman of the communities’ choosing (de la Briere and 
Rawlings, 2006). This innovation has been especially revolutionary in 
indigenous communities, which had lagged behind other communities 
in acceptance of women's rights. As noted by deBrauw and Hoddinott 
(2008), de la Briere and Rawlings cited the increase in productive 
activity as a result of the transfers, with investment of approximately 
25% of the transfers in enterprise activities. Much of this investment 
was undertaken by the women themselves. Molyneux (2006) 
suggested that having greater control over cash gave women greater 
standing not only within their households, but also within the 
community at large. 
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Another positive though not specifically targeted outcome 
revealed by interviews was that the women participating in the 
program developed new forms of social capital (Adato, 2000). The 
opportunity to connect with other women through the required 
meetings and talks allowed for information sharing and the creation of 
a support system.  
Implementation 
In addition to the evaluation of impact, research has been done 
on the design and implementation of conditional cash transfer 
programs. Many researchers have questioned the merits of 
conditioning cash transfers versus simply providing transfers to be 
used at the discretion of families. While the additional conditions 
attached to conditional cash transfers can be expected to mold 
recipient behavior, cash transfers still provide a greater level of choice 
and decision-making to those who receive them than do in-kind 
transfers (e.g. of food, fertilizer, or medicine), voucher programs in 
which money is to be used solely for school enrollment or scholarships 
predicated on the acceptance and continued enrollment of an 
individual in order to make use of the benefit. Despite the conditions 
that participants must follow to receive funds, the specific use of the 
cash itself is not fully stipulated. Families have the discretion to use it 
as they see fit.  
DeBrauw and Hoddinott (2008) studied the effect of conditioning 
on school enrollment in an effort to isolate what parts of CCTs have led 
to their success. Using households and schools that failed to receive 
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the forms necessary for monitoring enrollment and attendance as 
cases for non-conditioning, they found that the absence of 
conditionality does decrease enrollment, particularly in the transition 
from primary to lower secondary school. Similarly, Behrman, Segupta 
and Todd (2005) demonstrated quite a large increase in enrollment 
due to the conditionality of the Oportunidades program using Markov 
transition analysis. Additionally, deJanvry and Sadoulet (2005) and 
Das, Do and Ozler (2005) found that conditionality helped to 
internalize the positive externalities of child education, health, and 
nutrition. 
Another prevalent implementation issue that has received 
attention is the targeting and selection of beneficiaries and the 
exclusion of others from the program. Targeting has been carried out 
by the central government, often in ways that are not transparent to 
the recipient communities, and has at times led to tensions within 
those communities. This is especially apparent in those programs that 
have targeted at the household level, such that some families within 
each community were recipients and some families were not. Adato 
found that a majority of community members lamented the exclusion 
of so many from the program’s benefits. It was common for people to 
express that “we are all poor here” and that the selection of some and 
exclusion of others did not seem just. Researchers have agreed that 
the explanation of the targeting process was not sufficient; many living 
in communities believed the selection either unjust or due merely to 
luck. Where considered unjust, as might be expected, the selection 
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process often led to resentment. Three quarters of the doctors 
interviewed indicated that their communities suffered from this sort of 
tension, though one quarter of those said that the tension was not 
serious. The most common ways of manifesting it was that non-
beneficiaries resisted participation in community activities. Adato 
highlighted the importance of the role of locally-elected facilitators 
called promotoras and doctors in managing the relationship between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, in particular by welcoming 
beneficiaries to informational meetings where possible and stressing 
that maintenance activities such as community cleanups are not only 
for beneficiaries.  
Adato, Coady and Ruel (2000) expanded upon the previous 
research of Adato (2000) by looking at the effects of the above 
perceptions on the actual functioning of the Oportunidades program. 
They confirmed that from the participants' perspectives, the aspect of 
the program most worthy of critique was the targeting process and 
identified more specific issues with it. The first major issue was with 
the survey method that identified impoverished households. 
Interviewees complained that sometimes if the family was not home 
when the census teams came around, they never returned, thereby 
eliminating the households from consideration of the benefit. 
Secondly, in indigenous communities in particular where different 
languages are often spoken, it was a common complaint that survey 
collectors did not speak local dialects well enough to make an accurate 
assessment of household means. Interviewees also presented a 
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number of reasons why families might not represent their 
circumstances completely accurately: general fear or distrust of 
authorities; weariness in responding to authorities inquiries with little 
benefit; or shame at representing their poverty in its actual depth. 
While doctors and school directors did not share the belief that 
all of the residents of communities were equally poor, they did agree 
that the selection process needed to be improved to ensure that the 
correct households were selected. They also agreed that there is a dire 
need to improve communication between different sectors of the 
program, especially regarding the selection process. There was also 
some evidence that beneficiaries needed greater guidance with regard 
to the conditions required to maintain program eligibility (Adato, 
Coady and Ruel, 2000). 
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Table 3 
Program comparison, Brazil and Mexico 
 Mexico Oportunidades/PROGRESA Brazil Bolsa Familia 
Goal(s) Improve the conditions of 
education, health and nutrition of 
poor families, particularly children 
and their mothers by providing: 
Sufficient quality services in the 
areas of education and health, 
Monetary assistance and 
Nutritional supplements 
• To fight hunger, poverty 
and inequality through cash 
transfers associated with 
access to basic social rights 
• To promote social inclusion, 
contributing to the 
emancipation of beneficiary 
families, giving them the 
means and conditions to 
leave poverty. 
Pilot Year 1997 2003 
Financing World Bank & Mexican government Brazilian government  
 
Total Amount of 
Funds 
 
$700 million (1999) 
 
$3.2 billion (2005) 
Target Treatment 
Population 
Localities and individual 
households high in poverty 
Per capita monthly income 
≤US $48 
 





Maximum Amount of 
stipend 
US $52 per month 
 
US $45 per month 
Recipients of Funds Mothers Mothers  
 
Number of Recipients 
 
2.6 million families (in 2000) 
 
 
3.8 million families (in 2003, 





Basic package of primary health 
care services 
Vaccinations, regular health 
checkups, growth monitoring 
 
Stipend Delivery Monthly by wire transfer Bimonthly via banking 
system, through special 
agencies, using electronic 
benefits cards 
Educational Stipend • Higher stipend for girls in 
secondary school 
• $US 7 in primary school 
• $US24 for boys and $US28 for   
girls in secondary school 
No educational stipend per se; 
benefits given by poverty 
level, but is conditioned on 
school enrollment and 
attendance 
 
Level of schooling 
covered 
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CHAPTER 3:  METHODOLOGY 
 
This section provides methodological information common to 
both the Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social (RPS) and Colombian 
Familias en Acción programs. Specifics about the data sets, 
participants and analysis pertaining to each country can be found in 
the following two chapters. For Colombia, data is also available 
concerning school level conditions; this information is not available in 
the Nicaraguan case.  
JUSTIFICATION FOR CHOSEN METHODOLOGY 
The current study is a quantitative comparative analysis of the 
conditional cash transfer program in two countries. The analysis is 
based on secondary data available to the public, collected as part of 
the evaluation efforts by external contractors to each program. Both 
the Colombian and Nicaraguan data sets contain extensive panel data 
based on individual and household survey information. The surveys 
contained a range of questions covering personal, educational, income, 
consumption, and health information.  
Quantitative analysis is used to create an objective test of 
hypotheses, and to collect enough observations to develop confidence 
that the test is valid. A good quantitative analysis should be able to 
determine 1.) whether a hypothesis is true within a given situation 
(internal validity) and whether it can be thought to apply to other 
situations (generalizability or external validity) (Mertens, 1998). What 
is most of interest in the current study are the overall outcomes across 
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control and treatment groups, rather than individual experiences or 
the process leading to the outcomes, questions that would be more 
appropriately determined through qualitative means. Given the 
complexity and size of conditional cash transfer programs, determining 
whether outcomes such as increased enrollment are due to the 
program or not and what factors contribute to that outcome would be 
very difficult to isolate without using quantitative means. 
The comparative element of the current study is relatively 
unique. Given the time- intensive nature of gathering and evaluating 
the data, most statistical studies of CCTs to date have been limited to 
major impact evaluations within one country (Duflo & Kremer, 2003). 
Although multifaceted within the country of focus, these do not 
address specifically the differences in program design and outcomes 
across more than one context. Looking at the data from more than one 
country, using similar variables and the same theoretical model, allows 
for an in-depth analysis of each, but still provides a comparative lens. 
One can determine which variables perform similarly and which do not. 
The quantitative and comparative approaches can be complementary: 
as the chief benefit of research is generalizability, a chief benefit of 
comparative research is the potential to universalize (Lijphart, 1971).  
The quantitative comparative approach provides a unique 
opportunity for theory building. Identifying the variables in which the 
two countries differ, either in terms of outcomes or in the independent 
variables influencing them, and then looking carefully at the social, 
historical or political differences between the two countries allows for 
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the posing of new questions and operationalization of new variables 
around those differences. This study, with N=2, is only a start to the 
process, but is a valuable foundation for future work applying 
theoretical models across already-available data. 
DESCRIPTION OF DATA SETS 
The data in Nicaragua and Colombia were both fashioned after 
the same overall model, and so were very similar in design and 
information collected. The data were collected via household survey, a 
method very common within other research designs (Mertens, 1998). 
Survey data is extremely valuable in communities where more 
formalized data sources do not exist and where attitudes and 
preferences are an important part of the data collection, but does pose 
some risk. Because surveys rely on self- reporting by individuals, 
rather than on observed behavior by researchers, the validity is 
affected by the accuracy of respondents’ memory and knowledge as 
well as their forthrightness in answering questions (Mertens). Issues 
that might be particularly exaggerated in poor communities would be 
distortion in responses due to shame or fear of answering truthfully19 
and low educational attainment. 
Both the Nicaraguan and Colombian evaluators used a panel 
survey design. Data were collected on the same households and 
individuals over a number of years. This allowed the collection of 
several observations for a large number of cases. For each country, 
                                   
19 Especially in questions related to income, employment or  types of goods the 
family possesses. 
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three surveys were conducted, consisting of a baseline survey and two 
follow-ups. The importance of the baseline survey was twofold. First, it 
established the context in which the programs were being 
implemented. This was especially important in Colombia, as there was 
no detailed database previously available for the communities targeted 
by the program (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2003). Second, it allowed 
for determination of differences between the control and treatment 
groups. This was again more important in the Colombian case, as will 
be described below. The three surveys were spread over two years in 
Nicaragua and three years in Colombia. The second follow-up survey 
was used for each in the current study; thus, the program had run for 
one extra year in Colombia at the time analyzed. 
Survey data was collected door to door. In the poor, rural 
contexts in which the surveys were carried out, it is likely that door-to-
door interviewing was the only option for reaching a majority of 
households. Within developed contexts, while it takes more resources 
to collect data this way, it is in any case commonly thought to produce 
a higher response rate than mail or telephone (Mertens, 1998). In 
Nicaragua, 1,764 households were interviewed, and in Colombia, 
19,007 households were interviewed. Both surveys contained 
household-level information gathered from the household head only, 
as well as more detailed information separated into modules or 
sections for children below and individuals above the age of seven. 
Parents were asked to report data for children below seven, but 
individuals above seven responded for themselves.   
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In any impact evaluation, the central challenge is to identify a 
comparison group with similar enough characteristics to the treatment 
group that differences between the groups after the intervention can 
be attributed to the program (e.g. Duflo & Kremer, 2003). It is in the 
selection of treatment and control groups that the greatest difference 
between the data for Nicaragua and Colombia lies. For the Nicaraguan 
RPS, program implementation allowed for a randomized quasi-
experiment, with the control and treatment populations having similar 
characteristics, but receiving benefits at different times. In the realm 
of social policy, a quasi-experiment is generally the closest one can 
come to a natural laboratory-like experiment. Randomization allows 
for greater confidence in measuring program impact as it eliminates 
selection bias, which is the threat that pre-treatment differences exist 
between the two groups (Mertens, 1998). Any ethical dilemma posed 
by withholding benefits from a group that needs them in order to 
conduct a randomized trial were overcome by the fact that constraint 
in monetary resources required the program to be phased in by the 
government. The control group consisted of households that were 
eligible to receive program benefits, but would receive program 
benefits at a later time. 
In the case of Familias en Accion, data collection began at such a 
time as to preclude such clean experimentation (Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, 2004). In order to complete the data set, evaluators had to 
create counterfactuals through propensity score matching. The publicly 
available data set already had treatment and control groups assigned 
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via this method. In propensity score matching, the probability of being 
in the treatment group is predicted based on a number of observable 
characteristics. A comparison group is then created by selecting people 
with the same probability of being treated based on their observable 
characteristics. In this case, evaluators chose 50 treatment 
municipality sampling units from the universe of treatment 
municipalities. They then matched those with 50 municipalities similar 
to the treatment municipalities in terms of population size and quality 
of life that were not receiving the program.20 According to the 
researchers, the most common difference between these municipalities 
and treatment municipalities was the lack of a bank or possession of 
slightly more than 100,000 inhabitants. Within the treatment 
households, the evaluators selected a sample for the evaluation using 
a stratified random sampling method, and used propensity score 
matching to select control households out of the control municipalities. 
At baseline, four types of individuals were established: the 
“tratamiento con pago” (treatment with pay) group, the “tratamiento 
sin pago” (treatment without pay) group, and the corresponding 
controls. The difference between treatment with pay and treatment 
without pay is that the former had already begun receiving subsidies 
before the baseline measurement was taken. All individuals in the 
treatment and control groups had been previously classified 
                                   
20 In a small number of cases, the evaluators groups to municipalities together to 
form one “primary sampling unit”..” Thus, the 50 PSUs actually comprised 57 
treatment municipalities and 65 control municipalities 
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SISBEN1.21  The major drawback to propensity score matching, as 
with other econometric techniques that seek to compensate for 
nonrandomized samples, is the possibility that some variable is 
overlooked that actually does affect the dependent variable. These 
specification errors are found in many estimation techniques (LaLonde, 
1986; Duflo & Kremer, 2003).  
The major limitations of both randomized and nonrandom 
evaluations are sample selection bias, differential attrition rates 
between treatment and control groups and spillover effects between 
treatment and control groups that can minimize the observed impact. 
Since selection in Nicaragua was random, we do not expect selection 
bias, however it is always the possibility that even though selection is 
random, actual participation may not be (Duflo & Kremer, 2003). In 
Colombia, again, the matching technique attempted to overcome this 
possible bias. T-tests and chi-square tests were used for each country 
to determine whether and how selection might have created 
differences between the two groups at baseline. Differential attrition 
and spillover effects are discussed more in depth in the following 
chapters. 
                                   
21 The individuals eligible for this program were identified by the government via the 
central informational source for distributing benefits, SISBEN. The most 
impoverished group of people (the lowest 20% in terms of income and other 
indicators) are classified as SISBEN I. 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.  What has been the effect of the Nicaraguan and Colombian 
CCT programs on schooling outcomes (enrollment, attendance, 
retention and expectations) for individual children?  
2.  What has been the effect of the Nicaraguan and Colombian 
CCT programs on aggregate schooling outcomes (enrollment, 
attendance, retention and expectations) in participant communities?  
MODEL SPECIFICATION AND VARIABLE SELECTION 
As described in chapter 2, conditional cash transfer programs 
address the demand- side constraints to education. The variables of 
interest were chosen to reflect these major constraints. Table 4, 
located at the end of the chapter, summarizes the variables most 
commonly used to reflect these aspects of human capital theory, as 
well as the variables within each data set that are most suitable for 
use. School achievement is ultimately of concern to the researcher, 
but there is no achievement test data corresponding to the survey 
data gathered for these programs.  
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables selected to correspond with the 
research questions were the educational variables enrollment, 
absenteeism and retention. These were all identified by creators of the 
program as outcomes to be targeted. School expectations were also 
measured to determine if any attitudinal shift could be observed and 
attributed to the programs. Extending the range of desired schooling 
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would be one way in which the programs could have an effect lasting 
beyond the actual disbursement of funds. It is thus here considered 
one possible measure of the sustainability of human capital 
investment. 
Each of these variables was captured through self-report by the 
children themselves. Enrollment was a simple yes or no question; 
absenteeism was converted to a dummy from the question, “How 
many days did you miss last month?” The creation of the variables for 
retention and schooling expectations differed slightly between 
Nicaragua and Colombia and is described in those chapters. 
Covariates (Independent Variables) 
The demand side variables in human capital theory are divided 
into four major parts: wealth and budget constraints, opportunity 
costs, returns to schooling, and parental preferences, as in the model 
described in chapter 2. There are also a number of individual and 
community characteristics that should be added as controls. In this 
section, the major variables are explained and descriptive statistics 
supplied for each. Community-level characteristics and parental 
preferences will be presented first, as they best paint a picture of the 
communities in question.   
Wealth and Budget Considerations 
A household’s total income is an important human capital 
consideration, as discussed in depth in Chapter 2. Development 
economists have determined household consumption to be a more 
accurate measurement of a household’s well-being than income itself 
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(e.g. Skoufias, 2001). While detailed consumption data was collected 
at the household level for each country, the method of doing so 
resulted in highly non-standardized responses, as described separately 
in each section. The most representative possible number was used for 
each. Per capita expenditure and log expenditure were calculated as 
well, the former in order to standardize comparison across differently 
sized families and the latter because it better meets the assumptions 
of regression than does standard expenditure by producing a more 
normal distribution of expenditure values. 
The natural measure of direct cost for education is the 
educational expenditure variable. At the household level, educational 
expenditure is endogenous to enrollment; a family with children 
enrolled in school would obviously have a higher cost of education. The 
easiest solution to this is to use the community mean expenditure for 
families with children enrolled in school to estimate what a family 
would have to pay if children were enrolled (Glick & Sahn, 2006). In 
the regression equations, the log of the average educational 
expenditure in the children's communities was used.   
 
Opportunity Cost 
The major opportunity cost variables used in the model are 
those related to working. Work is the chief trade-off for schooling, so 
labor patterns among school-aged children are in turn of great interest 
to researchers within this field. Reduction of child labor is in itself also 
an important focus of researchers concerned with human rights issues. 
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For both of these reasons, the RPS surveyors collected information on 
work, the alternatives to work, and the number of hours worked. The 
number of hours worked and a simple work dummy were used in the 
various models. The children themselves responded to these 
questions. 
Returns to Schooling 
There is dialogue within the research community over how to 
model the returns on schooling. Technically, the expected and actual 
returns on schooling depend upon the labor market: the likelihood that 
schooling will increase one's possibility of acquiring work at higher 
wages. This can be modeled using the prevailing wage in the nearest 
urban center, assuming that in general, skilled labor tends to 
congregate in urban areas, or the amount that wage increases due to 
one year of additional schooling (Altonji, 1998). Where this is difficult 
to acquire, or in the case of primary schooling, returns to schooling 
can be modeled by the expectation to attend secondary school and/or 
the average distance to a secondary school (Lavy, 1996). In the RPS 
data set, the distance to secondary school was not available. 
Secondary expectations, however, was available. A dummy variable 
was created from the stated schooling expectations. The same was 
true for the Colombian data set, though in the second follow-up 
survey, surveyors also gathered information on expectations of wages 
from secondary school. The community mean distance from primary 
school for those who were enrolled was available in Nicaragua and was 
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used as a variable in the models at the community and individual 
levels.  
Parental Preferences & Household Characteristics 
The major family and community level characteristics of interest 
were those quantifying the number of people in the households, 
gender, literacy and schooling characteristics, and whether the parents 
were living at home (Nicaragua only). Although schooling 
characteristics of the community and family were included in the 
impact evaluation model, child literacy is considered endogenous to 
individual school enrollment. It was included in the sections detailing 
baseline characteristics, but was not included in the models for 
analysis. Research has shown that the educational attainment of 
parents, particularly of mothers, is one of the key variables influencing 
children's enrollment (e.g., Glick & Sahn, 2006; Boserup, 1985). To 
determine the overall state of schooling in the treatment and control 
communities, school attainment characteristics were measured for the 
adult population, individuals over 25. Because mothers’ education level 
in particular has been determined to be a major factor in human 
capital decision-making with regard to education, a variable for 
mother’s education was created for each child in both data sets.  
The Nicaraguan data contained a question specifically geared 
toward determining whether each of the parents was present in the 
household. The Colombian data did not contain a direct question 
pertaining to this, but was structured to allow for easy determination 
of whether a male or female headed the household. The gender of any 
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individual child can be considered an individual level characteristic, but 
it must be remembered that human capital theory considers the 
schooling decision to belong mostly to the parents, especially at the 
age in question for the RPS program. Thus, it is here considered one of 
the parental preference variables. In general, if boys (or girls) were 
expected to receive greater returns on their schooling, in the form of 
greater wages later on, their parents would be expected to be more 
likely to invest in education (Alderman & Gertler, 1997). Previous 
research would suggest gender to have a lesser effect in the 
Nicaraguan and Colombian cases than in Mexico, where gender parity 
in rural communities has traditionally been lower. 
Age was included as a control. Following tradition in modeling 
educational returns, a quadratic age function was used: age was 
included as was age-squared. Probability of school enrollment is 
expected to increase with age, but to show diminishing returns such 
that the coefficient on age is positive and that on age-squared 
negative (e.g. Lincove, 2006; Wolfe & Behrman, 1984).   
School Quality 
It was difficult to find adequate variables to represent school 
quality, particularly in Nicaragua. Traditional variables such as 
percentage of teachers certified, access to libraries and books, or even 
student/teacher ratio were not available. The closest alternative was a 
question for whether a child was in a multi-grade classroom or not. 
Because this only applies to enrolled children, and thus was not 
collected for all children, it was necessary to use an aggregate by 
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community. The school quality variable used in the individual 
regressions was the percentage of children in multi-grade classrooms 
in the community where each child lived. The rationale is that families 
living in a particular community would expect the conditions of the 
majority of students in that community to be the same conditions that 
their children would face if they were enrolled in school. It is 
hypothesized that a higher frequency of multi-grade classroom use 
would be equated with a lower quality education. The Colombian data 
set asked each child how many students were in his or her class. This 
was used as a school quality variable. The full model with specific 






Human capital model with specific variables for Nicaragua and Colombia 
Aspect of Human 
Capital Theory 
Description of Variable 
in Nicaraguan data 
Description of Variable 
in Colombian data 
Wealth and Direct 
Cost for education 
 
 
• Ln Total family 
expenditures 
• Ln per capita Educational 
Expenditure (comcens 
level) 
• Ln per capita monthly income 
• Ln per capita Educational 




• Dummy for whether 
worked or not in the past 
week 
• Age  
• Age squared 
• Dummy for whether worked or 
not in the past week 
• Age  





• Expectation of secondary 
school 
• Community mean 
distance to school  
• Expectation of secondary 
school 
• Expected salary for individuals 





• Mother’s schooling 
attainment, by grade 
reached 
• Whether mother lives at 
• Mother’s schooling attainment, 
by age mother left school 
• Number of siblings 
• Gender of child 




• Number of siblings 
• Gender of Child 
 
School quality • Community percentage 
of children who study in 
a classroom that contains 
multiple grades  
• Municipality average number 
of children in classrooms 
Treatment 
Variable 
• Whether an individual 
actually participated in 
the RPS program 
• Treatment individual 
 
For each data set, the models were run at the community level 
and at the individual level, using community level variables as 
controls. This method follows that of other major impact evaluations, 




Community-level human capital model with specific variables for Nicaragua and 
Colombia 
Aspect of Human 
Capital Theory 
Description of Variable Description of Variable 
Direct Cost 
 
Endogenous at community 
level 





• Mean number of hours 
worked per week 
• Average Age  
• Average of Age squared 
• Mean number of hours 
worked per week 
• Average Age  





• Community mean distance 
to school 








• Mean mother’s schooling 
attainment, by “grade 
reached” 
• Percentage of mothers who 
live at home 
• Mean number of persons in 
the household  
• Ln Mean Total family 
expenditures  
• Age mother left school 
• Number of siblings 
• Ln per capita monthly 
income 
School quality • Community percentage of 
children who study in a 
classroom that contains 
multiple grades 
• Municipality average number 
of children in classrooms 
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EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Descriptive statistics were first taken at the community level for 
each of the dependent and independent variables before the start of 
the program. For each data set, the statistics were run for the entire 
sample, done for the adult population (over 25), then for the children 
in the target age group. 
In order to answer the major research questions, linear and 
logistic regression were used with the variables already described, but 
including the treatment variable as a measure of program impact at 
the beginning and end of the observation. There has been criticism in 
the past of program evaluations that only observe the end of a 
program, measuring the difference in groups at the end of an 
intervention and concluding that the program met its goals if a 
significant difference is measured. This ignores: 1.) differences that 
may have been in place at the start of the intervention as well as 2.) 
differences that might have occurred in both groups that could not be 
attributed to the program. Using regressions at the beginning and end 
of the program, it is easier to show the impact that the program had 
on the desired outcomes. Specifically, if there is no statistical 
difference between the participant and control samples at the 
beginning of the program22, but there is at the end, we can assume 
that the program is the reason for the effect.  
                                   
22 Assuming that adequate measures have been taken to overcome selection bias. 
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At the individual level, enrollment took the form of a dummy 
encoded “0” for those who were not enrolled and “1” for those who 
were. The logistic regression (logit) function takes the form: 
 
Logit (p) = ln (p/(1 - p) =  βX + βY+ βZ (1) 
 
where for this case X is a vector of child characteristics, Y is a vector of 
parental preferences and family characteristics, and Z represents the 
variable for program participation. Results can be reported either using 
a log-odds ratio, which compares probability that an event will occur to 
the probability that the event will not occur, or predicted probabilities, 
which predicts the effect of any given coefficient on the probability that 
y will occur.   
In the logit model, beta coefficients can be converted into 
slopes, which give the marginal effects of each independent variable 
on the dependent variable: in this case on the probability of 
enrollment, absence from school, retention, or the expectation to 
attend secondary school. 
 
Prob(enroll=1) = ebeta/(1+ ebeta)    (2) 
The coefficients, log-odds ratios, and predicted probabilities are 
all presented for the models in the analysis. 
 
At the community level, the aggregated outcome variables 
represented the percentage of children meeting each condition within 
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each community, or the average level for the others. Thus, the 
outcome variables were continuous and required the use of linear 
regression to test the effects. The standard OLS regression is specified 
as: 
 
 y = " + βx + βx… + βxi + ε    (3) 
 
where the coefficient (β) represents the effect that a one-unit change 
in any given variable (x) will have on the outcome variable. 
Increasing robustness of the models  
Unobserved similarities between households and individuals in 
the same municipality have the potential to lead to substantial bias in 
standard error if not accounted for (e.g. Skoufias, 2001). In order to 
report the smallest possible standard error for each regression, the 
models were run in Stata using robust estimation of standard error 
and clustering at the community level. 
 
  70 
CHAPTER 4:  COUNTRY CONTEXTS AND PROGRAM DESIGN 
 
The application of the conditional cash transfer model to 
Nicaragua and Colombia allows for a case study of the possible 
constraints, the modifications that might need to be made in order to 
replicate such a program in very different settings, and the expected 
gains from implementing the program in such contexts. This research 
contributes to the literature on conditional cash transfer program 
implementations in several ways: 1.) compared to the Mexican and 
Brazilian programs, the Nicaraguan and Colombian programs have 
been studied less extensively; 2.) most research and discussion of 
CCTs takes place in the economic literature, which often fails to include 
consideration of the social and political factors that have contributed to 
the poverty of the people; 3.) CCTs are not as well known to 
educational researchers. By focusing more on the educational context 
and constraints, as well as by focusing more in-depth on the 
educational outcomes of the program, it is hoped to widen the 
audience for consideration of such comprehensive programs; and 4.) 
in taking a comparative perspective, this research examines more fully 
how the historical, political and social contexts interact with program 
design to yield results. 
The following section supplies some historical context from which 
to understand the countries addressed by these programs, as well as a 
discussion of educational and social policy. This is followed by a 
discussion of the overall poverty demographics in Nicaragua and 
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Colombia at the time of the programs’ implementation. The chapter 
concludes with an explanation of the RPS and Familias en Acción 
programs. A detailed table comparing the programs to Progresa is 
found in Appendix 5.    
 
COUNTRY CONTEXTS 
History, Poverty and Educational Policy in Nicaragua 
The country of Nicaragua provides a unique context for the 
application of anti-poverty programming in general and the conditional 
cash transfer idea in specific. Unlike Mexico and Colombia, Nicaragua 
is classified by the World Bank and the CIA as a low-income country. It 
is, in fact, the poorest country in Central America and one of the 
poorest in the Latin America/Caribbean region, second only to Haiti 
(e.g. US State Department, 2008; World Bank, 2009). A continued 
reliance on agriculture and a string of political and natural events in 
the modern era have wreaked havoc on the economy of the country. 
Civil war and greed by entrenched governmental interests and often 
self-serving United States intervention have also combined to make 
economic stability impossible in the nation. Despite these constraints, 
the Nicaraguan government, in concert with international lending 
institutions has put in place various means for attempting to aid the 
most extremely impoverished and for improving conditions for all of 
the poor. Prior to implementation in Nicaragua, cash transfers had not 
been applied to low-income contexts, as they require a fair amount of 
infrastructure and coordination to carry out. 
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Like many other Latin American countries, Nicaragua has had a 
long history of political turmoil, because of both  homegrown 
leadership and the results of imperialist or protectionist actions by the 
greater international powers of the world. These years of instability 
and conflict have had an impact on Nicaraguan social provision, 
including education. In its nature a means for passing on ideals and 
values and shaping national sentiment, education has been an 
important indicator of each administration’s priorities. As a result, 
consistent with the radical shifts in political ideology, Nicaraguan 
educational policy has changed dramatically over the past few 
decades. 
Beginning in the 1930s, American influence was exerted largely 
through the backing and protection of the pro-capitalist leadership 
regime of the Somoza family (e.g. Burgerman, 2006), which came into 
power with the help of the United States. In an effort to end rule by 
renegade armies, the United States created the Nicaraguan National 
Guard to maintain order after its withdrawal from the country in 1933. 
The first Somoza, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, was put in charge of the 
Guard and became president in 1936. Protected by the U.S.-supported 
Guard, the Somoza clan governed Nicaragua for four decades, to the 
benefit of a small elite of businessmen and landowners and with large 
disregard for the poor and rural inhabitants of the nation (Arnove, 
1986). Various presidents from both major U.S. political parties 
supported the regime. 
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The Constitution of 1950 established the basis for educational 
provision in Nicaragua, including the obligation to attend primary 
school and the ideal of free education at the primary and secondary 
levels (Waggoner & Waggoner, 1971). As in other Latin American 
countries, the constitutional provision of education has occurred in a 
highly centralized manner via a Ministry of Public Education. This 
centrality has allowed the government to play an extremely heavy role 
in the content and implementation of educational policy.  
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, relative growth in the 
economy, coupled with the provisions in the Constitution, allowed for 
rapid growth in schooling (Arnove, 1986) and a decrease in illiteracy 
from 63 to 48 percent by 1971. An economic downturn in the 1970s, 
however, saw a reversal of these gains, further exacerbated by the 
Somozas’ preference against mass education. In 1976, rural illiteracy 
reached over 75%, with only 6% of rural students reaching the sixth 
grade and only 34% completion in urban areas. The United States 
during this era played a role in Nicaraguan education, supplying 
textbooks (in conjunction with USAID-OAS) and shaping policy in the 
areas of curriculum development, teacher training and educational 
planning (Arnove, 1986). However, education was viewed as a means 
for advancing the elite rather than as a benefit to be shared by all 
(Arnove). As a result, the poor remained undereducated; the primary 
school attendance rate remained abysmal; and the government 
spending directed toward education was largely focused on the 
postsecondary level. Under the last leader of the Somoza regime, 
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Anastasio Somoza Debayle and the National Guard which he 
controlled, youths were considered de facto public enemies (Arnove, 
1986), to be ignored if not actively persecuted.  
A student, Carlos Fonesca, founded the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) in 1961. Originally insignificant as a political 
movement, it grew in power through the 1960s as the chief opposition 
party to Somoza. Named for Sandino, considered one of the earliest 
martyrs in the cause of liberation, the opposition movement swept 
peasantry and the urban middle class together. As abuses of power 
became more blatant, United States backing flagged, but the 
government attempted to negotiate a peaceful abdication of Somoza 
rule. Ultimately, however, in the face of mounting violent opposition, 
the US finally withdrew all support from the dictator. A Sandinista 
military junta took power of Nicaragua in 1979.  
The dependence on foreign aid and the mismanagement and 
corruption of government had led to an astounding underdevelopment 
of the Nicaraguan economy at the time of its take-over by Daniel 
Ortega and the Sandinistas. The major goals of the Sandinista 
(“revolutionary”) government were initially to move the economy 
toward socialism, to improve the lives of the poor, to build a 
participatory democracy and to integrate portions of the populace 
previously alienated from the political system (Booth et al., 2006). To 
this end, the government promoted grassroots organization of women, 
peasants and young people in conjunction with sweeping reforms in 
health and education.  
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Within the revolutionary government, education became a 
priority on a much greater scale than previously: the focus of 
education shifted to include and uplift the peasant and working classes 
of Nicaragua. According to Arnove & Torres (1995), the development 
orientation of the FSLN included the redistribution of power and wealth 
and an expansion of citizen participation. To support this program, the 
major principles of Sandinista educational policy were: 
1.)  The emergence of the great majority of the people formerly 
dispossessed and socially excluded, as the active protagonists of 
their own education. 
2.)  The elimination of illiteracy and the introduction of adult 
education as priority tasks of the revolution. 
3.)  The linking of the educational process with creative and 
productive work as an educational principle, leading to 
educational innovation and promoting the scientific and technical 
fields. 
4.)  The transformation and realignment of the education system 
as a whole, to bring it into line with the new economic   and 
social model. (Arnove & Torres, p. 319) 
One of the first and greatest initiatives of the Sandinistas was a 
large-scale literacy campaign. Thousands of brigadistas, middle-class 
adolescents from the urban areas, were sent to rural regions of the 
country to serve as volunteer literacy instructors. The campaign 
employed for the first time students and women in the service of their 
country (Arnove, 1986; Booth et al, 2006). Through this effort, great 
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strides were made, with estimates for literacy rising from less than 
50% to around 87% by the mid-80s (Booth et al.). The education 
received through the literacy campaigns, however, was in many cases 
not neutral: much of the material used was designed to support the 
ideals of the revolution, either directly or indirectly. The literacy 
campaign was a political tool first and an educational program second. 
The desired pedagogy stressed the importance of increasing 
empowerment of the learners and the importance of community 
(Arnove, 1986). Some of the material was more overt propaganda 
designed to promote loyalty to the administration. Lessons were 
couched in the terminology of rebellion toward “imperialist” powers 
and empowerment of the campesino. Many textbooks were donated by 
Cuba (Arnove & Torres, 1995; Burgerman, 2006). 
In addition to the literacy campaign, the revolutionary 
government increased access to schooling more generally. During the 
first half of the Sandinista administration, over 1,000 primary schools 
and 48 secondary schools were built, and technical and agricultural 
education facilities were built in rural and coastal areas of the country 
(Arnove, 1986). Following the literacy crusade, the Sandinista 
government embarked upon an adult education program to counter 
the effects of years of educational neglect (Sandiford et al, 1994; 
Arnove).   
The expansion of the system did put a strain on educational 
resources and led to some distortions. For instance, most students 
who had never attended school entered the first grade, leading to a 
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distribution in which almost half of all primary students were in the 1st 
grade, and students three to four years older than the expected age 
could be found enrolled in any particular grade (Arnove, 1986). In 
addition to the influx of students, a shortcoming of the literacy 
campaign’s “mass” nature was the minimal preparation of many of the 
teachers. Because the educational level of the populace was already so 
low, it was difficult to recruit teachers who had themselves even 
completed the sixth grade. According to some reports from the period, 
as many as 70% of the teachers employed in the campaign had not 
completed that level of schooling (Arnove). 
Despite internal challenges, the great majority of pressure on 
the educational system came from political turmoil rooted in local and 
external sources. With the beginning of the Reagan administration 
(1981), the United States openly opposed the Sandinista government 
that had overthrown Somoza. Reagan ran upon and pursued a 
platform of ardent anti-communism. The revolutionary and socialist 
tenor of the Sandinista government, as evidenced not least of all in the 
National Literacy Campaign, posed a seemingly communist threat that 
was intolerable to the Reagan regime. Considering American values to 
be directly in conflict with the ideals and practices of the FSLN 
government, the United States organized and participated in warfare 
against the Nicaraguan government, acting through the Nicaraguan 
contra-revolutionaries, or Contras beginning in 1981. The United 
States also imposed economic sanctions in 1985 and convinced 
multilateral institutions to withdraw aid. Though by most accounts 
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truly believing in the campesino’s need and right to be served by 
government, the Sandinista government essentially imposed a 
dictatorship of its own, albeit a socialist one (Burgerman, 2006). Those 
more moderate elements of the revolutionary cause, who had fought 
for nationalistic reasons (self-rule, freedom of press and commerce) 
and sought greater pluralism as a necessary component of a “free 
Nicaragua” chafed under the one-party dominance of the Sandinistas 
(e.g. Chamorro, 1996). Meanwhile, the economic situation of the 
majority of people did not improve. 
In order to fight the Contra War, Nicaragua was forced to 
redirect funds for social programs, including education, to the defense 
budget, thus stalling outright any further gains in education 
throughout the duration of the war and into the 1990s. Though less 
often noted in the literature, it is also the case that the war itself was 
fought predominantly in the rural highlands, areas that already were 
some of the poorest and least educated in Nicaragua (Booth et al., 
2006). This led to great damage to infrastructure and crops and thus 
the entire economy of the region. Those considered to be on the front 
lines of Sandinista social reform were often targeted: teachers and 
health workers were assassinated (Arnove, 1986). Against this 
backdrop, and partially for these reasons, the literacy gains made 
during the crusade were not long-lasting (Sandiford, 1994).  
Despite the pressures from the United States and many of the 
other Central American countries, Sandinista Nicaragua received aid 
and support from more markedly communist regimes, particularly 
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from Cuba and the Soviet Union. Hundreds of Cuban doctors, nurses 
and teachers provided services, even in places that Nicaraguan doctors 
tended not to service. The Soviet Union provided aid money. As long 
as these allies remained, the Sandinistas were able to maintain their 
fight against the United States and the contras. Ultimately, however, 
faced with its own internal turmoil, the Soviet Union withdrew 
economic support from Nicaragua, effectively completing the alienation 
of the country.  
Partially as a result of external pressures, the declining 
worldwide economy, and the difficulties of economic governance in the 
socialist state (Booth et al., 2006), during the latter years of 
Sandinista rule, social spending stagnated, leading to disruption in 
medical care, sanitation service and school funding. As the populace 
increased its criticism of the government, the administration turned 
increasingly to repressive measures similar though less severe to 
those experienced under Somoza. While repression of government 
critics remained much less violent than in Guatemala and El Salvador, 
[it] included intimidation, harassment, and illegal detention of 
opponents, independent union leaders, and human rights workers; 
press censorship; curtailment of labor union activity; and poor prison 
conditions. (Booth et al, 2006, p. 84)   
Toward the end of the 1980s, in response to hyperinflation 
caused largely by the need to fund the war, the government began to 
impose structural reforms that further intensified the economic woes of 
the populace (Booth et al., 2006). Although similar to the reforms 
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beginning to be enacted in other Latin American countries, the 
Nicaraguan reforms differed in that they did not receive the aid of 
multilateral institutions, since they had been cut off from these 
institutions in response to those reforms (Booth et al.), thus making 
the impact even more severe. 
In response to growing pressure and yet confident of victory, the 
FSLN arranged for democratic elections in the late-1980s. The United 
States interceded and provided funds to help unite the dissident 
groups opposing Sandinista control into a coalition. This National 
Opposition Union (UNO) prevailed in the election and Ortega passed 
the presidency to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, widow of Pedro Joaquin 
Chamorro, the editor and owner of the famous newspaper La Prensa 
and vocal opponent of the Somoza clan until his murder in 1978. The 
Chamorros were widely regarded in Nicaragua as nationalistic, patriotic 
and devoted to economic liberalism and political pluralism.  
The 1990 election of Violeta Chamorro is considered by most to 
have been the first definitive act of true democracy in Nicaragua (e.g. 
Booth et al., 2006). The outcome reopened the lines of trade and 
international assistance between Nicaragua and the United States. At 
the start of the Chamorro administration, the net primary enrollment 
rate was 72% for males and 74% for females. However, it had not 
translated into grade completion, as indicated by the data and 
corroborated by various sources (e.g. Arnove & Torres, 1995); the 
progression to grade 5 was only 11% for males and 37% for females. 
This fact as well as the fact that primary completion for females was 3 
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times that for males, lends strong evidence to the human capital focus 
on opportunity cost in the form of work. Schooling remained 
unattainable for the majority of Nicaraguans in 1990.  
The Chamorro government and the subsequent administration 
held values more similar to the pro-democratic, pro-capitalist views of 
the developed countries. As in other Latin American countries of the 
1990s, the aid institutions in concert with the new administration 
increased the pace of structural adjustment reforms begun under 
Ortega to shore up the nation’s ruined finances. In order to qualify for 
debt relief, Chamorro had to impose far greater fiscal discipline upon 
the economy than had been previously applied. Among other changes, 
the administration dramatically cut back spending on social programs. 
While this period allowed Nicaragua to decrease somewhat its foreign 
debt burden, bring inflation under control and to increase overall 
productivity, it also led to greater inequality and unemployment. The 
administration also used the educational system to replace some of 
the previous administration’s ideals with more liberal/capitalist ideals. 
Sandinista textbooks were replaced with new books financed and 
approved by the United States (Booth et al., 2006).  
Ortega was reelected in 2006, in no small way reflecting the 
inability of preceding administrations to fully satisfy the needs of the 
populace, and remains as of 2008 the president of Nicaragua. The 
administration has rolled back some of the most neoliberal reforms of 
the preceding administrations, continuing the cycle of relentless reform 
that has existed in Nicaragua for decades. While Nicaragua has 
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emerged with far lesser violence in modernity, as a result of its 
historical legacy, the country entered the 21st century lagging behind 
most of its Latin American counterparts in many areas. The Contra 
War affected the infrastructure and production of Nicaragua far more 
than did similar civil disturbances in Guatemala or El Salvador 
(Burgerman, 2006). So while the Nicaragua of today is more peaceful 
than the other countries that have shared its revolutionary past 
(Burgerman), it remains extremely poor, especially in the rural areas. 
Those regions reliant on coffee farming remain particularly vulnerable 
to price fluctuations in that staple crop, as well as to natural disasters 
such as the major worldwide drop in coffee prices that occurred in 
2001, concurrent with the RPS program.  
History, Politics and Educational Policy in Colombia 
Colombia, the fourth-largest country in South America, is the 
second largest in terms of population after Brazil, with 45 million 
people in 2007 (Kline and Gray, 2007). Based on GNP per capita, in 
1997 Colombia was considered a lower -middle-income country by 
international standards (World Bank, 2002). In possession of startling 
geographic and ethnic diversity, Colombia is one of the Latin American 
countries with the longest tradition of civilian democratic government 
(Kline and Gray), but has also experienced a legacy of violence that 
continues into the present. 
In 1819, Colombia won independence from Spain and formed a 
partnership with modern-day Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama, called 
Gran Colombia. This crumbled in 1830, with the exit of Venezuela and 
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Ecuador. The Constitution of 1886, though in name a democratic 
constitution, actually concentrated power in the hands of the Catholic 
Church and the two major parties (Hanson, 1995), Conservative and 
Liberal, formed in 1843 and 1848 respectively. Colombia’s history of 
conflict began between the parties themselves. Although both parties 
were organized around elite interests and had a common ideology with 
regard to the social order, the network of relationships and 
appointments differed for each (Kline and Gray, 2007). Thus, any shift 
in party power resulted in an equally dramatic shift in social and 
economic power. This created an intense degree of competition 
between the parties, leading to several civil wars led by party elites 
but fought by mobilized peasants (campesinos). This system greatly 
politicized and divided the masses, and perpetuated a psychology in 
which the greatest perceived differences were along party lines rather 
than along class lines. It was also extremely centralized, with leaders 
at the local and departmental levels all appointed by the president. As 
in Nicaragua, the reserved power of the president to rule absolutely in 
times of national emergency or “state of siege” was at times abused 
for the consolidation of power (Hanson). 
The two parties participated in several civil wars, the most 
significant and famous of which was known as the Thousand Days civil 
war, from 1899 to 1902. Another great interparty conflict, known as La 
Violencia, occurred between the late 1940s and early 1950s in large 
part a result of the assassination of the liberal presidential candidate in 
1948. Conservatives rushed to consolidate the majority, and 
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conservative-supporting campesinos began to seize lands that had 
been previously taken from them by liberals. The civil war, which 
greatly surpassed all previous wars (Kline and Gray, 2007) continued 
for the next 20 years and claimed the lives of over 200,000 
Colombians. 
The major thrust of organized violence came to an end with 
Colombia's first and only military dictatorship of the 20th century. Most 
members of the two major parties united in support of Gustavo Rojas 
Pinilla in 1953. Pinilla was able to pacify certain elements of the 
citizenry, but unable to really control the radicalized peasantry or 
create solid governance for the majority of the country. Furthermore, 
Rojas began to move increasingly toward repressive dictatorship to 
appear desirous of remaining in power beyond the usual four-year 
term.  
The leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties came 
together to oust Rojas and put in place a unique bipartisan governing 
coalition to manage the country for the next 16 years. This political 
compromise, known as the National Front, stipulated an alternating 
presidency between the two parties every four years, and a 50-50 split 
among party members in all other parts of the government. During the 
16-year period, no other political parties would be allowed to 
participate in elections. The agreement also established a merit-based 
bureaucracy to replace the one based solely on patronage that had 
existed up to that point. Although this arrangement put an end to the 
bloody bickering between the two major parties, the structure 
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introduced several political inefficiencies that would prove to have 
serious consequences. The alternating structure of the presidency as 
well as the perpetually divided national Congress made it very difficult 
for any particular administration to implement significant changes, 
including improvements in infrastructure and welfare for many of 
Colombia's people. The ban on new political parties prevented many 
groups from having a voice in the government (Kline and Gray, 2007). 
The dismal conditions for many of Colombia’s people, the inability to 
effect change through government and the ineffectiveness of the 
government in asserting control over public welfare created the 
opportunity for alternative means of exercising power to emerge in 
local areas, such as the clientelism so common in Latin America and 
also prevalent in Nicaraguan political history, in which favors are 
exchanged for political support, rather than dispensed by the state for 
the public good (DeFerranti et al, 2004). 
When the National Front came into power, the educational 
system of Colombia was in an abysmal state. Literacy was 
approximately 57%, and only half of the primary school-aged 
population was in school (National Department of planning, as cited in 
Hanson, 1995). Although spending on education improved from about 
1.5% to 3.5% under the National Front, the governing class did 
nothing to improve economic disparities between rich and poor. In the 
late 1960s, although the central government technically oversaw 
education, each departmental governor selected its own Secretary of 
Education. This meant that the central Ministry of Education had little 
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control over day-to-day planning. Teacher salaries, paid by the 
Ministry but funneled through the regional offices, were often hijacked 
for other purposes, so teachers often did not receive salaries on time 
and resorted to disruptive strikes (Hanson).  
To address some of these issues, 1968 saw the beginning of a 
massive educational reform- centralization of the educational system 
to ensure that all regional offices conformed to national policy 
(Hanson, 1995). Because of these reforms, by 1980 the educational 
system had shown some vast improvement in combating blatant 
corruption: teacher salaries were paid appropriately, qualified teachers 
were being hired. Yet in terms of educational outcomes, Colombia 
continued to trail several other South American countries, with only 
57% of children completing primary school within the usual amount of 
time and a 46% secondary school attendance rate. Colombia also 
trailed the Latin American average in terms of educational spending as 
a percentage of GNP (Hanson, 1995). Furthermore, the consolidation 
of control at the central level led to greater neglect in many areas of 
the country. 
The populace grew increasingly frustrated with the government 
through the 1970s and early 1980s. Scholars have attributed the rise 
of organized narcotic trading, guerrilla warfare, and paramilitary 
activity to the disordered state of the government: as the masses 
grew more unruly, the ruling class was unable to keep control over 
them, but did not face this fact and change accordingly (Hanson, 
1995). Colombia began a descent into violence nearly unparalleled in 
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its legacy. According to Hanson, between 1988 and 1991, over 2,000 
political assassinations occurred; three political candidates were in fact 
assassinated within the same presidential election. Policemen and 
newspaper reporters faced a similar fate in the city of Medellín, the 
site of greatest activity for the drug trade. Within the educational 
arena, university students, school principals and officials were also 
targets of violence (Hanson). 
Government-wide, it was in response to this deepening chaos 
that the government finally embarked upon a program of change, this 
time in the form of decentralization. The year 1988 saw the popular 
election of over 1,000 mayors as well as the governors for all of the 
departments. The government's four-year development plan, created 
in 1990, highlighted the need for still greater improvements in primary 
and secondary education and a still underdeveloped participatory 
democracy. A constitutional assembly was convened in 1991, resulting 
in a new Constitution that emphasized an expansion of democracy. 
This was considered necessary to quell violence by integrating political 
dissidents.  
This enhanced democratic philosophy applied to the educational 
system. The drafters of the Constitution in fact considered education 
essential to the creation of the new Colombian order (Hanson, 1995). 
Following the government-wide program to reverse the trend of 
centralization, the Ministry of Education was reorganized and decision-
making more localized, relegated to the level of the municipality. At 
the start, 85% of educational financing came from the national 
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government; the educational reform required more co financing from 
municipal governments. National spending was frozen, so that any 
additional spending would have to come from the municipalities 
(Hanson). However, many municipalities, including wealthy ones, 
refused to take responsibility for schools because the facilities were in 
such poor condition and severely understaffed in many cases. 
Since the end of the National Front, much of Colombia's political 
activity has focused on addressing the problems of guerrilla warfare 
and drug trafficking. Several administrations have attempted to 
eradicate drug cartels, using various strategies from the ‘hard-line 
repressive approach’ of President Turbay, supported by Ronald 
Reagan, to a peace program involving the laying down of arms and the 
granting of political voice (Betancour, 2008). The largest and most 
famous of guerrilla forces are the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC) and the ELN, both of which have roots in Marxist 
ideology. The years 1986 to 1990 were especially violent, with three 
types of irregular armed actors (Betancour, 2008) strengthening 
during the period: drug traffickers, guerrillas, and paramilitary units 
established ostensibly to protect against the other two. As the military 
strength of the guerrilla forces have grown and ebbed, the United 
States and other nations have provided and withdrawn economic 
investment in the country according to their comfort level with the 
stability of the nation. Currently, the liberal and conservative parties 
remain the largest, but in 2007, there were over 74 other political 
parties. Outside the parties, but still powerful in the political sphere 
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are some labor unions, notably the National Association of 
Industrialists and the National Foundation of Coffee Growers 
(Betancour, 2008). 
One major impact of Colombia’s political history is that in 
general, the government has been unable to implement policies to 
improve the welfare of the poor (Kline and Gray, 2007). Despite 
assertions of presidents since at least the 1980s that their 
administrations would resolve issues of poverty, little progress has 
been made. In fact, despite the fact that Colombia is considered one of 
the most liberal democracies in Latin America, it has neglected its 
poorest citizens more than many other countries in the region (Kline 
and Gray). Ironically, as the domestic instability has impeded 
governmental progress, it is the poverty itself that in many cases has 
spurred Colombians to a life of crime.   
The current president, Alvaro Uribe, was elected in 2002 and 
reelected in 2006. With the backing of the United States, Uribe has 
taken an aggressive approach to combating guerrilla forces and 
strengthening the national military rather than supporting paramilitary 
activity (US Department of State, 2009). Reduction in violence has 
allowed for a cautious growth in tourist activity. The Uribe years have 
also witnessed a rise in economic productivity. He considers himself 
and is considered further to the right than previous Colombian 
presidents and is currently considered by some to be the United States 
biggest ally in Latin America (Business Week, 2007). Uribe’s stance on 
crime as and success in courting foreign investment has won him 
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support both in his country and outside, but some as being linked with 
paramilitary organizations criticize him. Despite accusations, Uribe has 
enjoyed 60 to 70% approval ratings during most of his time in office 
(Business Week, 2007). However, conditions of a majority of 
Colombians remain difficult (Kline and Gray, 2007). 
The introduction of mayoral elections and electoral competition 
has introduced opportunity for new groups. The entrepreneurial class 
in particular has pushed for changes that engender political stability by 
providing broader social services rather than relying on previous client 
list practices (DeFerranti et al., 2004). Although many researchers 
believe that radical social and educational reform will not take place in 
Colombia because a real redistribution of educational opportunities 
would work against the interests of the most powerful groups (Berry, 
1983, as cited in Patrinos), the implementation of the conditional cash 
transfer program discussed in this paper at least demonstrates a 
recognition that those who have long been left out of the educational 
system should have greater opportunities for inclusion. 
Summary of major historical themes in Nicaragua and Colombia 
Nicaragua and Colombia are very different in their progression 
toward the modern era, as well as in the overall current position of 
their economies. A very important thing that they share, however, is 
the existence of a large population of individuals with far fewer 
educational opportunities than others in the country. Nicaragua’s 
history has been characterized by instability and dictatorial rule, 
punctuated by a few administrations of political moderation. Poverty 
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has plagued the nation; neglected by some in power, and aided by 
others, but always in the context of very low overall resources, the 
poor have continued to suffer limited gains. As the country has swung 
between capitalist and socialist administrations, it has been subject to 
a great deal of intervention by the United States, which has favored 
business but not always to the benefit of all Nicaraguans. Colombia’s 
political history is characterized by a more stable economic order, but 
domination via the political elite has prevented the benefits from 
reaching the majority of Colombians. The neglect of broad social 
development and order under both centralized and decentralized 
schemes of government have led to the high incidence of drugs, 
violence and intimidation that Colombia is perhaps best known for. 
Despite an understandable preoccupation with quelling violence, the 
last two administrations in Colombia have made an effort to focus on 
improving the conditions of the poor. 
DEMOGRAPHICS AND PROGRAM SPECIFICS:  NICARAGUA 
In 2001, the Nicaraguan government in conjunction with the 
World Bank undertook a comprehensive evaluation of poverty in order 
to advise anti-poverty efforts in the 21st century. At the time of that 
report, which was published during the pilot phase of the RPS 
program, about 50% of the population remained in poverty with about 
17% classified as extremely impoverished. There had been gains in 
provision of social service throughout the Sandinista and Chamorro 
years, yet the poor tended to regard the 1990s as an era in which 
their welfare actually decreased (World Bank, 2001). In Nicaragua, 
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this may have been more pronounced than in other nations since the 
country was not only facing macroeconomic reform but also the 
transition from a socialist to a capitalist state. Under the Sandinistas, 
despite the rapid decline in the overall economy, improvements had 
been made in social indicators arising because of increased social 
spending (e.g. World Bank). Once the administration changed, while 
many NGOs were formed to provide assistance to those who would no 
longer benefit from state institutions (World Bank), there was no 
formal widespread safety net in place to protect the poor from the 
rapid changes.  
There were some positive changes in demographics over the 
period, including in health and education. With regard to the latter, 
gains between 1993 and 1998 occurred mostly in rural areas. 
According to the 2001 Nicaraguan Household Survey, however, 19% of 
the population was still illiterate at that time. These numbers are not 
particularly high for the region; overall Nicaragua’s gains against 
illiteracy have been laudable. However, consistent with its history, 
school enrollment figures have not kept up. Aside from low enrollment 
and school completion numbers, there are a large percentage of 
children in grades inappropriate for their ages. The official starting age 
for primary school is seven, yet one often finds 6-year olds in primary 
school rather than in preschool where they technically should be. On 
the other end of the scale, one finds many children between the ages 
of 13-18 still in primary school, especially in rural areas where 52% of 
the children in this age range remained in primary school in 2001 
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(United Nations, 2000). Of the regions of Nicaragua, the Atlantic is 
currently the poorest, having surpassed the rural highlands in 1983, 
with nearly 80% of its population living in poverty (deFerranti et al., 
2004; United Nations). The Atlantic region is the traditional home of 
the remaining indigenous population, mostly Moskito Indian, and a 
small population of African-descendent people. 
 
Table 6 
Literacy and enrollment in Nicaragua, 2001 
 % literacy1 % primary enrollment2 % secondary 
enrollment 
Total 81% - - 
Urban 89% 83% 74% 
Rural 66% 59% 34% 
Sources: 1. World Bank, 2006; 2. Arnove & Torres, 2003 
 
Historically, and continuing into the present, Nicaragua has 
devoted an inordinate amount of resources to tertiary education, to 
the detriment of pre-school and secondary funding in particular (e.g. 
Porta & Laguna, 2007). In 2000, primary education made up 53% of 
the education spending, and university spending made up 24%, while 
preschool (1%) and secondary (5%) comprised much less. More 
tellingly, however, the per-student government expenditure was US 
$61 per year for primary students and $22 for each secondary school 
student, compared with $1,612 per each university student (World 
Bank, 2001). Based partially on the support for primary education by 
lending institutions, the country has also dedicated a large percentage 
of spending to the primary level. This is not in itself detrimental, but 
as research continues to indicate the importance of preschool 
education and the necessity of secondary education as a bridge to 
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university, which currently mostly the rich achieve, the funding 
scheme is branded in most analyses as highly regressive (e.g. Porta 
and Laguna, 2007; World Bank, 2001; United Nations, 2001). The 
extremely low figure for government funding for secondary school in 
particular means that individuals must either take on the burden for 
most of the cost of secondary education (for example, by enrolling in 
private school) or suffer a very low quality education (United Nations). 
In order to reduce Nicaragua’s debt burden and make social 
expenditures at least partially revenue-generating, administrations 
since 1990 have implemented school fees at the primary level, which 
in general have accounted for approximately 15% of private direct 
investment in primary education, the rest being associated mostly with 
uniforms and books.  
 
Table 7 
Educational expenditure in Nicaragua, 2000 
Level of schooling % of total 
expenditure 
US dollars per student 
Preschool 1 - 
Primary 53 6.14 
Secondary 5 21.70 
University 24 1611.70 
Source: World Bank, 2006 
 
On a positive note, Nicaragua has not had a problem with gender 
disparity in education (Porta & Lagnua, 2007). To the extent that there 
is a difference, it is larger in rural areas, where there is such a great 
need for boys to go to work that in some cases female enrollment in 
primary and especially secondary school actually exceeds that of male 
(World Bank, 2006). It is suggested that these statistics indicate a 
very high opportunity cost to substituting work for school in rural 
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Nicaragua. This led World Bank researchers in the poverty assessment 
to hypothesize that programs like the CCT of Mexico and Brazil might 
be able to affect school enrollment, but would most likely not be able 
to affect child labor. 
Rural Poverty and Infrastructure 
As at other phases in Nicaragua’s history and Latin America as a 
whole, the incidence of poverty among the rural population was 
staggering at the end of the 1990s, with a nearly 70% poverty rate 
compared to a 30% rate in urban areas, as well as a greater depth of 
poverty23 for the rural poor (World Bank, 2001). Access to water and 
sanitation facilities remains a challenge for many Nicaraguans. Among 
the poorest households, 95% do not have piped water inside their 
homes. Thus, most have to acquire water from public wells or rivers 
(UN, 2001). According to a demographic survey in 2001 (ENDESA, as 
cited in UN), almost 25% of rural Nicaraguans do not have access to 
potable water within a fifteen minute distance from their homes. In 
terms of sanitation, efforts have been made to increase the number of 
latrines, so as to provide at least some minimum sanitation facilities. 
Despite increases in the number of facilities, little evidence has shown 
a decrease in common illnesses such as diarrhea as a result (World 
Bank, 2001).  
Infrastructure issues also provide a challenge to schooling. A 
2001 survey suggested that about 75% of public educational facilities 
lacked minimum conditions for teaching (World Bank, 2006). In this 
                                   
23 Measured in terms of distance from the poverty line. 
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case, putting aside lack of qualified teachers and adequate teaching 
materials, 63% of schools lack drinking water on premises, and a full 
70% lack electricity. It is in recognition of the extreme poverty, and 
especially the concentration of rural poverty, that the RPS program 
was designed. 
The RPS Program 
The Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social CCT was the first CCT 
to be implemented in a low-income country. Due to the need for 
supply-side support to the initiatives, it was initially unclear how 
successful the programs might be in low-income settings. However, it 
is also what makes it an especially important case study, as so many 
of the countries under consideration for dissemination are low-income 
(e.g. in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa). While the International 
Food Policy Research Institute has already made some evaluation, the 
RPS has not received the same level of research attention as have 
Progresa and Bolsa Familia, and thus remains a fruitful area of greater 
research. 
Past social programs in general in Nicaragua, like those of many 
countries, have suffered low impact for various reasons: programs lack 
specific goals and clear responsibilities by those in charge of them, are 
not targeted to the poorest and therefore more costly than they need 
to be, and have been implemented with no way of measuring impact 
(World Bank, Poverty Assessment, 2001). Lastly, the government has 
remained greatly reliant on external donors to fund recurrent 
expenditures that generally should be used to finance new projects 
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and projects that contribute to advancement (World Bank, 2001). The 
general shift towards programs that emphasize long-term goals rather 
than short-term poverty relief reflects a broader change in the 
approach to social policy in the region (Graham, 2000). RPS was a 
step in that direction.  
It is important to acknowledge the major shift in political 
philosophy required for the Nicaraguan government to embrace a 
program constructed around a human capital framework. Critics place 
conditional cash transfer programs in the same category as other 
neoliberal reforms. Though it should be conceded that the RPS allowed 
a level of participatory democracy in implementation, the adherence to 
a market based solution would have been and ultimately was 
anathema to a more socialist administration. 
Program Components: Benefits and Requirements 
The RPS was funded in part by the InterAmerican Development 
Bank (Maluccio and Flores, 2005; Dammert, 2008). As a stipulation for 
receiving funding, the Bank required an externally evaluated pilot 
program to ensure the program’s efficiency. The pilot program, 
evaluated by IFPRI, began in 2000, with a focus on rural areas, the 
areas of greatest poverty concentration.24 The Government of 
Nicaragua selected two departments out of the 17 to participate in the 
pilot, both of which showed increasing poverty over the years prior: 
Madriz and Matagalpa. Despite high poverty, these departments were 
                                   
24 In 1998, of the 48% of Nicaragua classified as poor, 75% of these lived in rural 
areas (IFPRI, 2005). 
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chosen for infrastructural advantages that rendered them most 
suitable for a pilot study: relatively close proximity to the capital of 
Managua, a decent supply of schools and health facilities, and good 
local institutional capacity, including a banking system. Although it 
could be said that these conditions limit the intervention from reaching 
the poorest, it did allow the CCT to function more fully as a demand-
side program, and to be evaluated solely as such. More importantly, 
given the overall lack of capacity, it provided a possibility for success 
without the redistribution of more of the government’s scarce 
resources. 
The major stated goals of the RPS were to supplement 
household income, reduce school dropout during the first four years of 
primary school, and to increase the health and nutrition of children 
under 5. Toward this end, benefits were organized around two major 
areas: food, nutrition and health on the one hand, and education on 
the other. The benefits were tied to these, with families receiving food 
transfers tied to health-related behaviors and educational benefits tied 
to education-related behaviors. 
In 2000, the amount of the food transfer was a flat $224/year, 
received bimonthly, not contingent upon the size of the family. In 
order to receive this stipend, families were required to 1.) attend 
workshops on health and nutrition and 2.) maintain monthly (for 
children under two years of age) or bimonthly (for children between 2 
and 5) clinic visits for growth and development monitoring and other 
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preventive care. In addition to the visits, mothers received individual 
counseling directed toward their specific children. 
In terms of education, there were two separate transfers, one 
called “bona escolar” tied to enrollment, and given to children ages 7-
13 up to the fourth grade25 (IFPRI, 2005; Regalia & Castro, 2007). 
This was a US$11 bimonthly sum paid for 10 months out of the year, 
which unlike in the other programs, was fixed per family rather than 
increasing with the number of children enrolled; if one child did not go 
to school, the entire stipend was theoretically withheld. This factor 
might be expected to produce different effects than would the tying of 
transfers to each child. This award structure also differs from that of 
the Mexican, Brazilian, and Colombian programs in the ages and 
grades it targets; it is far more limited than its predecessors. However, 
given the extremely low educational attainment of the Nicaraguan 
population at the start of the program compared to the others, it was 
likely a necessary first step for establishing some regularity of school 
attendance, as well as a reasonable scope given the funds at hand. 
In addition to the bono escolar, beneficiary families received a 
mochila escolar for school supplies of US $21, conditioned upon 
enrollment, for each child attending school. In the second phase of 
RPS, the Mochila Escolar was increased to $2526 per year, while the 
enrollment transfer was reduced to US$9 per month (Regalia & Castro, 
2007). This is sensible given the data (provided in analysis) that 
                                   
25 Regalia & Castro (2007) noted that most rural schools did not offer 5th or 6th grade 
at the time of implementation. 
26 This equaled the amount that the Ministry of Education was delivering to non-RPS 
schools in in-kind supplies (Regalia & Castro, 2007) 
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supplies comprise the greatest percentage of school cost. Given the 
human capital orientation of the program, it is important to note that 
since the nominal value of the transfers remained constant over both 
years of the pilot, the real value of the transfers declined about 8% 
due to inflation over that time period. 
In order to receive school-related benefits, households were 
required to maintain 85% attendance rates and were subject to lose 
benefits if children did not advance from grade to grade. This latter 
requirement was intended largely as a disincentive to try to cheat the 
system by purposefully keeping children in grades 1-4 in order to 
continue to receive the benefit. Due to irregularities in the 
enforcement of the requirement, however, it was ultimately dropped 






Nicaraguan RPS eligibility and benefits, pilot phase 
 Food security, health, and 
nutrition 
Education 
Eligibility All households All households with children ages 
seven through 13 who have not 
yet completed fourth-grade 
Demand-side 
benefits 
Food security transfer 
C$2,880 per household 
per year (US $224) 
School attendance transfer 
C$, 1440 per household per year. 
(US $112) 
 
School supplies transfer 




• Bimonthly health 
education workshops 
• Child growth 
monitoring 
• Provision of anti-









• Vaccinations (0-5 year 
olds) 
Source: Maluccio, 2004 
 
Program Administration 
As with Oportunidades, implementing the program required 
coordination between the federal government and local communities, 
as well as all of the levels in-between. At the local level, as in Mexico, 
community-elected women called promotoras provided information to 
the participants and worked in conjunction with RPS representatives. 
At the municipal level, committees of central government and RPS 
personnel coordinated supply-side issues to support RPS. This was an 
especially important function given the increased demand created by 
the program.  
As far as the specifics of fund distribution, for each household, a 
particular individual was identified as the representative and only this 
person could collect the transfer. Mothers were favored, with the result 
that 95% of the designees were women (IFPRI, 2005). The method of 
distributing funds was extremely efficient (IFPRI), paid bimonthly by 
payment agencies located in each municipality. Beneficiaries received 
a photo identification card with a bar code to be used at payment 
stations, and were given at each visit a receipt detailing the transfers 
to be expected during the following period. Non-compliance would 
result in reduction of transfers received, and generally, the municipal 
committees (and/or promotoras) would explain why funds were to be 
deducted. If funds were deducted in error, they could be refunded in 
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the next month’s disbursement. All transfers were paid in Nicaraguan 
córdobas.  
Monitoring of compliance was accomplished through a 
Management Information System (MIS) designed specifically for use 
by the RPS. Like Colombia’s SISBEN, MIS was used for targeting. 
However, the system also coordinated health-care providers, schools, 
requests to the Ministry of Health and could track the fulfillment of 
duties by service providers. 
Chief Differences/Innovations 
There are several major differences between the contexts in 
which Brazil and Mexico’s programs were implemented and that of 
Nicaragua. The most relevant and most noted is the greater degree of 
overall poverty in the country. As noted, Nicaragua has suffered 
historically low income, low growth, poor resistance to natural and 
economic disasters, a high debt burden, and an unstable relationship 
with major world donors. Unlike Mexico and Brazil, poverty is not 
identified with any particular ethnicity more than others, and unlike 
Mexico, Nicaragua does not have a high percentage of purely 
indigenous people. Due to the poverty, relative government instability 
and extreme lack of infrastructure in parts of Nicaragua at the time of 
implementation, the investment that could be made in RPS had to be 
carefully considered. Toward this end, several innovations were 
introduced into the RPS that had not been included in previous 
programs. These innovations were mostly in overall governance and 
  103
administration of the program, as well as in the health component of 
the program.  
The most innovative adaptation was the use of private providers 
for the health portion of the program (IFPRI, 2005). This innovation 
came about as an utterly pragmatic solution to the lack of capacity on 
the part of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Health to expand services to 
meet the anticipated increased demand. Private provision of 
educational services was not as much needed, as the supply of schools 
greatly exceeded that of health facilities (United Nations, 2001). A 
competitive bidding process was used to select for-profit firms and 
non-governmental organizations to provide health care to the most 
remote areas of the country. The selected providers were monitored 
for performance and remunerated based on that performance (Regalia 
& Castro, 2007). In doing this, the RPS became the first CCT to fully 
utilize a public-private partnership to deliver widespread social 
assistance. 
Also particular to RPS, the teacher and school received a small 
bonus, to partially remunerate for additional reporting time and cost to 
the school due to increased attendance. This stipend was received by 
the family and delivered to the school by the child. Its receipt was 
monitored and tracked.  
Review of the studies already done on RPS 
Although not a lot of research has been conducted on the 
Nicaraguan RPS program, there has been some, related largely to 
changes in consumption because of the program. The most extensive 
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research has been done by John Maluccio of IFPRI, who wrote the 
preliminary impact evaluation for the program. The evaluation focused 
on the mean treatment effect on a range of household outcome 
variables. Maluccio and Flores (2004) found that RPS had a positive 
impact especially for the very poor on household expenditures, 
including the proportion devoted to food; a significant increase in 
enrollment and attendance; and positive effects on children’s health 
care, nutritional status and vaccination rates. Although extensive and 
covering many of the key outcomes associated with the program, the 
impact evaluation did not utilize a model containing significant controls 
for variables. It has been left to subsequent research to take up more 
specific aspects of program impact. 
Adato and Roopnaraine (2004) performed an analysis similar to 
that described in the literature review by Adato around the social 
impacts of Progresa. The findings were similar to those in Mexico as 
well. Although with the RPS the targeted level was the community 
rather than the household, there were still some households within 
treatment communities that did not receive treatment. The selection of 
communities and households for inclusion in the program was not well 
explained to participants. Individuals who were interviewed expressed 
confusion, and in some cases a sense of injustice that some 
community members were included and some were not included in the 
program. Similarly to Mexico, program participants knew that there 
was a way for reporting issues or complaints, but in many cases did 
not know the exact procedure for doing so.   
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Dammert (2008) has purported to go beyond the treatment of 
mean impact of the program to measure heterogeneous impacts of the 
various kinds of transfers on expenditure distribution. She included a 
model to estimate the conditions of the individual households at the 
start of the program based on such factors as income, ages of the 
people in the family, enrollment and health patterns within the family. 
Dammert found evidence that there is a large degree of heterogeneity 
in the impacts of the program depending on the level of poverty 
experienced by the households.  
Lastly, in an interesting innovation in use of the RPS data set, 
Maluccio (2004) tested the extent to which the RPS program had been 
used as a coping strategy during a coffee crisis that occurred during its 
implementation. He looked at households in coffee-growing 
communities severely affected by the worldwide drop in coffee prices 
leading up to 2001, and found that RPS communities were better able 
to maintain their household expenditures and resist major increases in 
child labor. From this, he was preliminarily able to conclude that the 
RPS had shown evidence of providing risk protection to economically 
vulnerable families. 
Several studies have sought to disentangle the supply and 
demand impacts of the RPS program. It is typically very difficult to do 
this in CCT research, partially because most require supply to be 
readily available. Regalia & Castro (2007) studied RPS recipient 
communities after the subsidies had been dropped, but where supply-
side benefits continued to be implemented, and found a still high 
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utilization of health centers in those communities that had received 
sound education on the benefits of maintaining health services.6 They 
concluded from this that the supply-side interventions can carry on the 
work of cash transfer programs as long as the mechanism for 
behavioral change is strongly implemented. 
Other studies have focused on the administration of RPS: e.g. 
the structure and function of the public-private partnership for health 
delivery (Regalia & Castro, 2007); cost-effectiveness of RPS (Caldes, 
Coady & Maluccio, 2006); and various tests of the targeting efficiency 
of the program. 
Data, Variables and RPS Targeting 
The Nicaraguan dataset for Red de Protección Social is offered 
free of charge by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), by request.27 The names of participants were removed before 
releasing the dataset to the public. The program was designed in 
1999, piloted from 2000 to 2002, and expanded from 2003 to 2006. 
The data used in this analysis is the only data currently available (as of 
October 2008) and came from the pilot, which involved 6 communities. 
The RPS population census, used both for initial targeting and to follow 
the individuals in the program, contains information about household 
characteristics, employment, education and expenditures, among 
other variables, and includes 11,994 households (69,459 individuals). 
IFPRI has made publicly available the census, the 2000, 2001 and 
2002 follow-up data; treatment and control data files, and 
                                   
27 http://www.ifpri.org/data/Nicaragua01.htm  
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documentation of assignment of household communities. Survey 
instruments and manuals are also available for download in PDF 
version, as are the codebooks for some of the data sets. The RPS 
documentation is offered in English as well as in Spanish.  
Targeting of the program proceeded in three phases. First, it was 
determined that rural areas in all 17 departments in Nicaragua would 
be eligible. The Government of Nicaragua then selected two 
departments to participate in the pilot, Madriz and Matagalpa for the 
reasons discussed previously. Within these two departments, six 
municipalities were chosen out of 20 possible municipalities: 
Totogalpa, Yalagüina, Terrabona, Esquipulas, El Tuma-La Dalia, and 
Ciudad Darío. These six were the only municipalities in the two 
departments that participated in a program called Microplanificacion 
Participativa, whose purpose is to develop local/municipal capacity for 
administration. Though chosen partly for their institutional capacity, 
subsequent analysis showed them to be well-suited to receive benefits, 
with populations in which 78 to 90% were classified “poor” or 
“extremely poor”, compared to a national average of 45% poor and 
21% extremely poor (IFPRI, 2005). Finally, within the chosen 
municipalities, a marginality index was created for each rural comarca. 
The index was created based on the 1995 National Population and 
Housing Census, and constructed as a weighted average of four 
poverty indicators for all 59 comarcas in Madriz and Matagalpa. The 
four measures were: 1.) Average family size (weight of 10%); 2.) 
Percent without piped water in home or yard (50%); 3.) Percent 
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without a latrine (10%); and 4.) Percent of persons over five illiterate 
(30%) (IFPRI, 2005). Based on the marginality index, each comarca 
was assigned a priority level 1 through 4 and the levels of highest 
priority (1 and 2) were given first eligibility to the program by allowing 
them to participate in the pilot study. Within the comarcas, no poverty 
targeting was done at the household level- benefits were then 
determined according to the specific characteristics of the household, 
e.g., how many school-aged children lived in the household. 
The design of the Nicaraguan evaluation allowed for a natural 
experiment. Beneficiaries were randomly selected from within a group 
of potential beneficiaries all with similar characteristics. IFPRI used a 
community-based randomized intervention to create groups, taking 
extensive survey data before and after the implementation of the 
program. Making use of the limitation on resources, implementation 
was staggered, thus allowing one group to receive treatment before 
the other; the former was used as a treatment group for purposes of 
evaluation, and the latter as a control. 
Of the 59 comarcas, 42 fell in the first and second priority 
groups, and so were part of the pilot. Of these 42, 21 were randomly 
selected into the program, and 21 remained as the control group. The 
control groups were originally to be incorporated within one year, but 
entrance was delayed until a little over two years due to a government 
audit. Despite the unfortunate delay of the communities’ entrance into 
the program and access to the benefits thereof, the delay did allow for 
a greater experimentation period. The implementation of health 
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benefits did not begin until the beginning of October 2001-also later 
than planned. However, the second follow-up survey took place in 
October 2002, thus representing a full year of all participants receiving 
























Attend bimonthly health education 
workshops 
   
Bring children to prescheduled healthcare 
appointments 
   
Adequate weight gain for children under 5    
Enrollment in grades 1 to 4 of all targeted 
children in the household 
   
85% attendance of all targeted children in 
the household 
   
Promotion at the end of the school yeara    
Delivered teacher transferred to teacher    
Up-to-date vaccinations for all children 
under five yearsb 
   
 Source: Maluccio & Flores, 2004 
a Adequate weight gain requirement was discontinued in 2003 
b Condition was not enforced 
 
COLOMBIA 
The Colombian economy has at times been considered one of the 
most stable in the region, but suffered great volatility during the 1990s 
(WB, 2002). Before that time, prudent management of the Colombian 
economy had allowed for a stable economy with low government debt 
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levels and low inflation. After a slow down in the 1980s, economic 
adjustment policies were enacted that helped restore stability and 
towards the end of that period the economy, once dependent on coffee 
farming, diversified, leading to growth. However, trade liberalization 
policies of the 1990s hurt farmers and pushed up the prices of certain 
goods. Concomitantly, public spending began to rise at an 
unsustainable rate both for social programs and to combat the 
increasing violence, leading to an increased reliance on external debt 
financing (World Bank, 2002). On top of all of this, an earthquake in 
the coffee region of Colombia in early 1999 dramatically increased the 
amount of spending required by the government.  
Despite a decline in poverty during the 1980s and the first half 
of the 1990s, the incidence of poverty began to rise in 1996, and by 
1999 had returned to the 1988 level. Because of the economic 
volatility, Colombia's population suffered rapidly declining birth rates 
and an increase in unemployment (WB, 2002). This recession had a 
particularly adverse effect on the very poorest segment of the 
population. By 1999, 8 million lived in poverty in the largest seven 
cities and 2.1 million were classified as extremely poor. The United 
Nations in 2002 estimated 17 million poor, or 64%, with a 47% urban 
poverty rate and a 53% rural poverty rate. Great advances had been 
made in water and sanitation coverage, but there remained 






Urban and rural demographics, Colombia 2002 
 Urban Rural 
Percent in poverty 47% 53% 
Access to safe water 
supply 
99% 71% 
Access to sanitation 96% 54% 
Child labor, ages 10-16 10% 19% 
 
Ultimately, the macroeconomic environment must be corrected 
to attain lesser poverty in the end. In the short run, however, safety 
nets must be provided for the poor as the economy undergoes 
transition. This is very much the case in Colombia. As everywhere, 
being poor makes it more likely that children will have to work rather 
than go to school. For Colombia, this has been quantified: when 
household members other than the household head work, the 
household is much less likely to be poor. In fact, poverty risks are 
estimated to decrease by 13% for each additional household member 
employed (World Bank authors, 2002). This means that in order to 
incentivize education over work it is extremely necessary to 
supplement income in the short-term. 
Public social expenditure in Colombia was 10% below the Latin 
American average in 2002, but the government has made an effort to 
raise expenditure (deFerranti et al., 2004). The Constitution in fact 
mandated increases in social spending, especially in the areas of 
human capital. The nationwide education plan of 2000 (National 
Department of Planning, 2000) outlined the major goals of the 
educational system and provided information on the system at that 
time. The major goals were: to increase coverage with equity; to 
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improve quality; and to create a modernized learning environment. At 
time of writing, according to the DNP, 20% of children were not 
enrolled in basic education and average schooling in urban areas was 
almost double that of rural. According to the DNP, of non-enrolled 
children, 46% cited high costs or the need to work as their reason for 
dropping out of or not enrolling in school. The stated approach to 
ameliorate the problem was twofold: to augment administrative 
efficiency, and to provide money to offset schooling costs. Although 
the Constitution calls free education, it allows for some fees including 
matriculation fees at many schools and additional administrative fees 
at some others. Uniforms and books are significant outlays and 
uniforms a ‘near-universal requirement’ (Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
Equality in education remains a tremendous problem for the 
country of Colombia. Over-reliance on private education in the past, as 
well as disproportionate returns to tertiary education has privileged 
elite over the poor for decades. Overall, although primary and 
secondary enrollment rates have shown improvement, access to 
postsecondary education remains quite limited and skewed heavily 
toward the upper class. In 1990, Columbia was the only country 
besides Brazil in which private university enrollment exceeded that of 
public; 60% of enrollment in universities was at private institutions in 
1984 (Patrinos, 1990). Patrinos attributed this rapid expansion of 
private higher education to two main factors: high excess demand for 
higher education and political turmoil associated with public 
universities. In particular, despite an increase in demand for university 
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expansion during the National Front, politicians did not open 
universities that are more public nor increase the size of the existing 
ones due to student unrest. Thus, there is an undersupply of public 
universities. The Betancour government (1982-1986) attempted to 
increase postsecondary access to more of the middle class by opening 
distance education night schools, but these schools were of low 
quality. Only if one studies at a high-quality university do the benefits 
of University accrue; therefore, the university system serves to 
perpetuate the social hierarchy.  
The pattern of returns to education in Colombia has great 
implications for the less educated. College graduates have the lowest 
rates of unemployment, while individuals with intermediate education: 
high school dropouts and high school graduates have the highest 
unemployment rates, greater even than unskilled workers (World Bank 
2002). The gap in success between the secondary and tertiary 
education beneficiaries increased during the recession of the 1990s. 
The wage skill premium - the extent to which higher education leads to 
higher wages - is nearly twice that of the United States, and quite a bit 
higher than Mexico and Brazil. This means that disparities in 
educational attainment are magnified in the income distribution 
(deFerranti et al, 2004). These high skill-wage differentials in Colombia 
will continue to contribute to inequality unless special attention is paid 
to postsecondary education for lower and middle classes (World Bank, 
2002). The first step, of course, is to ensure that all students are even 
completing primary school and making the transition to secondary. 
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Overall, the World Bank (2002) reported persistent long-term 
improvements in social indicators, including completion rates for 
primary and secondary schooling. Health outcomes, infant mortality 
and life expectancy, and access to health insurance and basic 
infrastructure such as water sewers and electricity improved in the 
1980s and 1990s; primary and secondary enrollment increased; 
literacy rates increased and the incidence of child labor decreased. 
However, the homicide rate, domestic violence and property crimes 
have all risen since the 1970s with homicide rates in particular 
concentrated among young men. At the time the poverty report was 
written, school enrollment was declining, most likely because of the 
economic recession. This indicates that enrollment remains vulnerable 
to interruption by external factors. 
Special populations  
Whereas the major focus in Nicaragua is on ameliorating 
disparities between rural and urban populations, Colombia has a much 
higher percentage of urban people and urban poor. Although rural 
poverty is more extreme than urban poverty, and child labor is higher 
in rural areas than in urban, rising crime and national inequality over 
the past few decades have been associated not as much with 
differences between urban and rural regions as differences among 
individuals within these regions. Welfare improved from late 1980s to 
the mid-1990s for rural inhabitants, but then decreased for most of 
the rural population between 1995 and 1999 (World Bank, 2002). The 
regions with greatest difficulty are the central and Pacific. 
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There are a few additional major areas of focus in poverty 
alleviation. In Colombia, female primary school enrollment is higher 
than that of boys. This, however, is not thought to indicate overall 
levels of gender equality, but most likely to reflect the entrance of 
boys in the labor force an early age, especially in urban areas (Arnove 
and Torres, 2003). In general, as in other countries, female-headed 
households fare worse economically than do male-headed households. 
As is the case with Mexico, Colombia has a number of indigenous 
inhabitants, though also as with Mexico their number continues to 
decline. Unlike Mexico, Colombia also has a high percentage of African 
descendents, brought to Colombia as slaves during the colonial era. 
Blacks are concentrated in the poor Pacific region; they make up 80 to 
90% of the population there (Wade, 1995). Though it has not always 
been the case, current social policy pays some special attention to 
mobilizing and recognizing blacks as a distinct but relevant group. 
Violence and Displaced Persons 
One issue that is particularly pressing for Colombia, and that 
sets it apart from most countries in the world including most of those 
in Latin America, is the level of crime and violence to which its citizens 
are subjected. Colombia is the world's largest producer of cocaine, and 
in turn, cocaine as of 1994 became Colombia's fifth most valuable 
agricultural commodity. The drug trade and the militarized forces 
formed to fight the drug lords have led to extreme levels of violence. 
Due to the violence, the government has lost control over certain parts 
of the country. Extortion and kidnapping have weakened property 
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rights, and in some rural areas drug lords, paramilitary groups, or 
guerrillas have become the de facto leaders (World Bank, 2002). 
Homicide numbers in Colombia are two or three times higher than 
those in Brazil or Mexico and surpassed worldwide only by the 
homicide rate in El Salvador (World Bank, 2002). 
Faced with chaos in their communities, the number of persons 
displaced from their homes, formally called Internally Displaced People 
(IDP), has risen dramatically. Among the impoverished, those 
displaced by internal armed conflict rank among the most vulnerable. 
Most of these people remain in Colombia, but move to medium and 
large cities where they congregate in shantytowns with little access to 
infrastructure. In most cases, all family members have to work, 
including children and the elderly. They are at great risk for increased 
poverty and disruption of education. The major barriers to education 
for IDP are space, matriculation fees, the lack of required 
identification, and cost of schooling. In 2002 according to the Ministry 
of Education, only 8.8% of displaced children in 22 communities were 
enrolled in school (Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
In addition to the difficulties mentioned above, internally 
displaced people face an especially high risk of unemployment as there 
is little market in urban areas for the agricultural skills most of them 
bring (World Bank, 2002). In addition to the obvious loss of human 
capital due to violence, the social costs include the cost of public 
resources to serve victims and increase security. There are 
psychosocial effects on victims and their relatives as well (World Bank, 
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2002). The lack of security makes it difficult for people to carry on 
normal social and economic relations. Afro-Colombians and indigenous 
are more likely to be affected by conflict, and more than half of IDP 
are under 18 (HR Watch, 2005).   
Education has been identified as the single most important lever 
affecting social welfare (World Bank, 2002), as among the poor in 
Colombia, poverty tends to be associated with low skills, low 
employment rates, and high number of dependents per adult 
(dependency ratio). The education of both spouses, for instance, 
improves the chance for the entire family to maintain a high household 
employment rate, which is in turn extremely important in the escape 
of poverty. Education has also been found in Colombia to decrease the 
probability of domestic abuse. 
The conclusion of the World Bank Colombia poverty assessment 
was that a more integrated social protection policy was needed, 
providing: 1.) social assistance programs for the chronically poor; 2.) 
social safety nets for those exposed to shocks, and 3.)  a strong stable 
system of public expenditure.  
Familias en Accion 
Originally begun under Pastrana administration and continued 
under Uribe, Familias en Acción is one of the largest programs 
implemented by the Colombian government for the poorest sector of 
society. As with the other CCTs, major donors included the World Bank 
and the International Development Bank. Familias en Acción also 
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received a grant from the United States and funding from the 
Colombian government (Interregional Inequality Facility, 2006). 
Program Components: Benefits and Requirements 
The initial program focused on human capital accumulation in 
rural Colombia and was in most ways quite similar to the programs in 
Mexico, Brazil, and Nicaragua already described. There were three 
main components: nutrition, health and education, with the nutrition 
subsidy given for families with children under seven years old. Children 
were not allowed to be enrolled in both Familias en Acción and the pre-
existing preschool program, Hogares Comunitario. 
The education subsidy was similar to the program in Mexico, and 
therefore more robust than that in Nicaragua. It covered children up to 
17 years of age and awarded twice as much money for secondary 
school attendance. The monthly subsidy at the beginning of the 
program was 12,000 pesos ($US 5) for primary school and 24,000 
pesos for secondary school children. The monthly subsidy in 2004 was 
adjusted for inflation, to 14,000 pesos for primary school and 28,000 
pesos for secondary school children. Families with children under 
seven received a flat transfer to subsidize health costs.   
 
Table 11 
Grants and conditionalities, Familias en Accion 
Grant Target group Amount Conditionality 
Health Families with 
children aged 0-6 
US $17 per month Compliance with growth and 
development appointments set 
by health authorities 
 
Education Families with 
children aged 7-18 
US $5 per month per 
child in primary 
school (2nd to 5th 
grade) 
Attendance of at least 80% of 
classes during the school year 
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  US $10 per month 
per child in 
secondary school 
(6th to 11th grade) 
Attendance of at least 80% of 
classes during the school year 
Source: Inter Regional Inequality Facility, 2006  
 
The Colombian program was a massive undertaking and required 
coordination at many different levels. At the national and regional 
levels, the program was administered by the Colombian Social Welfare 
Institute (ICBF). To coordinate municipal level activities, municipal 
liaison offices were created. The national database SISBEN was used 
to select beneficiaries. This worked well for community buy-in as the 
system is well respected by beneficiaries (Interregional Inequality 
Facility, 2006). It helped to lend transparency and legitimacy to the 
selection process. 
Chief Differences/Innovations 
Because Colombia had greater resources available, fewer 
modifications to the Mexican model were required than in Nicaragua. 
As apparent in the comparison table, the evaluation pilot encompassed 
many more municipalities and many more households on a far larger 
budget than was available in Nicaragua. Like Nicaragua, but unlike 
Mexico, there was no difference in the amount of benefit between girls 
and boys. This no doubt reflects the fact that the gender disparities in 
education in Colombia are far less pronounced than were those in 
Mexico at the time of implementation. 
One important innovation of the Colombian program that had 
not been implemented in any previous CCT is that conditionality 
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monitoring was outsourced to a private firm. Since the conditionalities 
are such an integral part of program design, the system for monitoring 
compliance cannot be neglected. The impact of the monitoring system 
on the effectiveness of the program cannot be directly inferred from 
the current study, but is certainly an avenue for future research. 
Although perhaps not an innovation in program design itself, the 
use of an already- established national database to identify 
participants (SISBEN) decreases the likelihood that beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries will react negatively to the fact that certain 
households are chosen and others left out of a CCT program. Given the 
evidence of social discord due to the confusion surrounding household-
level selection in Mexico, it seems preferable in this case that such a 
database exists to use that rather than creating a new, less 
transparent process for beneficiary selection. 
Data and Targeting 
The Colombian data and documentation were all in Spanish. The 
files were downloaded from the website of the DNP (National 
Department of Planning), specifically from a site dedicated to 
evaluation documents, Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de Resultados 
de la Gestión Pública. The program was initially implemented in 691 
out of 1060 municipalities28 in 26 departments. The municipalities had 
to meet several criteria, similar to those stipulated by the Nicaraguan 
program. In particular, participating municipalities had to have basic 
education and health infrastructure already in place and to have at 
least one bank. Additionally, and particular to Colombia, participating 
                                   
28 The baseline evaluation included 622 
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municipalities had to have fewer than 100,000 inhabitants, to not have 
received aid after the 1995 earthquake, and could not be the capital of 
any of the regional districts. Unlike with the Nicaraguan program, not 
all families within eligible geographical units were eligible to receive 
the program. Within qualifying municipalities, all families classified as 
SISBEN1 were eligible to participate in the program. At the end of 
October 2002, 407,076 families were eligible, with 362,403 families as 
beneficiaries. 
The second follow-up survey in 2006 included 9,566 households 
and 57,099 individuals. This represented 89% of the respondents 
interviewed in 2000. Of these, 5834 were children below six and 
19,386 were children and youth 0-17. Ninety-seven surveyors 
participated in the second follow-up survey, with the requirement that 
all who participated in the follow up had to also have participated in 
the baseline survey collection.  
   
Table 12 
Survey sample sizes, Colombia 
Unit Baseline Second follow-up (end of 
pilot) 
Municipality 122 122 
Households 11,462 9,566 
Individuals 68,608 57,411 
Individuals over 7 51,003 19,386 
Source: IFS,2003; 2006, Instructions to evaluation data, FA website 
 
The data consists of a number of modules, containing household, 
individual, program participation, etc. data. Additionally, there is a 
module specific to gathering information on each municipality as a 
whole; one devoted to educational institutions; and one to health 
institutions.  
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Research on Familias and Acción has mostly been conducted by 
Attanasio et al. of the Institute for Fiscal Studies. In addition to impact 
evaluations (in 2005 and 2006), the team has conducted research on 
the program's effect on consumption (Attanasio & Mesnard, 2006) and 
child health (Attanasio et al., 2004). The impact evaluations showed 
evidence of increased school enrollment, with greater impact for older 




CHAPTER 5:  NICARAGUAN DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND 
FINDINGS 
HOUSEHOLD AND INDIVIDUAL LEVEL DATA 
Control and Treatment 
There were two variables in the Nicaraguan data set that could 
be considered for use in the impact evaluation of this program. The 
first, “treatment,” reflects the original designation by program 
designers in the evaluation team. In the initial sampling, the number 
of control and treatment individuals was roughly proportional. Once 
selected, however, representatives of the comarcas were given the 
opportunity either to accept or to reject participation in the program. 
There were some comarcas initially selected into the treatment group 
that did not actually participate in the program as well as households 
within participating comarcas that did not participate. The dataset 
contains a distinct dummy variable for each household to reflect the 
acceptance of the program in addition to the dummy for mere 
selection. A slightly smaller number of eligible comarcas and 
households actually participated in the program, leaving a smaller 
proportion of individuals in the true treatment group. For purpose of 
this study, since the goal was to determine the actual effect of the 







Numbers and Percentages of Comparison, Treatment and Accepted at Start of 
Program 
 comparison “treatment” 
Individual (N = 9747) 4827 49.5% 4920 50.5% 
Household (N = 1746) 875 50.1% 871 49.9% 
Community (comcens) (N 
= 42) 
21 50% 21 50% 
Actual Participation  
 comparison “accepted” 
Individual 5077 52.1% 4670 47.9% 
Household 958 54.9% 788 45.1% 
 
Table 14 
Numbers and Percentages of Comparison, Treatment and Accepted at end of 
Program 
This comparison “treatment” 
Individual (N= 9482) 4708 49.7% 4774 50.3% 
Household (N = 1453) 687 47.3 766 52.7% 
Community (comcens) 21 50% 21 50% 
Actual Participation  
 comparison “accepted” 
Individual 4923 51.9% 4559 48.1% 
Household 726 50% 727 50% 
 
Family and Community Level Characteristics and Parental 
Preferences 
The descriptive statistics for the family and community-level 
variables were taken directly from the IFPRI dataset at baseline 
(2000). As shown in the above tables, there were 1746 households in 
the sample in 2000, and 1453 in the final sample. The sample for 
which all three-panel observations (2000, 2001 and 2002) were made 
is 1359 households. As is evident, at the end of the program, the 
proportion of control and treatment households remaining was almost 
identical.   
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Overall, households averaged six members, but ranged in size 
from a single individual to 18 members. Approximately 60% of adults 
reported being married or living together as couples. This varied some 
by gender, the most significant difference being a greater proportion of 
single males and a greater portion of separated or widowed females 
(Table 15).  
 
Table 15 
Civil Status at Baseline, Over 25 
 Total Male Female 
Together (civil union) 38% 41% 35% 
Married 39% 40% 38% 
Separated 7% 3% 10% 
Divorced 1% 1% 1% 
Widowed 8% 4% 11% 
Single 9% 12% 6% 
 
Marginalization and Poverty Index 
The marginality index was compiled based on several indicators 
of poverty. The concentration of marginality indices was then used to 
construct a priority level for each comarca, with priorities 1 and 2 
being eligible for the pilot phase of the RPS. This is reflected in the 
pilot data: each individual either had a 1st or 2nd level priority assigned 
to his or her comarca. Overall, about three quarters of the individuals 
(all ages) in the RPS baseline survey lived in comarcas with priority 
level 2, leaving a quarter who belonged to the very most impoverished 
communities in the surveyed area. A slightly higher percentage of 
treatment individuals than control lived in comarcas with the highest 
concentration of poverty. Practically speaking, this means that a 
slightly greater proportion of the treatment households were 
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experiencing severe poverty at the start of the program than were 
control households.  
 
Table 16 
Marginality by Priority Index (individuals) 








Priority Index  (N = 9747     
1 22.6 20.2 24.9 
2 77.4 79.8 75.1 
4.7** 
 
A greater percentage still of the poorest communities accepted 
participation in RPS, such that the final treatment sample population 
was 25% of priority 1 and the control sample only 20% priority 1. The 
baseline difference in poverty levels between the treatment and non-
treatment groups has been discussed by other evaluators of the RPS 
program as a factor that slightly diminishes the quality of the 
experimental design (Maluccio & Flores, 2004). Measuring outcomes 
before and after the intervention, however, helps to minimize any bias 
that would come from this sampling error.  
Literacy and Schooling Characteristics 
The RPS survey collected literacy information through self-
reporting by respondents. Respondents were given the options: “can 
only read,” “can read and write” and “can neither read nor write.” Of 
the individuals over 25, taken to represent an overall indication of the 
state of literacy, 36% classified themselves as fully literate (able to 





Table 17  







Literacy, Over 25 
N = 2962 
   
Can read and write 36 39 33 
Can only read 4 4 3 
Can neither read nor write 60 57 64 
Level of Schooling Attained 
N = 2962 
   
None 53 50 56 
Preschool 0 1 1 
Adult Education 2 2 2 
Primary 42 45 39 
Secondary 3 3 3 
Technical (All Levels) 0 0 0 
University 0 0 0 
 



























Mother’s Educational Attainment 
Creating the variables related to mother’s educational 
attainment was somewhat indirect given the structure of the RPS data 
set. A separate data table was created for women, and then those who 
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had classified themselves as “head” or “spouse of head” for the 
variable “relationship with head of household” were further separated 
out to identify the probable mothers from single women. Their 
educational attainment variables were renamed to indicate that these 
were the characteristics of mothers, and then matched back to their 
children in the 7-13 dataset by household ID. Thus, for example, any 
children with household ID 001 would have had the mother’s 
educational attainment variables associated with the female head or 
spouse with household ID 001. Approximately 50% of mothers had 
received no schooling. Almost all of the rest had attended primary 




Mothers’ educational attainment by level 
 Frequency Percent 
None 2757 51% 
Adult Education 72 1% 
Primary 2425 45% 
Secondary 121 2% 
Technical 8 0% 




Mothers’ Educational Attainment by Grade 
 Frequency Percent 
None 2757 51% 
1 427 8% 
2 572 11% 
3 708 13% 
4 506 9% 
5 190 4% 
6 229 4% 
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Whether Parents are Present in the Home 
Using the 7-13 dataset, 21% of the children reported having 
fathers that did not live at home. A smaller percentage of mothers, 
8%, were reported as not living at home. The absence of a parent is 
suspected to change the preferences of the remaining parent with 
respect to resource allocation. This is particularly the case if the absent 
parent is unable to contribute funds to the remaining family. It is not 
possible in the RPS data set to determine whether the absent parent is 
contributing funds. 
Income/Consumption 
Average annual per capita expenditure for all households, taken 
from the household module of the RPS survey, was C$3,880 at 
baseline, and C$3,871 at the end of the program. Even without 




Average annual expenditures, all households 
 Baseline 
N = 1581 
End of program 
N = 1397 


























a Exchange-rate in 2000 was 12.68 (CIA Factbook) 
b 2000 inflation adjuster as of January 2009 was 0.79946 





BASELINE MEASURES, STUDENT-AGED POPULATION 
As described in Chapter 1, the overall goal of the RPS program 
was to reduce the transmission of intergenerational poverty through 
various means, and especially through increased schooling at the 
primary level. The major focus of the program was on children of 
primary school age, particularly ages 7-13. Cash and other benefits 
were directed to these children. The remainder of this analysis 
examines the preliminary and post-program states of educational and 
work-related variables, and the effect of the RPS program on those 
who participated in it.  
Enrollment 
As self-reported by the children, total enrollment at the start of 
the program was 66%. As would be expected of this age range, the 
vast majority of students were in primary school in 2000. Of these, 
most attended a traditional public school. Sixty-nine percent of the 
children reported being in a multi-grade classroom. This could either 
be evidence of supply-side constraints or of low demand, making it not 
cost effective to have separate classes for each grade. 
Confirming the UN poverty assessment findings of 2001, there is 
an evident drop off in enrollment from grade to grade (Table 21). In 
2000, 42% of enrolled children between ages 6 and 15 were 
concentrated in the first grade, while only 3% could be found in the 
sixth grade. In fact, the majority of 6, 7, and 8-year-olds were in the 
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first grade at the baseline of the program and the majority of nine-
year-olds were in the second grade. Literature suggests that 
concentration in the lower grades may be attributable to a number of 
factors including a late start to education, high attrition each year, and 
low promotion rates due to failure to pick up the appropriate skills to 
move from first to other grades.29  
 
 
Table  21 
Distribution of enrollment by grade and age (6-15), Baseline (2000) 
 Grade  
Age 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
6 116 11 24 1   152 
7 188 35 11 1   235 
8 137 67 26 2   232 
9 81 85 52 16 1  235 
10 51 68 47 34 7 2 209 
11 51 33 45 47 38 10 224 
12 39 35 40 49 26 15 204 
13 30 32 22 28 33 24 169 
14 27 16 20 26 18 14 121 
15 26 17 11 10 19 21 104 
Total 746 399 298 214 142 86 1885 
 
Plotting age by percent and number of children enrolled, the 
pattern becomes clearer (Figure 3). Presented in linear form, age 15 
appears to be the point at which the proportion of unenrolled children 
begins to surpass that of enrolled children. The falloff in enrollment, 
however, begins before that, at around the age of 11.   
 
 
                                   
29 Certain government administrations had, in fact, instituted automatic promotion 
from first to second grade in order to counter the widespread phenomenon of holding 
children back in the first grade (Arnove & Torres, 2003), but this policy was not in 






















Reasons for Non-Enrollment 
All RPS respondents ages 6 through 17 who were not enrolled 
were asked why they were not enrolled and given a number of options. 
In the communities served by RPS, the stated reasons for not enrolling 
largely affirmed human capital theory assumptions. The major reason 
given by both boys and girls for not enrolling in school was “problemas 
economicos” (economic problems). Additionally, there were a small 
percentage of children (13% of boys and 4% of girls) who identified 
distance from school as a reason for not attending. This does suggest 
that there remained some supply constraints as well, even in these 
communities that were deemed overall to have a sufficient supply of 
schools. 
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One slightly unexpected response to the question was “por edad” 
meaning “due to age.” Given that the analysis for this question was 
limited to children ages 7-15, the response that a child was not 
enrolled in school due to age is somewhat interesting. It is impossible 
to determine from the available data what factors contributed to this 
perception; be it lack of access to secondary schooling, rendering the 
conceivable age of schooling to be limited; community perceptions of 
appropriate schooling; misunderstanding or mistaken responding to 
the question; or dropping out of school if outside of the range of 
receiving benefits. For males, 8% of respondents gave this answer in 
2000, while 9% of females gave the response.  
 
Table 22. 
Reasons for Unenrollment by Gender, Baseline 
 Male Female 
Economic problems 37% 40% 
Work or labor in the fields 21% 4% 
No school nearby 13% 4% 
Age 8% 9% 
No interest 6% 0% 
Domestic labor 1% 10% 
Other1 14% 33% 
1. The remaining possible responses were: Por enfermedad (Illness); Matrícula 
cerrada (Closed enrollment); No hay grado ofrecido (Grade not offered); Falta de 
profesores (Lack of teachers); Discapacitado (Disabled); Otro (Other) 
 
Absenteeism and Retention 
Although not one of the major stated goals of RPS, increasing 
attendance has been a major educational goal for most of the 
conditional cash transfer programs to date. Insofar as attendance 
increases one’s chances of being promoted on time, and retention has 
been shown to have the effect of increasing the chances of dropping 
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out, increased attendance (reducing absences) contributes directly 
toward the goals of increasing enrollment and reducing dropout. 
In the RPS dataset, attendance rolls from participating schools 
were not available. Thus, it was necessary to use a proxy for 
attendance: “days missed last month,” as self-reported by 
interviewees. Before the RPS program was implemented, 63% of 
children had had perfect attendance for the previous month. The 
reasons for missing school were varied, with illness cited most often. 
Returns to schooling: Schooling Expectations and distance to 
school 
The RPS survey had respondents indicate their desire for 
schooling with the question, “What level of study would you like to 
reach?" For purpose of this study, this variable is considered a proxy 
for schooling expectations. At the beginning of the program, a simple 
majority of all male respondents (42%) sought to complete secondary 
school. The rest were divided more or less evenly between wanting to 
finish primary school and wanting to finish university. For females, the 





Schooling Expectations, baseline  
 Male Female 
Primary 29% 27% 
Secondary 42% 42% 
University 26% 28% 
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Direct cost: School Fees and Expenditures 
Because one of the key components of the RPS was to provide 
income assistance to the poor to allow them to increase expenditures 
in key areas, the RPS household survey also collected information on 
the costs associated with schooling encountered by each household. All 
individuals - parents and children - were asked about monthly 
scholarships and other fees, transportation costs, enrollment fees, and 
costs for uniforms, supplies and books. In a different part of the 
survey, household heads summarized expenditures for their entire 
households by major categories. This simplified number is used later in 
the regression model. The detail is used here for greater transparency 
of spending, though it is considered less reliable since children's 
responses were included. This presentation and way of asking 
questions related to expenditure in the original RPS data set were 
scattered enough to call into question the reliability of the data.  
 
Table 24 
School Costs and Amounts, Descriptive 














Distance to school (m) N/A 201 100 - - 
Monthly Fees      
Monthly fee  15 10 (7) 10 $0.79 $0.63 
Monthly scholarship fee  14 15 (13) 10 $1.18 $0.94 
Transportation 15 24 (29) 18 $1.89 $1.51 
Total N/A 47 15 $3.71 $2.97 
Annual Fees      
Annual Enrollment fee 21 15 (24) 5 $1.18 $0.94 
Uniform 48 152 (98) 130 $11.99 $9.59 
Supplies 68 45 (28) 28 $3.55 $2.84 
Books 48 8 (11) 5 $0.63 $0.50 
Total N/A 145 (173) 95 $11.44 $9.15 
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The majority of children in the RPS survey communities traveled 
to school by foot to schools nearby. Thus, fees for transportation 
appear rare, and where they exist, do not come to a significant 
amount. Enrollment fees are equally rare and when present not 
especially high. The most frequent and substantial direct costs are for 
uniforms, supplies and books. The enrollment stipend offered by RPS 
was 1,440 cordobas per year (120 per month) and the school supply 
stipend was 275 cordobas per year given in one lump sum.  
Using the expenditures reported by the household heads, overall 
average monthly educational expenditure was C$319 total and C$47 
per child at the start of the program. Assuming these to be more 
accurate estimates of school costs, the monthly stipend would have 
covered about 40% of the average educational cost per household in 
this sample. Differentials in educational expenditure by control and 
treatment households are discussed below.  
 
Table 25 
Total educational expenditures, all households 
 Baseline 
N = 1581 
End of program 
N = 1397 
 Mean Standard error Mean Standard error 
Total educational 
expenditure 
319 23 717 34.6 
Total per capita 
educational 
expenditure 
47 3.4 111 5.3 
% Educational/Total 
Expenditure 
1.24 0.00075 3.2 0.0012 
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Opportunity Cost: Trade-off between Work and Schooling 
At baseline, slightly fewer than one quarter of boys and very few 
girls reported having worked the previous week. Of those who worked, 
boys averaged nine additional hours of work per week than did girls. 
Of those who did not work, the most frequently given reason for not 
working was school/study (61% of females and 55% of males offered 
this response). A small percentage (5%) of girls stayed home and did 
domestic chores instead of working.30  
To illustrate more effectively the extent to which work competed 
directly as an alternative to schooling in the target communities before 
implementation of RPS, schooling, work and housewifery were placed 
on the same graph. The incidence of work begins to increase around 
age 9, with the chief alternative being schooling. The first age at which 
work exceeds schooling as the activity of preference is age 15. Until 
the age of 12, there were no reported instances of children foregoing 
schooling in order to stay home and perform domestic duties. At 
approximately age 16, however, housewifery surpasses schooling as 
the chief alternative for work, almost exclusively for females. The 
possible implications of these findings for future educational 
interventions are offered in the concluding chapter. 
 
                                   
30 This was the majority alternative in each case. For those that did work, the 
average number of hours worked per week for boys was 29, but the mode was 48 
and the median 30.  . The median number of hours worked by girls was 20. 23.4% 
of school agedschool-aged boys reported having worked the previous week. By 
contrast, only 4.8% of school-aged girls reported having worked. For those that did 
not work, 61% of females and 55% of males offered study as their alternative to 
work. 
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Summary of baseline characteristics for student aged children  
Although more promising than literacy and school characteristics 
for the adult population in the same communities, the statistics for 
school age children in the control and treatment villages considered for 
RPS confirmed the need for intervention at the primary school level. In 
particular, the still low rate of school enrollment, a drop-off in 
enrollment from grade to grade, and the extremely low enrollment 
manifested in later primary grades are cause for concern. This is 
especially troubling when considering that the majority of children do 
have the desire to reach secondary school; the desire does not seem 
to conform to the reality of most children. The discrepancy is certainly 
largely attributable to the economic difficulties cited by the majority of 
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children not enrolled at the time of the survey, as by the inverse 





For the test of program effect on enrollment at the individual 
level, a logistic regression was created with enrollment as the 
dependent variable: 
Probability (Enrolled) = β1 (mother’s last grade reached)+ 
β2(mother present)31 + β3(number of siblings) + β4(gender) + 
β5(secondary expectations) + β6(community school distance) + 
β7(community frequency of children in multigrade classrooms) + 
β8(work dummy) + β9(age) + β10(age squared) + β11(ln 
community average educational expenditure) + β12(program 
participation) 
 
It was necessary in order to remain true to human capital theory 
that a variable for educational expenditure and a variable for total 
expenditure be used. As discussed above, using the community mean 
for school expenditure was a way of avoiding endogeneity with 
individual enrollment. The coefficient on acceptance was taken as an 
                                   
31 In addition to those included in the model, whether the father was present in the 
home was also considered.  . Having run a correlation matrix (see Appendix 2) for all 
the possible variables, however, mother and father present were found to be too 
closely correlated to use both.   
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estimate of impact. The regression was run at baseline as well as at 
the end of the pilot (2002). As presented in Table 25, at baseline, the 
acceptance variable was not significant, indicating that there was no 
significant difference in enrollment between the treatment and control 
groups at the start of the implementation. Thus, we can plausibly 
attribute any difference in enrollment at the end of the program to 
participation in the program. The variables that proved significant were 
the dummy for work, the age variables, mothers’ educational 
attainment, and community expenditure on education.  
 
Table 25 
Total educational expenditures, all households 
 Baseline 
N = 1581 
End of program 
N = 1397 
 Mean Standard error Mean Standard error 
Total educational 
expenditure 
319 23 717 34.6 
Total per capita 
educational 
expenditure 
47 3.4 111 5.3 
% Educational/Total 
Expenditure 


















Individual Model. Baseline. Effect of RPS on Enrollment. 
 Enrollment 







Ln  pc total expenditure 0.494** 1.64 0.081 0.14 
Community mean (ln per capita 
educational expenditure) 
   0.304 1.35 0.049 0.35 
Work dummy -  
1.920** 
0.15 -0.415 -1.92 
Age    
1.528** 
4.61 0.249 1.55 
Age-squared -   0.074 
** 
0.93 -0.012 -0.07 
Secondary Expectations 0.216 1.25 0.035 0.13 
Community mean school 
distance 
0.001 1.00 0.000 0.00 
Mother’s educational level    
0.176** 
1.19 0.029 0.04 
Mother present      -0.035 0.97 -0.006 0.24 
Number of siblings      -0.023 1.02 0.004 0.02 
Gender 0.104 1.11 0.017 0.13 
Community frequency of 
students in a multi-grade 
classroom 
0.004 1.00 0.000 0.00 
RPS participation “Acceptance” -0. 023 0.98 -0.004 -0.01 
Number of cases  1689   
-2 log likelihood  -802.17                
Wald chi2(13)    184.09**   
Pseudo R2  0.13   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
y  = Pr(enrolled) (predict) =  .79431083 
 
At the end of the program, participation did in fact seem 
significant even given the included controls. Although a few other 
variables were still important, RPS participation remained the third 
largest effect after work and age. Based on the marginal effect of 
acceptance, being a program participant resulted in a 7% increase in 




Individual Model. End of Pilot (2002). Effect of RPS on Enrollment. 
 Enrollment 







Ln  pc total expenditure 0.331 1.39 0.017 0.33 
Community mean (ln per capita 
educational expenditure) 
      0.108 1.12 0.006 0.28 
Work dummy -  2.146** 0.12 -0.245 0.33 
Age    3.031** 20.7 0.155 9.60 
Age-squared -  0.145** 0.87 -0.007 0.02 
Secondary Expectations   0.759** 2.14 0.039 0.61 
Community mean school 
distance 
      0.002 1.00 0.000 0.00 
Mother’s educational level  0.315** 1.37 0.016 0.09 
Mother present     -0.056 0.95 -0.003 0.43 
Number of siblings       0.037 1.04 0.002 0.05 
Gender       0.021 1.03  0.001 0.16 
Community frequency of 
students in a multigrade 
classroom 
     -0.003 0.99 -0.000 0.01 
RPS participation “Acceptance”   1.361** 3.90 0.073 1.25 
Number of cases  1715   
-2 log likelihood  504.92   
Wald chi2(13)        234.6**   
Pseudo R2  0.2131   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
Marginal effects after logit, y  = Pr(enrolled) (predict) =  .94593968 
 
A slightly abbreviated model was run at the comcens level. 
Comcens enrollment data represents the percentage enrollment. 
Therefore, enrollment in the comcens was a continuous variable and 
linear regression was used rather than logistic. Using a measure of 
educational spending would have been here endogenous; it was left 








Change in % enrollment, 2000-2002, by control and treatment comcens. 
 % Enrollment 
 Control Treatment Difference 
Baseline (2000) 76 74 -2 













Ln Average total spending per capita          -3.868 0.793 
Mean Hours worked last week   5.450* 0.037 
Age 26.882 0.830 
Age-squared -0.072 0.991 
Community mean school distance 0.057 0.058 
Mean Mother’s educational level 8.919 0.119 
Average % mother present in home 0.748 0.154 
Number of siblings 2.478 0.655 
Community frequency of students in multigrade 
classrooms 
-0.105 0.519 
RPS Treatment or Control -1.593 0.718 




    5.52** 
0.470 
Notes: 1. ) *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
            2.) Standardized coefficients not calculated because they cannot be used with 











Ln Average total spending per capita 0.227 0.200 
Mean Hours worked last week 1.779 1.108 
Age -91.714* 44.982 
Age-squared 4.747 2.219 
Community mean school distance -0.008* 0.021 
Mean Mother’s educational level 6.321 3.010 
Average % mother present in home 1.131 2.719 
Number of siblings -0.008 0.082 
RPS Treatment or Control 10.707** 2.977 
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    4.47** 
0.570 
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
 
At the community level at baseline, the model proved significant 
at the 1% level although only the number of hours worked was 
significant. Most importantly, there was no significant difference 
between control and treatment groups. The R-square and adjusted R-
square were decidedly higher than that for the individual model, 
indicating a better fit at the community level. Because the selection 
was randomized at the comcens level, this is not surprising. 
 At the end of the program, three variables were 
significant: age, average school distance and program acceptance. 
Being a treatment comcens was correlated with an 11% greater 
enrollment rate. 
Attendance and Retention Rate 
The attendance numbers were only gathered for those students 
who had answered yes to the enrollment question. After calculating 
the average number of days missed before and after the program, a 
dummy variable was used for perfect attendance or not perfect 
attendance.32 In specific terms, with regard to attendance by 
treatment group, the program appears to have yielded significant 
decreases in the number of absences for the RPS participants. Taken 
                                   
32 The model was also tried using days missed as a continuous variable with a linear 
regression.  . The results were similar, but R-squared was lower and the coefficients 
on the variables also lower. 
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as a whole, the group showed a significant difference in days missed at 
the start of the program, but the treatment group started with a 
higher absentee rate. The total treatment mean fell from 3 days at the 
start of the program to less than one day missed on average per 
month. For males, a slight mean difference in the baseline (the 
treatment group actually had a slightly higher absentee rate) became 
a significant difference, with the average number of days missed 
falling to ½. The pattern was similar for girls. 
At baseline, at the time each household was interviewed, 63% of 
boys had had perfect attendance for the previous month. The rest 
were scattered between 1 day and 22 days missed. The reasons for 
missing school were varied, with illness cited most often.  
 
Table 31 
Mean number of school days missed (Attendance), Control and Treatment, 2000-
2002 




(T – C) 
Total    
Baseline (2000) 2.6 3.1 0.5* 
After RPS (2002) 1.6 0.6 - 1.0** 
Male    
Baseline (2000) 2.7 3.3 0.6* 
After RPS (2002) 2.0 0.6 - 1.4** 
Female    
Baseline (2000) 2.5 2.9 0.4 
After RPS (2002) 1.3 0.5                       -0.8 
 
Using the regression model at baseline to control for other 
factors, the dummy variable “absence” was used to identify students 
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who had missed one or more days of school the previous month.33 
There was a slight difference between the control and treatment 
groups in baseline retention rate while controlling for other variables. 
However, future RPS participants were at that time 11% more likely to 
have missed school than the control. 
 
Table 32 
Individual Model. Baseline. Effect of RPS on Attendance.  
 Attendance 







Ln  pc total expenditure 0.010 1.010 0.002  0.156 
Community mean (ln per capita 
educational expenditure) 
-0.120 0.885  -0.028 0.243 
Work dummy 0.835** 2.305 0.204 0.282 
Age -0.220 0.803 -0.051 0.010 
Age-squared 0.010 1.010 0.002 0.181 
Secondary Expectations -0.082 0.922 -0.019 0.001 
Community mean school 
distance 
-0.004**  0.996 -0.001 0.007 
Mother’s educational level -0.035 0.965 -0.008 0.037 
Mother present 0.116 1.123 0.027 0.218 
Number of siblings -0.065** 0.938    -
0.015 
     0.027 
Gender -0.006 0.994 -0.001 0.133 
Community frequency of 
students in multigrade 
classrooms 
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.298 
RPS participation “Acceptance” 0.267* 1.306  0.113 0.243 
Number of cases  1291   
-2 log likelihood  -826.51   
Wald chi2(13)    41.79**   
Pseudo R2  0.030   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
Marginal effects after logit,      y  = Pr(absence) (predict)         =  .36757236 
 
                                   
33 The question asked how many daysdays respondents had missed the previous 
month. Those who answered “0” were coded 0 for “absence”; all other responses 
were assigned a 1 to indicate that they had missed one or more days. 
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At the end of the program, the dummy for work and the dummy 
for RPS participation showed the largest and most significant effects 
with acceptance yielding a 14% decrease in the probability of missing 
school. Working resulted in a 13% increase in the probability of a 





Individual Model. End of program. Effect of RPS on Attendance, Standard Logistic 
Regression. 
 Attendance 







Ln  pc total expenditure 0.129 1.138 0.016 0.121 
Community mean (ln per capita 
educational expenditure) 
0.193 1.213 0.025 0.145 
Work dummy     
0.816** 
2.262 0.132 0.260 
Age -0.181 0.835 -0.023 0.413 
Age-squared 0.007 1.007 0.001 0.021 
Secondary Expectations -0.239 0.788 -0.030 0.144 
Community mean school 
distance 
0.001 1.001 0.000 0.001 
Mother’s educational level -0.057 0.944 -0.007 0.041 
Mother present 0.331 1.393 0.038 0.294 
Number of siblings 0.007 1.007 0.001 0.027 
Gender 0.043 1.044 0.005 0.146 
Community frequency of 
students in multigrade 
classrooms 
-0.009* 0.991 -0.001 0.004 
RPS participation “Acceptance”    -
1.058** 
0.347 -0.139 0.170 
Number of cases  1542   
Pseudo likelihood  -655.6   
Wald chi2(13)       65.37**   
Pseudo R2  0.0451   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
Marginal effects after logit,      y  = Pr(absence) (predict)         =  .15052043 
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Although the results are encouraging, the R-squared measures 
on the absenteeism regressions are rather low, indicating that the 
variables selected do not explain many of the variations seen in 
absenteeism. Using the community level model on the comcens data, 
the RPS program still showed a positive impact on absenteeism with 
much better fitting models. For the community model, the average 
number of days missed per community was used as the dependent 
variable, and the model was analyzed using a linear regression. At 
baseline, none of the variables was significant, indicating that there 
was really no relation between attendance and any of the other factors 




Community model. Baseline. Effect of RPS on attendance. 
 Attendance 
 B S.E. 
(Robust) 
Ln Average total spending per capita 11.398 24.629 
Mean Hours worked last week -4.364 4.868 
Age -38.497 194.468 
Age-squared 1.068 9.793 
Community mean school distance -0.100 0.561 
Mean Mother’s educational level -10.598 11.041 
Average % mother present in home -0.309 0.812 
Number of siblings 11.152 7.984 
Community frequency of students in multigrade 
classrooms 
0.155 0.273 
RPS Treatment or Control 6.143 6.269 






Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
 
At the end of the program, the model was significant at the 5% 
level. Further, participating in the program yielded a significant 
 150 
difference in attendance, with RPS participant communities showing 
about 14% fewer students reporting absences the previous month. 
 
Table 35 






Ln Average total spending per capita 8.879 7.486 
Mean Hours worked last week -0.387 1.851 
Age -5.787 93.275 
Age-squared 0.382 4.609 
Community mean school distance -0.025 0.034 
Mean Mother’s educational level -4.239 4.211 
Average % mother present in home -0.295 0.388 
Number of siblings -4.804 4.352 
Community frequency of students in multigrade 
classrooms 
-0.093 0.087 
RPS Treatment or Control -13.698** 3.944 
Number of cases 42  
F 2.57*  
R Square 0.383  




The RPS household survey allowed for the classification of 
respondents as first-time enrollers in whichever grade they were 
presently enrolled, or as repeaters. The specific question was 
(translated): “first time in current grade?” and if not, how many times 
a participant had been in that grade. For simplicity, in this study the 
repetition dummy variable was used, but not the number of times 
repeating. At baseline, of the valid responses to the question, 88% of 
students responded that this was the first time they had been in the 
current grade, leaving a retention rate of 12%.  
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For both the total sample and males by themselves, the 
percentage of students repeating a grade increased for the control 
group from 2000-2002. For females this was not the case; retention 
rate fell over the period. However, for males and females, the 
retention rate for RPS participants fell over the course of the 
implementation, such that the treatment group achieved a significantly 
lower retention rate in 2002. This finding suggests that the program 
had positive results on retention, which is not especially surprising 
given its effect on attendance and the effects that attendance should 
generally have on promotion. 
 
Table 36 





(T – C) 
Total    
Baseline (2000) 13 12 -1 
After RPS (2002) 15 8     -7** 
Male    
Baseline (2000) 12 13 1 
After RPS (2002) 16 8   -8** 
Female    
Baseline (2000) 11 10 -1 
After RPS (2002) 11 6     -5** 
 
 To further explore the program effects on retention, 
logistic regression models were run before and after the program using 











Individual Model. Baseline. Effect of RPS on Retention. 
  Retention 







Ln  pc total expenditure -0.238 0.194 -0.025 0.79 
Community mean (ln per capita 
educational expenditure) 
0.176 0.262 0.018 1.19 
Work dummy -0.474 0.321 -0.058 0.62 
Age -0.220 0.465 -0.023 0.80 
Age-squared 0.007 0.024  0.001 1.01 
Secondary Expectations     
0.542** 
0.188 0.055 1.72 
Community mean school 
distance 
-0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.10 
Mother’s educational level 0.022 0.052 0.002 1.02 
Mother present 0.249 0.424  0.028 1.28 
Number of persons siblings -0.007 0.038 -0.000  0.10 
Gender -0.076 0.190 -0.008 0.93 
Community frequency of 
students in multigrade 
classrooms 
-0.010 0.010 -0.001 0.10 
RPS participation “Acceptance” 0.111 0.269 0.012 1.12 
Number of cases  1291   
Wald chi2(13)    23.06*   
Pseudo R2  0.0265   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
Marginal effects after logit,      y  = Pr(absence) (predict)         =  .88185935 
 
At the end of the program, the coefficient on participation was 
not significant. This might be in part due to the large effects shown by 
the other variables. Being female, having a higher percentage of 
multigrade classrooms within a child’s community, and being older all 
decreased the chances of being in the current grade for the first time 
or increased the probability of retention. As with absenteeism, the R-
square terms of the retention models were very low. It is quite 
possible that this reflects the fact that attendance and retention are 
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more dependent on school quality, teacher choices and other school-
level variables than is initial enrollment.   
 
Table 38 
Individual Model. End of Implementation (2002). Effect of RPS on Retention. 
 Retention 







Ln  pc total expenditure 0.087 0.156 0.008 1.09 
Community mean (ln per capita 
educational expenditure) 
-0.017 0.244 -0.002 0.98 
Work dummy -0.397  0.267  -0.038 0.67 
Age     -2.771** 0.713 -0.229 0.06 
Age-squared      0.143** 0.037 0.012 1.15 
Secondary Expectations -0.207 0.209  -0.017 0.81 
Community mean school 
distance 
0.001 0.002 0.000 1.00 
Mother’s educational level 0.083 0.070 0.007 1.09 
Mother present 0.580 0.327 0.059 1.79 
Number of siblings 0.022 0.033 0.002 1.02 
Gender    -0.476** 0.177  -0.040 0.62 
Community frequency of 
students in multigrade 
classrooms 
   -0.020**  0.007  -0.002 0.98 
RPS participation “Acceptance” 0.480 0.298  0.040 1.62 
Number of cases  1542   
Wald chi2(13)     49.01**   
Pseudo R2  0.0753   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
Marginal effects after logit,      y  = Pr(absence) (predict)         =  .90926765 
 
The model fit for the community regression was better than for 
the individual regression. Retention rates were used as the dependent 
variable and linear regression was used to measure impact. The R-
Square and Adjusted R-Square at baseline were very low, the model 
insignificant, and none of the individual variables significant, again 
indicating basically that retention rates are almost perfectly random or 
not at all well explained by any of the variables chosen in this model. 
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At the end of the program, however, the R-Square terms were 
acceptably high, the model significant at the 1% level, and program 
participation significant at the 5% level (t =0.015). RPS appears to 
have lowered the retention rate in RPS communities by 6% over that 










Ln Average total spending per capita 13.897 11.450 
Mean Hours worked last week 1.177 2.566 
Age  -24.187 87.194 
Age-squared 0.944 4.441 
Community mean school distance -0.019 0.024 
Mean Mother’s educational level -1.390 3.385 
Average % mother present in home 0.028 0.292 
Number of siblings 1.490 4.421 
Community frequency of students in multigrade classrooms 0.183 0.119 
RPS Treatment or Control -1.070 3.844 
Number of cases 42  
F 0.65  
R Square 0.118  










Ln Average total spending per capita 8.578 5.310 
Mean Hours worked last week -2.207** 0.731 
Age 156.63 70.265 
Age-squared -7.860* 3.487 
Community mean school distance -0.027 0.022 
Mean Mother’s educational level -1.147 2.641 
Average % mother present in home -0.000 0.240 
Number of siblings -2.551 3.565 
Community frequency of students in multigrade classrooms 0.134 0.076 
RPS Treatment or Control -6.257* 2.421 




    7.42** 
 0.473 
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
 
Schooling Expectations 
Dummy variables were created for the major educational levels: 
primary school, secondary school, and university. At baseline, there 
was no significant initial difference in expectations. No other variables 
proved significant. Unlike the other variables, the model after the 
program also did not reveal any significant difference in secondary 
expectations. The program seems not to have had much effect in this 
area. This was not however, a goal of the program, and so might not 
have been as scrupulously recorded as it could have been. It is 
possible that greater results could be extracted through greater focus 
on this area of the survey or through greater focus within such a 
program on increasing expectations. 
Additionally, in looking at the table of frequencies for schooling 
expectations before and after, it appears that both control and 
treatment groups increased by about 3% in the percentage of students 
who expected to reach secondary school. The lack of significance was 
most likely diminished by the fact that both groups showed 
improvement in secondary expectations. 
 
Table 41 
Frequency of schooling expectations before and after RPS implementation 
 Control Treatment 
 Baseline After Baseline After 
Primary 25% 21% 24% 19% 
Secondary 45% 48% 41% 44% 





Individual Model. Baseline. Effect of RPS on schooling expectations. 
 Schooling expectations 







Ln  pc total expenditure  -0.076 0.160 -0.019 0.93 
Community mean (ln per capita 
educational expenditure) 
-0.157 0.247  -0.038 0.85 
Work dummy  0.106 0.252 0.026 1.11 
Age -0.155 0.329 -0.038 0.86 
Age-squared 0.008 0.017 0.002 1.01 
Community mean school 
distance 
 0.002 0.002 0.001 1.00 
Mother’s educational level -0.058 0.041 -0.014 0.94 
Mother present  -0.150 0.284 -0.037 0.86 
Number of siblings -0.006 0.033 -0.001 0.99 
Gender -0.014 0.119  -0.004 0.99 
Community frequency of 
students in multigrade 
classrooms 
 0.002  0.006 0.001 1.00 
RPS participation “Acceptance” -0.348 -0.348  -0.085 0.7 
Number of cases  1291   
Wald chi2(13)    17.42   
Pseudo R2  0.0161   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 






Individual Model. End of Implementation (2002). Effect of RPS on schooling 
expectations. 
 Schooling expectations 







Ln  pc total expenditure -0.085 0.135 -0.021 0.918 
Community mean (ln per capita 
educational expenditure) 
-0.029 0.226 -0.007 0.971 
Work dummy  0.400 0.341 0.099 1.492 
Age -0.145 0.224 -0.036 0.865 
Age-squared 0.006 0.011 0.001 1.006 
Community mean school 0.002 0.002 -0.001  0.998 
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distance 
Mother’s educational level -0.015 0.041 -0.004 0.985 
Mother present 0.001 0.275 0.002  1.001 
Number of persons in household 0.043 0.032  0.011 1.044 
Gender 0.098 0.104 0.025 1.103 
Community frequency of 
“multigrd” 
 -0.002  0.009  -0.000 0.998 
RPS participation “Acceptance” -0.149 0.305 -0.037 0.862 
Number of cases  1542   
Wald chi2(13)    13.45   
Pseudo R2  0.0125   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
Marginal effects after logit,      y  = Pr(absence) (predict)         =  .47760463 
 
 
Summary of Findings 
 Despite the high poverty and low initial educational 
outcomes experienced in Nicaragua, the RPS program showed overall 
an extremely positive impact on schooling outcomes, both at the 
individual and community levels. The particular model chosen 
appeared most applicable to enrollment, but enrollment, retention and 
attendance all demonstrated good model fit at the community level, 
indicating that the selection of variables was well justified. RPS 
participants were far more likely to be enrolled in school, as well as to 
attend school more often and be held back less. Of the outcome 
variables tested, only schooling expectations showed less of an effect 
than might be hoped. This is likely due, however, to a similar increase 
in non-program participants rather than the lack of increase in the 
treatment group.  
Of the other variables besides program acceptance, opportunity 
cost and returns to schooling (the work and age variables), as well as 
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income and mother’s education, proved to be very important for 
predicting enrollment at the individual level. The greatest effect 
resulted from whether a child was working or not. For the other 
outcome variables, significant independent variables were fewer in 
number and varied from model to model, making it more difficult to 
make broad generalizations. Although secondary expectations were 
not informative in Nicaragua, comparison with Colombia is informative. 
The results of those regressions were presented for that purpose. 




CHAPTER 6:  COLOMBIAN DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS & 
FINDINGS 
BASELINE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Household and individual level data 
As described in the discussion of program targeting, within 
qualifying municipalities all households registered under SISBEN1 were 
eligible. The treatment group was drawn from the SISBEN1 households 
within eligible municipalities, and then control municipalities were 
chosen to match the treatment group. For the current study, the 
treatment variable was created by matching the municipality control 
status to households and individuals. Overall, at baseline there were 
roughly 50% each of control and treatment at the individual, 
household and community levels. When divided into age groups, the 
targeted 7-17 year-olds had a greater proportion of treatment 
individuals, approximately 60%. 
By the end of the pilot program, more of the municipalities had 
received treatment, so the percentage of control households and 












Numbers and Percentages of Control and Treatment at Start of Program 




Individual (N = 
68,608) 
28,268 50% 20,753 30% 19,587 29 % 
Ages 7-17(23,793) 9877 42 % 7165 30% 6751 28 % 
Household (N = 
11,462 ) 




65 53% 28 23% 29 24% 
 
Table 45 
Numbers and Percentages of Control and Treatment at end of Program 
 Control Treatment  
Individual (N = 
57,411) 
17,314 30% 40,097 60% 
Ages 7-17 (13,116) 5400 41% 7716 59% 
Household (N = 
9,566) 
2890 30% 6676 60% 
Community 
(municipality) (N = 
122) 
52 43 % 70 57 % 
 
Family and community level characteristics and parental preferences 
Many more households and individuals participated in the 
Colombian program than in the Nicaraguan RPS. As in Nicaragua, the 
average number of members per household was six, but there was a 
larger range, from a single member to 28. Within those households, 
the average number of children between the ages of 7 and 17 was also 
calculated. Families averaged three children within this age range, but 
as depicted in the figure, all points of the distribution of children 




































Literacy and schooling characteristics 
As in Nicaragua, literacy information was gathered via self-
reporting by respondents. Each was asked the simple questions, “Can 
you read?” and “Can you write?” Following the literacy trends 
countrywide (Appendix 4), a much higher percentage of individuals 
over 25 in the Colombian sample were literate than in Nicaragua, with 
males reporting approximately 5% greater literacy. Despite the slight 
difference in literacy between the genders, educational attainment for 
the population over 25 was almost identical for males and females. 
The majority of adults had completed some primary school but had not 
finished. One quarter of adults had been exposed to no schooling at 












Table 46  







Literacy, Over 25 
N = 24,464 
   
Can read 70.0% 72.4% 67.3% 
Can write 73.1% 71.5% 67.5% 
Level of Schooling Attained 
N = 24,464 
   
None 25.1% 23.8% 26.5% 
Preschool 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Primary (complete) 15% 15.7% 14.2% 
Primary (incomplete) 45.1% 45.4% 44.9% 
Secondary (complete) 3.8% 4% 3.5% 
Secondary (incomplete) 9.5% 9.6% 9.4% 
Technical (All Levels) 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 
University 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 
 
 








































The variable for mothers’ educational attainment was created 
similarly for Colombia as Nicaragua. A separate table was created for 
women who had identified themselves as household heads34 or 
                                   
34 22% of household heads were identified as women. Although not a focus of the 
study, some research has suggested that households headed by women are more 
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spouses. Their educational attainment was then matched back to the 
data set for children 7-17 as the variable mother’s educational 
attainment. The distribution for mothers’ educational attainment is 
nearly identical to that of females as a whole. All unenrolled individuals 
were also asked at what age they had left school. The majority of 
mothers had left between the ages of 10 and 15, with a peak at the 
age of 12. This latter variable performed better in the regressions, so 
was used in the regression analysis. 
 
Table 47 
Mothers’ educational attainment by level 
 Frequency Percentage 
None 3426 22.9% 
Primary (complete) 2433 16.3% 
Primary (incomplete) 7114 47.6% 
Secondary (complete) 443 3.0% 
Secondary (incomplete) 1349 9.0% 
Technical (All Levels) 32 0.2% 
University 15 0.1% 
  




















                                                                                                        
likely to be poor (Skoufias, 2001). Additional research might focus on how female-
headed households are faring under the program. 
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Income/consumption 
The household head provided detailed expenditure information 
for the entire family in a number of categories. For purpose of 
analysis, the reported total average monthly expenditure was used.35 
In order to calculate expenditure in current dollars, the average in 
cordobas was first converted to US dollars using the exchange rate for 
the year in question.36  It was then adjusted for inflation using the 
United States consumer price index. At baseline, the average monthly 
expenditure was US $55. This means that on average, the sample 
contains families living on less than $2 a day. Considering inflation, the 
overall average monthly expenditure was approximately $30 higher by 
the end of the program.   
 
Table 48 
Average monthly expenditures, all households (N = 11,448), Córdobas and 2009 
US$ 
 Baseline End of program 










$55.00 - $89.00 - 
Total monthly per capita 
expenditure (pesos) 
33,406 222 .99 38,788 252.77 








                                   
35  Detailed weekly expenditure was also calculated in 2003 using the detailed 
listing, but when multiplied to create the monthly total only differed from the 
estimated monthly total by $5-$7. 
36 Source: CIA factbook, 2008. 
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Baseline measures, Student-aged population  
Enrollment 
At baseline (2003), 82% of children ages 7-17 were enrolled in 
school, with approximately two-thirds in primary school and one-
quarter in secondary. Children were asked how many students were in 
their classrooms. The average number of students per class was 30 at 
baseline, but ranged from 3 to a reported maximum of 70. Although 
some school data was collected, inconsistencies in the data made it 
difficult to match the school to the individual child. In the below 
regressions, the average number of students per community was 




Levels of schooling for enrolled children, baseline (2003) Colombia 
 Frequency Percentage 
No schooling 257 1% 
Preschool 346 2% 
Currently in primary 12,147 68% 
Completed primary 423 2% 
Currently in secondary 4657 26% 
 
The tables and figures for enrollment by age and distribution of 
grade by age at baseline indicate that peak enrollment occurred 
around the age of 9, and began to fall off rapidly after age 11. This 
mirrors the information collected for mothers above, indicating that 
the highest number of individuals left school at the age of 12.The age 
at which overall unenrollment surpassed that of enrollment was three 
years later than in Nicaragua, at age 17. Unlike in Nicaragua, where 
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the highest number of students was concentrated in the first grade, 
the highest number of students in Colombia was concentrated in the 
second grade. As in Nicaragua, there was a higher variability in the 
ages of students found within each grade than one generally expects 
in developed countries, and the age at which children entered first 
grade was later. 
 


















Distribution of enrollment by grade and age (seven to 17), Baseline (2003) 
Grade 
Age 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total 
7 1146 692 98 12 2 1 3    1 2059 
8 631 845 527 75 8   1 1  1 2128 
9 369 596 616 452 70 7   2 1  2132 
10 208 396 493 564 356 57 5 1 3   2092 
11 123 269 337 466 521 286 50 1 1  1 2064 
12 71 168 225 310 435 393 210 25 5   1854 
13 32 98 139 192 304 368 299 160 22 1  1627 
14 22 61 79 117 186 260 256 215 127 29 1 1366 
15 14 25 49 63 106 162 191 191 191 100 19 1121 
16 8 18 18 29 53 89 123 131 158 155 77 867 
17 1 9 5 13 29 35 67 83 107 127 132 623 
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Reasons for non-enrollment 
As in Nicaragua, those who were not enrolled were asked the 
reason for their nonenrollment. In Colombia, however, respondents 
could offer more than one answer. For each option, respondents 
answered yes or no to indicate whether this was a major factor 
preventing them from being enrolled in school. The most frequently 









Table 51  
Reasons for non-enrollment by gender, Baseline 
 Total Male Female 
Cost 58% 55% 63 % 
Work 19% 23% 12 % 
No school nearby 7% 6% 8 % 
Do not like to study 30% 36 % 20 % 
Domestic labor 16% 15 % 18 % 
 
As in Nicaragua, and consistent with the theory that motivated 
conditional cash transfer programs, the most frequently stated reason 
for not being enrolled in school was the cost of schooling. This 
sentiment was expressed even more often in Colombia than it had 
been in Nicaragua, but the wording of the economic response was 
slightly different between the two countries. In Nicaragua, the 
response was “economic problems,” whereas in Colombia it was “cost,” 
presumably of schooling itself. It is possible that the more general 
“economic problems” framing of the response did not fully translate to 
respondents as meaning the cost of schooling itself. The inability to 
choose more than one option in the Nicaraguan case undoubtedly 
affected the response to this question. Whereas in Nicaragua work was 
the next most frequently offered reason, in Colombia that response 
ranked third, after expressed dislike of studying. It is possible that this 
increase in dislike of study in the Colombian sample is due to the 
presence of older children.  
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Absenteeism and retention 
Attendance rolls were not available with the data for Familias en 
Accion. Children were asked whether they had missed any days the 
previous month. If they had, they were then asked to estimate the 
number of days missed. At baseline (2003), of the students who were 
enrolled, 75% reported perfect attendance - not having missed any 
days of school the preceding month. Of those that had missed some 
days, the average was 3, with the great majority missed due to illness. 
The full range of possible reasons and their frequency of reportage are 
presented below. As with the other measures, the stated incidence of 
perfect attendance was higher than for Nicaragua. 
 
Table 52 
Major reasons for missing school, 2003 
 Frequency Percentage 
Illness 2663 59% 
Did not want to go 375 8% 
Work 59 1% 
Housework 174 4% 
Lack of money for classes 217 5% 
Cancellation of class 214 5% 
Other 831 18% 
   
 
Returns to schooling 
The most meaningful measure of returns to schooling in the 
Colombian dataset was schooling expectations. A beneficial innovation 
in the Colombian evaluation survey was to distinguish between the 
level of schooling desired and the level of schooling that students 
expected to achieve. There was a striking disparity between the 
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expectations and desires of both males and females at the start of the 
program. While most students of both genders stated that they 
expected to complete primary or secondary school, approximately 
39% of males and 46% of females expressed a desire to attend 
university. It is important to note that secondary expectations were 
much higher in Colombia than in Nicaragua, by nearly 20%, 
representing a much higher perceived return to  schooling in that 
country. It is also evident from the table that male and female 
expectations were quite similar. 
 
Table 53 
Schooling Expectations & Desires, baseline  
 Male Female 
 Expect Desire Expect Desire 
Primary 28% 10% 25% 7% 
Secondary 60% 48% 62% 46% 
University 9% 39% 11% 46% 
 
 
Direct costs: school fees and expenditures 
Very similarly to the Nicaraguan evaluation, each respondent age 
7 or above who was enrolled in school was asked to estimate school-
related expenditures in a number of categories. Unfortunately, unlike 
the Nicaraguan case, the detailed expenditure information completed 
by household heads did not include a good summary measure of 
educational expenditures for the entire household. In the regressions 
below, the self-reported educational expenditure data was aggregated 
to the community level, and then matched back to each child aged 7 


















2003 US$ 2009 US$ 
Monthly 
2009 US$ 
Enrollment fee 19,377 
(213.17) 
10,000 $6.73 $5.79 $0.48 
Transportation 3055 (237) 1000 $1.06 $0.91 $0.08 
Uniform 41,846 (346) 32,000 $14.54 $12.51 $1.04 
Supplies 19,824 (150) 15,000 $6.89 $5.93 $0.49 
Books 22,392 (584) 14,000 $7.78 $6.70 $0.56 
Total 45,520 (379) 27,000 $15.82 $13.61 $1.13 
 
As presented in the table on school costs, transportation is by far 
the lowest expenditure. Eighty eight percent of students in the pilot 
communities were able to walk to school.37 Uniforms and books 
comprised the next two largest categories of expenditure. As 
mentioned in the section describing the Colombian context, although 
education is supposed to be free, it is legal for schools to charge 
enrollment fees and uniforms are required nearly across-the-board. 
The distribution of school related costs, then, is not surprising. The 
average total expenditure for education was approximately 2% of total 
household expenditure. In addition to the reported annual costs, some 
                                   
37 Of the remaining students, 5% traveled via non-motorized private transportation, 
presumably bicycle or donkey, 3% via public transportation, and 2% each by private 
car or school - provided transportation. 
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students reported costs for rent, photocopies or food served in school. 
Only the core annual costs were used in the regression analysis. 
If one assumes that the estimate above accurately reflects the 
annual cost of schooling, the 12,000 pesos per primary school enrollee 
and 24,000 pesos per secondary enrollee per month should have more 
than covered the educational costs. The extent to which the annual 
stipend amount exceeded the stated annual educational expenditures, 
however, either indicates that there are categories missing from the 
survey that comprise large amounts of educational spending or that 
students underreported expenditures. Given the ages of the students 
in question, this is a definite possibility. The reported annual costs in 
Colombia were similar in magnitude to those in Nicaragua, with the 
total cost about $2 higher, as measured in current dollars. 
 
Opportunity cost: Trade-off between work and schooling 
In the Colombian survey, all individuals aged seven or above 
were asked which activity had occupied the majority of their time the 
preceding week. The three most commonly reported activities were 
work, household affairs and study. There was no distinction made 
between domestic labors and running a business out of the home. As 
apparent from the below table, males were almost twice as likely as 
females to have worked, and less than a third as likely to have spent 
the majority of their time on household affairs. Interestingly when 
compared with the disparities in the other two categories, the 
proportion of males and females who spent the majority of their time 
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studying was almost equal. We can infer from this and the other 
schooling data that while schooling outcomes are similar between the 




    
Table 55 
Percentage of individuals stating study, work and housework as major activities by 
gender, Baseline (2003)   
 Male Female 
Worked  40% 22% 
Household affairs  8% 33% 
Studied   33% 35% 
   
 
Graphing these three domains by age on the same axis, it 
appears that study remains the primary activity until the age of 14, 
and then is surpassed by both housework and work. Since enrollment 
is still high at age 14, it is likely that even those students who were in 
school had to devote a significant amount of time to work and/or 
household affairs. For the total population as well as for females, the 
proportion of children reporting responsibilities outside school 
increased steadily with age, with no clear preference for work inside or 
outside the home. For males, however, the percentage of work done 
inside the home exceeded that done outside the home until age 15. 







Figure 12. Percentage of individuals stating study, work and housework as 
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Figure 13. Percentage of females stating study, work and housework as 
major activities   
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Figure 14. Percentage of males stating study, work and housework as major 




















Summary of baseline characteristics for student-aged 
population 
Literacy and schooling attainment at the start of the program 
were much higher than in Nicaragua, yet clearly not universal. Of 
those school-age children who were not enrolled, cost was the major 
reason, followed by disinterest and work. The targeted population had 
desires and aspirations for schooling that exceeded those of the over-
25 portion of the sample, with the vast majority expecting and desiring 
to attend secondary school or university. Although there were not 
large differences between males and females in literacy or schooling at 
any age, more girls did desire to enter university. This is likely due to 
greater job opportunities for boys who complete primary or secondary 
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school, and the resultant greater opportunity cost of school for boys. 
Given the information on total expenditures and expenditures for 
schooling, the educational stipend seems generous enough to cover a 
substantial percentage of the cost of schooling, so should be a 




As previously mentioned, the timing of the data collection for the 
baseline survey poses some problems for the interpretation of the 
findings. Evaluators asserted that the program had begun in one-third 
of the localities before the baseline measurement was taken. In order 
to somewhat make up for this, they included some retrospective 
questions on the survey for enrollment and attendance. They asked 
students whether they had been enrolled for each of the previous two 
years as well as what grade they were in and approximately how many 
days of school they had missed. In the original impact evaluation, the 
evaluators used these retrospectives measures as the ‘true’ baseline, 
and then attributed any differences in 2003 to the program.38 
 Where possible, the regressions below were run for the 
retrospective responses given regarding the 2001 calendar year. In 
those cases, the only variable that differed from the 2003 model was 
the dependent variable itself. It is thought that many of the other 
                                   
38 The evaluators compared treatment groups that had already received benefits 
with treatment groups that had not begun receiving benefits. 
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variables are relatively constant. In any case, there was no full dataset 
for years before 2003. 
 
Enrollment 
 For the test of program effect on enrollment at the 
individual level, a logistic regression very similar to that in Nicaragua 
was created with enrollment as the dependent variable: 
Probability (Enrolled) = β1(age mother left school) + β2(number 
of children) + β3(gender) + β4(ln per capita total expenditure) 
+ β5(community mean number of students per classroom) + 
β6(community mean ln per capita educational expenditure) + 
β7(work dummy) + β8(age) + β9(age squared) + 
β10(secondary expectations) + β11(participation) 
 
This same model was used for absenteeism and retention, as 
well as for the effect on secondary expectations, though in that case, 
secondary expectations were dropped from the independent variable 
list. This model is nearly identical to that in Nicaragua with the 
exception of the missing variable for mother’s presence in the home. 
This variable was not available in the Colombian data. Because it had 
very little effect in the Nicaraguan data, its absence is not thought to 
greatly affect the Colombian results. The treatment variable here 
stands for participation in the program, and was coded 0 for the 
control group and 1 for both the “tratamiento con pago” (treatment 
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with pay) and “tratamiento sin pago” (treatment without pay) 
groups.39 
Based on children's responses, there was no significant 
difference in enrollment between the treatment and control groups in 
2001, before the program started. By the time that the intended 
baseline measurement was taken, however, the treatment group 
already showed a significantly higher enrollment rate. Upon closer 
observation, it seems that the greater difference between control and 
treatment in 2003 was due mainly to a six- point drop in enrollment 
within the control group. The change in enrollment for both groups 
between the 2003 measurement and the final measurement in 2006 
was minimal. It appears that for enrollment, the program functioned 
not as much to increase enrollment for the treatment group as to 














                                   
39 The regression in 2003 was also run with “treatment with pay” coded as the only 
treatment group and “treatment without pay” coded as control.  . The coefficients 
were nearly identical.  . The coding reported in this analysis reflects the belief that 
once families are enrolled in the program, whether or not they have received 
benefits, they will behave as program participants. 
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Table 56 
Percent enrollment in 2001, at baseline (2003) and end of program by 
treatment group 
 Control % Treatment 
% 
Difference %40 
2001 (retrospective) 83.0% 85.2%          2.2% 
Baseline 77.0% 84.7%    7.7%** 
Difference between 2001 and 
2003 
-6.0% -0.5% 5.5% 
After Familias en Acción  76.9% 84.5%    7.6%** 
Difference between 2001 and 
2006 
-6.1% -0.7% 5.4% 
 
Plotted by age, it is evident that in 2003, program participants 
enrolled with a higher frequency than control participants at every 
age, and that the gap between them widened for older children. By the 
age of 17, there was a 12% difference in enrollment between the two 
groups. Focusing only on the older children by gender, it appears that 
much of the overall difference resulted from increased enrollment for 
boys. Up until the age of 17, girls’ enrollment was constant between 
the control and treatment groups. It was also quite a bit higher than 













                                   
40 Chi-square test was performed to determine significance: r (2001) = 10.8, df = 1; 












Baseline (2003). Enrollment by age and treatment group 
Age N Control Treatment Difference 
9 26 75 100 25 
10 1015 95 99 4 
11 1839 93 97 4 
12 1877 89 94 5 
13 1829 84 91 7 
14 1796 78 84 6 
15 1734 71 81 10 
16 1583 60 70 10 




Baseline (2003). Enrollment by Gender, Age and Treatment Group – older children 
only 
 Male Female 
Age Treatment Control Treatment  Control 
14 75 72 85 85 
15 71 64 73 74 
16 63 64 73 74 
17 55 49 69 55 
                                   




Using a logistic regression model in 2003 and 2006, as well as 
the retrospective enrollment measure to determine program effect in 
the presence of other variables, the similarity of enrollment rates in 
2001 was confirmed; the treatment variable was not significant. 
Several of the other variables were significant, however: mother’s 
education, gender, per child household expenditure, work, age and 
secondary expectations. The community average number of students 
per classroom was significant at the 5% level. Of these, per capita 
household expenditure, work and secondary expectations showed the 
largest effects, with expenditure and expectations each increasing the 
probability of enrollment by 15%. This is in contrast to the Nicaraguan 
data, where secondary expectations had very little effect. This may 
well be due to the fact that the Colombian data included older 
students, for whom the prospect of secondary school would be a lot 
more relevant. The model overall was also significant, and the R 
squared term suggests that this is an acceptable model for enrollment 

















Individual Model. 2001. Effect of Familias en Acción on Enrollment. 
 Enrollment 







Ln  pc total expenditure   0.150* 0.063 0.147 1.162 
Community mean ln per capita 
educational expenditure 
0.049 0.239 0.050 1.050 
Work dummy   -
0.854** 
0.102 -0.112 0.426 
Age   -
0.742** 
0.283 -0.074 0.476 
Age-squared      0.012 0.010 0.001 1.012 
Secondary expectations    
1.245** 
0.114 0.146 3.472 
Age mother left school   0.036** 0.005 0.004 1.037 
Number of siblings    -0.043 0.033 -0.004 0.958I'd  
Gender -0.253** 0.062 -0.025 0.777 
Community mean number of 
students per classroom 
0.755* 0.323 0.076 2.2127 
Program participation 
(treatment) 
    0.245 0.158 0.026 1.278 
Number of cases  10,157   
Wald chi2(11)        
936.21** 
  
Pseudo R2  0.205   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
y  = Pr(enrolled) (predict) =  0.88723283 
 
In 2003, there was a significant difference in enrollment between 
program participants and nonparticipants. Program participation 
increased the probability of enrollment by approximately 10%. The 
other significant variables were largely similar to those significant for 
2001, but the marginal effects were higher. Work and secondary 
expectations were particularly high, with work decreasing the 
probability of enrollment by 22% and the expectation of secondary 
school increasing the probability of enrollment by 23%. The R-squared 
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term on this model was slightly higher, which is not especially 
surprising since all of the data used for both models came from 2003, 
so should more accurately reflect the outcome in 2003 than the 
outcome in 2001. 
 
Table 60 
Individual Model. 2003 (Baseline). Effect of Familias en Acción on Enrollment. 
 Enrollment 







Ln  pc total expenditure     0.128* 0.059 0.155 1.137 
Community mean ln per capita 
educational expenditure 
   -0.059 0.149 -0.074 0.943 
Work dummy -1.264** 0.117 -0.217 0.283 
Age -1.041** 0.240 -0.128 0.353 
Age-squared     0.020 0.009 0.002 1.020 
Secondary expectations 1.565** 0.120 0.225 4.783 
Age mother left school   0.040** 0.005 0.005 1.041 
Number of siblings    -0.041 0.025 -0.005 0.960 
Gender  -0.357** 0.061 -0.043 0.699 
Community mean number of 
students per classroom 
    0.397 0.250 0.049 1.488 
Program participation 
(treatment) 
0.703** 0.139 0.098 2.020 
Number of cases  10,832   
Wald chi2(11)        
1126.28** 
  
Pseudo R2  0.277   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
y  = Pr(enrolled) (predict) =  0.85634172 
 
Between 2003 and 2006, the survey changed in a number of 
ways. The change with the most significant effect for the study was in 
the recording of secondary expectations. First, whereas in 2003 every 
child between the ages of 7and 17 was asked what level of schooling 
he or she desired and expected to attend, in 2006 only primary school 
children were asked; and of those, only the oldest child within each 
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family was asked. Second, instead of asking what level of schooling 
the child wanted to reach, the questions involved expected earnings of 
the child and the child's children. Most importantly, the question was 
not asked of unenrolled children. Since enrollment is a dummy 
variable, having no values where enrolled = 0 is not possible; 
community mean expectation had to be used. Here it represents the 
community average expected probability of graduating from secondary 
school.42 
At the end of the pilot phase, the treatment variable was still 
significant, though the treatment effect had diminished. Program 
participation increased the probability of enrollment by 6%. Few of the 
other variables were significant. Household per capita expenditure and 
work continued to show the greatest effect on enrollment, eclipsing 
even program participation. One unit greater expenditure per capita 
increased probability of enrollment by 21%. Working decreased the 
probability of enrollment by 38%. 
 
Table 61 
Individual Model. End of Pilot (2006). Effect of Familias en Acción on Enrollment. 
 Enrollment 







Ln  pc total expenditure 0.159** 0.065 0.207 1.172 
Community mean ln per capita 
educational expenditure 
-0.280 0.170 -0.337 0.756 
Work dummy -2.032** 0.103 -0.382 0.131 
Age -0.268 0.251 -0.031 0.765 
Age-squared -0.006 0.009 -0.001 0.993 
Community Secondary 0.026** 0.006 0.003 1.026 
                                   
42 Respondents were given a game to help them understand probability. They then 
indicated a response to the question by pointing to a ruler running from 0 to 100. 
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expectations 
Age mother left school 0.035** 0.005 0.004 1.035 
Number of siblings -0.005 0.032 -0.001 0.995 
Gender -0.121 0.063 -0.014 0.886 
Community mean number of 
students per classroom 
0.050** 0.018 0.006 1.051 
Program participation 
(treatment) 
0.472** 0.142 0.056 1.602 
Number of cases  11,622   
Wald chi-square  1200.65   
Pseudo R2  0.2419   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
Marginal effects after logit, y  = Pr(enrolled) (predict) =  0.8680326 
 
 Overall, though the absence of a true baseline makes any 
results more questionable, the fact that enrollment between treatment 
and control groups was reported to be so similar in 2001 allows us to 
interpret the results in 2006 as having been due to the program. 
Although 2003 was supposed to be a baseline, we can tentatively 
attribute the difference between the treatment and control groups at 
that time also to the program, again due to the fact that enrollment in 
2001 was reported to be similar between the two groups. Either way, 
we can attribute at least a 6% difference in the probability of 
enrollment to the program. If we do not consider 2003 the baseline 
but rather a first measurement of program impact, the effect of the 
program diminishes from 2003 to 2006. In actuality, this also occurred 
in Nicaragua; the intermediate effect of the program exceeded that at 
the end of the pilot. This is likely due both to some spillover effect and 
to some decline in impact as initial enthusiasm for the program waned, 
or as some individuals realized that even with the monetary incentive, 




The community model for Colombia was very similar to that for 
Nicaragua. The biggest difference was the presence of the school 
quality variable “number of students per classroom” and the absence 
of the variable for parental presence in the home. All of the 
independent variables in the community model represent community 
averages except for the treatment variable, which represents the 
frequency of treatment individuals. The outcome variable was 
percentage enrollment, so a linear regression was used. 
Looking just at the difference in percentage enrollment between 
the control and treatment groups for 2001, 2003 and 2006, it is clear 
that enrollment at the community level did not follow the same pattern 
as enrollment at the individual level. In particular, using the 
retrospective responses of children, treatment municipalities already 
had a 7% higher enrollment rate in 2001. This is possibly because 
initial targeting was done at the municipal level and was not random. 
Since all of the individual households chosen for the program had 
similar socioeconomic characteristics, and were matched to individuals 
with the same socioeconomic characteristics, they appear to have been 
more similar to one another individually than they were in aggregate. 
In other words, it seems that the evaluation matching was more 








Change in % enrollment, 2000-2002, by control and treatment municipality 
 % Enrollment 
 Control Treatment Difference 
2001 78.3% 85.3%        
7.0%* 
Baseline (2003) 76.2% 82.1%     
5.9%** 
After (2006) 76.9% 80.5%        3.6% 
 
The community models were only run in 2003 and 2006. When 
controlling for all of the other factors, the treatment variable was in 
fact not significant at baseline. As in Nicaragua, although R-squared 
was much higher for the community models, fewer of the variables 
were significant. Both of the age variables, however, were significant 












Ln (Mean Total spending per capita) 2.961 3.360 
Average number of hours worked last week -5.967** 1.808 
Average Age 36.791* 16.017 
Average Age-squared -1.815** 0.650 
Mean secondary expectations 11.941** 2.137 
Mean Age mother left school 1.086** 0.383 
Mean Number of siblings 1.898 2.322 
Mean number of students per classroom -4.066 3.319 
Treatment  4.802** 1.403 









In 2006, the treatment variable was significant at the 1% level. 
Being in the program was correlated with a 4% increase in enrollment. 
The sign on average community expenditure per capita is unexpected, 
indicating that for every additional unit of spending per capita, 
community enrollment declined by 4%. Although the coefficient is 
small, the sign of the coefficient on the average number of students 
per classroom is also unexpected. It appears that the more students 
per classroom, the higher the rate of enrollment. 
 
Table 64 
Community model. End of Pilot (2006). Effect of Familias en Acción on 







Ln (Mean Total spending per capita) -0.035** 0.269 
Average number of hours worked last week 0.000** 0.000 
Average Age 1.426** 0.391 
Average Age-squared -0.057** 0.014 
Mean secondary expectations 0.003** 0.001 
Mean Age mother left school 0.011* 0.005 
Mean Number of siblings -0.006 0.032 
Mean number of students per classroom 0.008** 0.003 
Treatment  0.036** 0.021 








Attendance and Retention Rate 
Disaggregated by treatment group and gender, the average 
number of days missed was calculated for 2003 and 2006.43  For the 
                                   
43 The retrospective section in 2003 asked  students to estimate the number of days 
missed in 2001 by broad category: <20 days, between 21 and 40 days, or > 40 
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total population as well as the male and female subsets, there was a 
significant difference in the average number of days missed between 
program participants and nonparticipants both at the start and end of 
the pilot program. 
 
Table 65 
Mean Number of school days missed (Attendance), Control and Treatment. 
 Average days missed 
 Control Treatment Mean Difference 
(T – C) 
Total    
Baseline (2003) 4.10 3.30 0.80** 
After FA (2006) 3.56 3.09 0.47** 
Male    
Baseline (2003) 4.32 3.00 1.3** 
After FA (2006) 3.76 3.24 0.52* 
Female    
Baseline (2003) 3.86 3.07 0.8** 
After FA (2006) 3.35 2.93 0.42* 
 
For the regression model, following the procedures set forth for 
Nicaragua, a dummy variable was used such that perfect attendance 
was coded 0, and any absences were coded as 1. With the addition of 
other variables in the logistic regression model, there remained a 
significant difference between treatment and control communities in 
2003. The only other significant variable was gender. Being male 
increased by 2% the probability that a student had been absent in the 
past month. As in Nicaragua, the R-squared term on the model for 




                                                                                                        
days.  . This measure likely contains a large margin of error on the part of the 
respondent, and thus was not used. 
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Table 66 
Individual Model. Baseline (2003), Effect of Familias en Acción on Attendance. 
 Enrollment 







Ln  pc total expenditure 0.050 0.046 0.087 1.052 
Community mean ln per capita 
educational expenditure 
-0.030 0.149 -0.054 0.971 
Work dummy -0.004 0.148 -0.001 0.996 
Age 0.157 0.159 0.028 1.170 
Age-squared -0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.994 
Secondary expectations -0.145 0.082 -0.026 0.865 
Age mother left school     -0.008 0.004 -0.001 0.992 
Number of siblings 0.007 0.024 0.001 1.007 
Gender 0.122* 0.051 0.022 1.130 
Community mean number of 
students per classroom 
0.008 0.020 0.001 1.008 
Program participation 
(treatment) 
-0.328** 0.127 -0.061 0.721 
Number of cases  8381   
Wald chi2(11)    28.03**   
Pseudo R2  0.005   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
Marginal effects after logit,      y  = Pr(absence) (predict)         =  0.22928337 
At the end of the program, controlling for the other variables in 
the model rendered the treatment variable insignificant. The two 
significant variables were gender and work, with the latter increasing 
by 7% the probability of missing days. 
 
Table 67 
Individual Model. End of pilot (2006). Effect of Familias en Acción on Attendance. 
 Attendance 







Ln  pc total expenditure 0.035 0.062 0.069 1.036 
Community mean ln per capita 
educational expenditure 
-0.094 0.279 -0.171 0.910 
Work dummy    
0.392** 
0.148 0.074 1.480 
Age    -0.082 0.134 -0.014 0.921 
Age-squared 0.004 0.005 0.001 1.004 
Community mean Secondary 0.008 0.011 0.001 1.008 
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expectations 
Age mother left school -0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.997 
Number of siblings  0.031 0.026 0.005 1.032 
Gender    0.092* 0.045 0.016 1.096 
Community mean number of 
students per classroom 
 0.046 0.024 0.008 1.047 
Program participation 
(treatment) 
-0.402 0.252 -0.071 0.669 
Number of cases  9 ,368   
Wald chi2(11)    31.66**   
Pseudo R2  0.0165   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level.; Marginal effects after 
logit,      y  = Pr(absence) (predict)         =  0.22017395 
 
At the community level, the average number of days missed per 
community was used as the dependent variable in the linear 
regression. At baseline, no variables were significant. At the end of the 
program, work was the only variable that was significant, indicating 












Ln (Mean Total spending per capita) -0.613 0.430 
Average number of hours worked last week 0.000 0.364 
Average Age -0.711 3.430 
Average Age-squared 0.000 0.142 
Mean secondary expectations 0.629 0.438 
Mean Age mother left school 0.000 0.071 
Mean Number of siblings 0.568 0.625 
Mean number of students per classroom -0.138 0.615 
Treatment  -0.431 0.261 




















Ln (Mean Total spending per capita) -0.126 0.526 
Average number of hours worked last week      0.015** 0.002 
Average Age 16.820 12.418 
Average Age-squared -0.582 0.444 
Mean secondary expectations -0.004 0.018 
Mean Age mother left school 0.056 0.129 
Mean Number of siblings 0.304 1.040 
Mean number of students per classroom -0.064 0.044 
Treatment  0.157 0.466 









Determination of retention was different than in Nicaragua as 
evaluators did not ask in each year the simple question of whether this 
was the first time in the current grade. They did ask, however, which 
grade each student was in, as well as what grade they had been in 
prior years. To determine the retention rate at baseline, the stated 
grade in 2001 was subtracted from that in 2002.44  The frequency of 
zeros was calculated as the retention rate. In 2003, the retention rate 
was already significantly lower for the treatment group for males and 




                                   
44 Grades in 2002 were the same as grades in 2003. 
45 Community models for retention were not significant, with no significant variables. 
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Table 70 
Retention rate, Colombia. 2003 & 2006. 
 Retention Rates 
 Control Treatment Mean Difference 
(T – C) 46 
Total    
Baseline (2003) 20.8% 17.8%    3.0%** 
After FA (2006) 9.4% 8.4% 1.0% 
Male    
Baseline (2003) 19.6% 15.4%    4.2%** 
After FA (2006) 12.2% 10.5% 1.7% 
Female    
Baseline (2003) 21.7% 20.4% 1.3% 
After FA (2006) 6.4% 6.18% 0.22% 
 
At the end of the program, the calculated retention rates were 
lower across the board, with a greater reduction in female retention 
rate, yet none of the differences between control and treatment was 
significant. To further explore the program effects on retention, logistic 
regression models were run before and after the program using the 
variables used for other models. Once the other variables were 
controlled for, the treatment variable was not significant. Of the 
variables that were significant, those with the largest effects were 
secondary expectations, age and the community average number of 
students per classroom. In the presence of the other variables, gender 
was still significant, with males showing a 3% greater probability of 






                                   
46 Chi-squared-tests were performed to determine significance. Total, r = 41.8; df 




Individual Model. Baseline (2003). Effect of Familias en Acción on Retention, 
Standard Logistic Regression. 
 Retention  







Ln  pc total expenditure -0.008 0.060 -0.011 0.991 
Community mean ln per capita 
educational expenditure 
-0.129 0.236 -0.183 0.879 
Work dummy 0.255 0.164 0.038 1.289 
Age    -
0.554** 
0.209 -0.077 0.574 
Age-squared    
0.002** 
0.008 0.003 1.022 
Secondary expectations   -
0.649** 
0.097 -0.098 0.523 
Age mother left school -0.011* 0.005 -0.002 0.989 
Number of siblings 0.053 0.030 0.007 1.054 
Gender     
0.205** 
0.060 0.028 1.227 
Community mean number of 
students per classroom 
-1.065* 0.558 -0.148 0.345 
Program participation 
(treatment) 
    -0.191 0.257 -0.027 0.826 
Number of cases  8363   
Wald chi2(13)    113.99**   
Pseudo R2  0.031   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level.   
Marginal effects after logit,      y  = Pr(absence) (predict)         =   0.16622672 
 
At the end of the program, only mother’s education and 
community educational expenditure were significant, but the 
coefficient on the expenditure variable was large. A $1 decrease in 
community educational spending yielded a 17% increase in the 
probability of a child being retained. Although the model itself was 
significant, the R squared was very low. That the school spending 
variable had such a large effect suggests that the inclusion of more 





Individual Model. End of Program (2006). Effect of Familias en Acción on 
Retention. 
 Retention 







Ln  pc total expenditure -0.083 0.089 0.071 1.087 
Community mean ln per capita 
educational expenditure 
   -
0.231** 
0.058 0.172 1.259 
Work dummy -0.034 0.268 0.002 1.036 
Age -0.236 0.275 0.018 1.267 
Age-squared 0.008 0.010 -0.001 0.992 
Secondary expectations -0.008 0.005 0.001 1.008 
Age mother left school  -  
0.016** 
0.006 0.001 1.016 
Number of siblings 0.080 0.053 0.006 1.038 
Gender      0.629 0.084 -0.047 0.533 
Community mean number of 
students per classroom 
-0.000 0.013 0.000 1.000 
Program participation 
(treatment) 
-0.131 0.112 0.010 1.139 
Number of cases  7173   
Wald chi2(13)      105.40**   
Pseudo R2  0.0272   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level.   




As described in the section on baseline characteristics, students 
were asked to state the level of schooling they expected to attain. For 
the regression analysis, only secondary expectation was used. Overall, 
the variable was much more meaningful in the Colombian than in the 
Nicaraguan data. In 2003, the treatment group had significantly higher 
expectations of attending secondary school than the control group. As 
also described above, the way of asking about secondary expectations 
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changed between the first and last surveys. Despite the change, the 
expectation of completing secondary school was also higher for 
program participants at the end of the program. 
 
Table 73 
Frequency of schooling expectations Familias en Acción implementation, Baseline. 
 Control Treatment 
Primary 29%     24%** 
Secondary 58%     63%** 




Average estimation of the likelihood that child will graduate secondary school, end 
of Familias en Acción implementation. 
 Control Treatment Difference 
Percentage 67% 72% 5%** 
 
Using the same model as for the other variables except with 
secondary expectations removed as an independent variable,47 at 
baseline, the treatment variable was not significant. The other 
significant variables were similar to those for enrollment, with the 
largest effects coming from per capita household expenditure and 
work. One variable of interest is gender - being male decreased by 
approximately 3% the probability that students would have 








                                   
47 Secondary expectations was also both run at baseline and for the end of the 





Individual Model. Baseline (2003). Effect of Familias en Acción on schooling 
expectations.  
 Schooling Expectations 







Ln  pc total expenditure 0.269** 0.577 0.609 1.309 
Community mean ln per capita 
educational expenditure 
0.338 0.246 0.798 1.403 
Work dummy -0.666** 0.093 -0.162 0.514 
Age 0.470** 0.106 0.109 1.600 
Age-squared -0.018** 0.004 -0.004 0.982 
Age mother left school 0.019** 0.005 0.004 1.020 
Number of siblings 0.028 0.242 0.007 1.029 
Gender   -
0.109** 
0.416  -0.025 0.897 
Community mean number of 
students per classroom 
0.046 0.341 0.011 1.047 
Program participation 
(treatment) 
0.145 0.187 0.034 1.156  
Number of cases  10,850   
Wald chi2(13)    113.69**   
Pseudo R2  0.0293   
Notes: *Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
Marginal effects after logit,      y  = Pr(absence) (predict)         =  0.63773098 
 
At the end of the program, a linear regression model was used 
since the variable was continuous. At that time, the treatment variable 
was in fact significant. Although not the variable with the highest 
coefficient, participation in the program yielded a 5% increase in 
expected probability of completing secondary school. Community 
average per capita expenditure also had a large effect, although the 










Individual Model. End of Implementation (2006). Effect of Familias en Acción on 
schooling expectations. 
Enrollment 
 B S.E. 
(robust, 
clustered) 
Ln  pc total expenditure 2.116** 0.837 
Community mean ln per capita educational expenditure -
7.865** 
1.981 
Work dummy -5.971 6.060 
Age 0.853 4.122 
Age-squared -0.154 0.165 
Age mother left school 0.234** 0.076 
Number of siblings 0.192 0.457 
Gender -0.784 1.088 
Community mean number of students per classroom 1.227** 0.252 
Program participation (treatment) 5.420** 1.984 





Summary of Findings 
The educational and demographic baseline data confirm that 
while conditions overall appeared better than the conditions in 
Nicaragua, the communities involved in Familias en Acción really did 
earn very little, and experienced real economic constraints to 
educational participation. Based on the program analysis, Familias en 
Acción had a particularly large and positive impact on enrollment and 
schooling expectations, even while controlling for gender, work and 
income, as well as the education of parents.  
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The program appears to have had less impact on attendance and 
retention, but both of these diminished for both groups over time. It is 
probable that over the range of the program, some spillover occurred 
between treatment and non-treatment groups, and likely that some 
part of the change in both groups was due to the presence of the 
program. This would have diminished the perceived impact of the 
program by lessening the difference between control and treatment 
groups. Although the treatment variable was not significant, the work 
dummy variable was significant for both attendance and retention, 
indicating that the opportunity cost of schooling remained an issue.  
Another variable that was significant in a number of different 
models was the age that the mother left school. This finding conforms 
to past research indicating that mother’s educational attainment 
greatly affects children’s educational outcomes. Another was total 
household expenditure, a measure of income. The marginal effect of 
income was generally quite large. Although gender was not significant 
in many models once other variables were controlled for, the simple 
differences in percentage showed that it might actually be boys who 
suffer more from absenteeism and retention and have lower 
expectations to attend University. 
One phenomenon that was clear in the Colombian data was the 
gap between schooling desire and schooling expectations among the 
population targeted for the program. The disparity in particular 
between the percentage of boys and girls that wished to attend 
university and those that expected they would actually be able to 
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attain it affirms that low educational attainment in these communities 
is not due mostly to a lack of value placed on education, but rather on 
other constraints. The policy implications suggested by this data, as 
well as the data from Nicaragua will be discussed in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 This chapter summarizes the conclusions and policy implications 
drawn from the study of the Colombian and Nicaraguan programs.  It 
begins with a review of the benefits of using a comparative approach 
to analyzing these programs.  Next, methodological implications and 
suggestions for future implementation are presented.  These are 
followed by a discussion of the models and significant variables and 
how well the results fit the assumptions of human capital theory. The 
chapter concludes with a reflection on the replicability of the CCT 
model in other developing countries, as well as a discussion of early 
efforts to establish on United States, the implications for current and 
future conditional cash transfer programs and some possibilities for 
future research. 
Benefit of the comparative approach 
The comparative approach used in this study is valuable in a 
number of ways.  From a theoretical standpoint, comparing more than 
one context lessens the probability of assuming that relationships 
between variables seen in one context are absolute (Arnove & Torres, 
2003).  Relationships that show up again and again can more reliably 
be considered generalizable. From a practical perspective, examining 
the design of two similar programs emphasizes the differences 
between them and how that may have contributed to the success of 
each within its particular context. For purposes of this study, the 
comparison between the two countries chosen also emphasizes the 
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importance of careful evaluation planning, and the effects that 
different political environments can have on the ultimate success of 
the program. 
 
Implications for methodology & implementation 
As discussed in the methods section, the Nicaraguan RPS 
program was originally evaluated via a randomized experiment.  The 
subset of data analyzed here confirms that the randomization was 
effective.  There were no significant baseline differences in most of the 
outcome variables of interest in the study. This makes it very easy to 
attribute the positive effects on schooling outcomes to the RPS 
program.  The implementation of the Colombian program did not allow 
for true randomization.  Further, analysis of  the treatment and 
comparison groups established by the evaluation team through 
propensity score matching revealed significant differences between the 
treatment and comparison groups in 2003, which was the first 
comprehensive survey done and should have served as the baseline.  
In their own evaluation, the evaluators underplayed the significance of 
this, suggesting that their results showed early success of the program 
among the groups studied (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2003). In this 
study, that approach has been tentatively followed. In reality, 
however, the inability to confirm comparability between the treatment 
and comparison groups before the implementation of the program 
makes the results less convincing than those for Nicaragua. 
  In order to more credibly claim that a program has led to 
improved results, it is essential to use true randomization and to 
establish a true baseline. It is ideal to verify comparability before 
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beginning the program if possible, and to re-sample if original 
sampling does not yield comparability between the treatment and 
comparison groups. This is certainly easier in theory than in practice, 
but the cases of Mexico and Nicaragua show that it is not impossible, 
even while ensuring that benefits ultimately reach all of the targeted 
population.   
The Colombian data revealed another issue related to the 
evaluation of program impact: the surveying of respondents from year 
to year. In the Colombian evaluation, the survey instrument was 
changed slightly between baseline and the final follow-up. While the 
change may have served to better align the questions with the theory 
informing the survey, it made it much more difficult to compare 
responses in the first with those in the last. Although it is again easier 
in theory than in practice, it seems much more helpful to design the 
baseline survey as carefully as possible and then use that same format 
for the follow-up surveys, regardless of imperfections. Once the pilot 
study has been conducted, if the program is to continue, a new survey 
can be constructed based on lessons learned and then used to 
evaluate the program over its lifetime. 
Level of benefit assignment  
With regard to program implementation from a methodological 
perspective, randomizing and assigning treatment status at the level 
of community during the pilot program seems both to minimize 
community conflict and to minimize spillover effects that dilute the 
observed effect of the program. If different households within the 
Sáme community receive transfers to increase enrollment, the model 
of their behavior might be passed on to families that are not receiving 
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the benefits.  This can cause households not receiving benefits to also 
send their children to school, either due to the increased sense of 
value or because they know that in the future they will also be 
receiving benefits.  While this is positive overall, it makes it difficult to 
truly evaluate the impact of the program itself. The danger of spillover 
effects during the evaluation has been described by researchers (e.g. 
Skoufias, 2001, Dammert, 2008; Bloom, 2005) and also seemed 
apparent in the Colombian data.  
Once the evaluative stage, or at least the pilot phase, is 
complete, some researchers advocate targeting at the household level 
for greater efficiency of use of funds.  Skoufias, Davis and La Vega 
(2001), for example, acknowledged social costs but still advocated 
targeting at the household level.  From a comparative perspective, it 
would seem important to use qualitative studies during the pilot phase 
to determine the social costs of excluding members within the Same 
community.  If those costs were minimal compared to the benefit of 
household-level targeting, then the latter would be appropriate. In 
communities that are very close-knit, however, or that have a more 
strongly group-centered than individual family-centered perspective 
(e.g. Molyneux, 2006; Sen, 1989), household level targeting might 
produce more social conflict than it is worth. 
The major lesson from this study for program pilot and 
evaluation comes from the limited resources and limited scope, but 
extremely well-designed evaluation of the Nicaraguan program. The 
program's impact on school outcomes is easy to measure, as are other 
impacts on outcomes available in the data. Other small-scale 
evaluations could be carried out if the program were to expand into 
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secondary school or to involve more school level and community level 
data. The number of data points and complexity of the Colombian data 
on the other hand, introduced a number of confounding factors that 
made it more difficult to identify program impact. The implication of 
this is that even with limited means, contracting quality evaluations of 
very small programs may in fact be preferable to piloting programs on 
a massive scale. Even in more wealthy nations, it might be preferable 
to carry out a more limited pilot, evaluate it and then scale a program 
up in resources and complexity, hopefully continuing to evaluate as 
the program expands.   
Theoretical implications 
Overall, the results confirm the assumptions of human capital 
theory, particularly for enrollment.  Of the factors thought to affect 
educational demand, the two that appeared most consistently were 
opportunity cost and parental preferences, specifically mothers’ 
educational attainment. The major opportunity cost variable was work, 
but the results of this study suggest that age could also be considered 
an opportunity cost variable.  As children get older, the competing 
claims on their time increase as they become responsible for work 
inside and outside the home. In Nicaragua, the coefficient on age 
indicated that being older increased the probability of being enrolled in 
school, but in Colombia the coefficient was negative, indicating the 
reverse. Since Nicaragua only targeted children of elementary school 
age, and the coefficients on age-squared were negative for both 
countries, the assumption that enrollment increases with age to a 
certain point and then decreases seems to be confirmed. 
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The variables for educational cost and income were not as 
consistently significant as expected, although log total cost was 
significant at the 5% level in several models.  However, the descriptive 
statistics for both countries indicated that the ability to pay for school 
was a major barrier to enrollment.  Researchers have noted that it is 
difficult to attain accurate expenditure data (e.g. Hoddinott & Skoufias, 
2004; Andersen, 2001).  The range of responses and the fragmented 
nature of the expenditure data, especially in Colombia, make it at least 
possible that the influence of household income expenditure was 
masked.  For educational expenditure, it might have gotten more 
directly to the root of the issue if surveyors had asked all families, 
regardless of whether they had children in school, how much they 
thought each category of educational expenditures would cost.  This 
variable could have represented the perceived cost of schooling, and 
have been included with the community average educational 
expenditure. Such an addition would address the fact that perceived 
cost is not always the Same as actual cost, but can be as great a 
barrier. 
Similarly, secondary expectations as a measure of returns to 
schooling was significant in only a few instances, and only in Colombia.  
In the second iteration of the Colombian survey, the questions related 
to schooling expectations more accurately reflected the theoretical 
meaning of returns to schooling.  Specifically, the questions revolved 
around how much students expected to earn if they graduated from 
secondary school as opposed to only graduating from primary.  
However, the expected earnings from secondary school did not 
perform well at all in the regression analysis, so was not even reported 
 207 
in the findings.  In refining empirical analysis to better reflect the 
theory, it seems that this line of questioning could be honed to yield 
more accurate results.  Other research has suggested that where 
available, prevailing wage in the nearest urban center can be used to 
estimate returns to schooling.  Where available, this might yield more 
significant results.  
In looking at the other variables that proved significant across 
many of the models, some patterns emerge that might be considered 
when designing program elements.  The importance of mothers’ 
educational attainment is worthy of special consideration. Given the 
data on conditional cash transfers presented here, girls’ educational 
attainment is increasing along with boys’. Thus, the next generation of 
mothers should be more highly educated than the current generation, 
and this will continue to raise the educational level of their children. In 
the meantime, a possible policy synergy would be to create a parallel 
structure providing adult educational opportunities for mothers who 
have recently had to drop out, and/or for those in the less well-
educated over-25 population. In addition to the empirical data 
regarding the importance of mothers’ education, qualitative 
evaluations have revealed that many parents desire the opportunity to 
enhance their own learning at the Same time that their children's 
learning is being advanced (Molyneux, 2006). As Adato et al. (2000) 
found, the women involved in these programs often also want to learn 
how to read and write so that they can have access to some of the 
benefits that they see resulting from their children's education.  In 
order to make this possible, however, policymakers will have to deal 
with the very real duties that women are expected to attend to: 
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housework and child rearing (e.g. Lincove, 2009).  This might include 
providing money for mothers to hire babysitters or free provision of 
child care while mothers attend school (Glick & Sahn, 1999). 
The issue of child labor as a potential trade-off for schooling has 
been discussed at length in this paper and the models analyzed in this 
study indicate that even with the program in place, work remains a 
factor in all aspects of the schooling decision.  This reinforces the 
purpose for which the transfers were created in the first place, 
providing income to decrease the necessity for children to work.  It 
also indicates the need for increasing innovative strategies for 
accommodating children who need to work, such as alternative school 
days or school calendars for farm laborers or migrants (e.g. Behrman, 
Parker & Todd, 2005). This would be an area in which understanding 
the specific issues of a given community would be crucial for the 
implementation of the CCT, as well as the establishment of fair, 
realistic conditionalities to ensure that the most marginalized are able 
to meet the requirements of the program. 
Both the descriptive and inferential statistics gathered indicates 
that for both countries, enrollment increases with age up to a point, 
and then declines rapidly. The Colombian program was designed to 
counter the drop-off in enrollment in early adolescence, by increasing 
the transfer for secondary school. This is a direct way of targeting the 
transfers to the area of the age distribution that policymakers most 
want to affect.  In Nicaragua, the age at which enrollment started to 
decline at baseline was 11.  Unfortunately, this was also close to the 
age at which benefits for the RPS program ceased. Again, given the 
extremely low rate of primary enrollment before implementation, it 
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made sense in that country to focus the first stage of the program on 
that level. In the design of future programs, and in programs around 
the world, the existing and desired age distribution of schooling should 
be taken into consideration when developing benefits. 
Although gender was not a significant variable in many of the 
regressions once all other factors were controlled for, there were 
definitely gender differences in schooling outcomes in Colombia, 
particularly among older students.  In general, where there were 
differences, girls were enrolled at higher rates than boys.  Program 
participation, however, seems to have had the effect of decreasing the 
decline in enrollments for older boys. This has important implications 
for countries in which many boys desert schooling for greater 
opportunities in the workforce.  In Colombia, where a major 
alternative to schooling for impoverished is to join illegal drug gangs 
(e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2005), this kind of program is not only 
important but life-Saving.  It seems that this could operate in other 
countries with similar problems, including some cities in the United 
States.  The fact that the money is given in cash, rather than given 
directly to the school might increase its attractiveness to certain types 
of students, though it does require increased monitoring. 
Evaluating replicability across comparative contexts 
The authentic use of comparative study resides not in wholesale 
appropriation and propagation of foreign practices but in careful 
analysis of the conditions under which certain foreign practices 
deliver desirable results, followed by consideration of ways to 
adapt those practices to conditions found at home. (Noah, 1986, 
pp. 161-162; as cited in Phillips & Ochs, 2003) 
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Poverty and Institutional Capacity 
As stated throughout the body of the dissertation, Nicaragua was 
the first low income country in which conditional cash transfer was 
attempted, and it was not clear at the outset whether or not a CCT 
could be implemented in such an environment. The empirical data here 
shows that the conditional cash transfer was successful, especially in 
terms of getting children to enroll in school. In analyzing replicability 
across the dimension of poverty, one can assume that a program 
similar in size and scope to Nicaragua’s should be able to be replicated 
in countries with similar or greater resources.  In order to determine 
which countries have comparable levels of poverty, a poverty map 
based on the 2007-2008 UN Human Development Report was used 
(Appendix 6). This is a more accurate basis of comparison than maps 
based on the percentage of the population living below the poverty 
line, as that measure differs from country to country.   
According to the UN Human Development Report, 41-60% of 
Nicaragua’s population lived on less than one dollar a day in 2007. 
Again, Haiti is the only country in the Western Hemisphere with that 
high a proportion of extremely poor people. From the perspective of 
economic and human resources alone, one might argue that any other 
country in North, Central or South America should be able to achieve 
the level of success that Nicaragua did.  It would be of immediate use 
to establish and evaluate a pilot program in Haiti, where differing 
issues of governance and political unrest would provide a valuable 
counterpoint to the Nicaraguan experience.  Looking at the rest of the 
world, for those with data in 2007 and 2008 Nicaragua matches the 
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poverty of Bangladesh in Asia; and Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Ghana, and 
Sierra Leone in Africa. India and at least 11 countries in Africa have a 
smaller overall percentage of persons living on less than a dollar a day 
than does Nicaragua. Colombia shares a similar poverty level with 
most of South America, China, Pakistan and Indonesia; as well as 
South Africa, Cameron and the Ivory Coast. So from the perspective of 
poverty alone, results from Nicaragua and Colombia confirm the 
feasibility of CCT implementation in many other middle and low income 
countries. 
On a pragmatic note, since the CCTs focus on demand 
constraints, all four of the programs discussed in this paper have 
required some level of resources and administrative capacity on the 
parts of the communities implementing the program. Although poverty 
is being used here as somewhat of a proxy for institutional capacity, 
the original evaluators of the Nicaraguan program noted the efficiency 
with which the program was carried out (IFPRI,2005; Moore, 2009). 
Those involved in the program were chosen for their technical 
expertise, not for their political affiliation.  Employees knew the 
purpose and goals of the program. In countries in which overall 
poverty is also tied to limited capacity or infrastructure (Farrington & 
Slater, 2004), or in which there is no sure way of distributing benefits 
to the citizens, it is unclear whether this model could be implemented 
(Schubert & Slater, 2006). Similarly, in volatile countries or 
communities without some level of stability, it would be difficult to 
ensure the delivery of resources needed to carry out these programs. 
The lesson is not that any poor country can successfully implement a 
conditional cash transfer program, but that in the presence of well-
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trained officials and a carefully developed program, poverty does not 
have to preclude the use of the CCT model.  
Political will, public perception and the implications for “Internalization” 
Phillips and Ochs (2003) developed a framework for explaining 
policy borrowing in comparative education, which is useful for 
understanding policy replication across international boundaries in 
general.  
 
Figure 16. International policy borrowing framework. 
 




Of the four stages constituting the framework, the first three 
have been addressed directly and indirectly throughout this 
dissertation. The fourth stage is particularly important for evaluating 
the sustainability of policy reforms and the implications for policy 
replication. At the fourth stage of policy borrowing, the implemented 
policy becomes or does not become part of the system of the borrower 
country.  In the case study presented here, the greatest difference 
between Nicaragua and Colombia is not in the results obtained from 
the programs, but rather in the extent to which the CCT pilot programs 
were integrated into overall social policy. 
 In Nicaragua, due to positive preliminary findings from the pilot 
evaluation and corroborated by this study, the program was at first 
continued by the World Bank and the government of Nicaragua and 
has been reported successful (Maluccio, 2004). Despite the success of 
the program in addressing its own goals, however, the RPS program 
was disbanded near the end of the Bolaños administration that 
preceded the current Ortega administration, due initially to failure to 
reapply for funding (Moore, 2009). 
 Up to this point, there are no examples of CCT's that have been 
implemented in purely socialist states. This is no doubt due partially to 
the fact that there are very few socialist states in existence (CIA 
factbook, 2009); the only true socialist states remaining are China, 
Laos, Vietnam, Cuba and North Korea. The fate of the Nicaraguan RPS 
program, however, may be used to speculate on the feasibility of 
implementing the programs in administrations that are more socialist 
in character. Many countries throughout the world contain socialist 
parties as part of the regular political system.  Latin America, in 
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particular has seen a recent resurgence in the strength of socialist 
ideals, with the rise to power of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Evo 
Morales in Bolivia though some commentators consider these leaders 
as representative more of populist leftism than of the Marxist ideology 
of purer socialists (The Economist, 2006).  Regardless, the role of 
welfare and of the means for securing it are conceived differently 
under non-capitalist regimes than capitalist. 
 As discussed in the chapter on Nicaragua, the FSLN was a 
markedly socialist regime when it took power in the 1970s.  The 
modern party, now in power under Ortega has moderated its rhetoric, 
but still bears its socialist moniker.  Ortega’s increasing alliance with 
Castro, Chavez and Morales also belies the socialist character of the 
administration.  At the time of its dissolution, the RPS program resided 
within Mi Familia: the Ministry of the Family, Adolescence and 
Childhood. It had been proposed that the program become part of the 
larger Solidarity for Development Program (Moore, 2009), but to do to 
an oversight, international funding fell by the wayside without 
domestic funds having been appropriated to fill the gap. 
 In 2004, the Crisis Attention System was created, and funded by 
the World Bank, to provide aid to victims of landslides in northern 
Nicaragua.  This program had all of the components of RPS, plus a 
“productive transfer” similar to a micro-loan, provided to people who 
proposed a productive enterprise (Moore, 2009).  Unlike other 
transfers, this transfer was often provided to men.  This particular 
initiative only existed for a short time. The current government 
suggests that it supplies the Same benefits as were supplied by RPS 
through a “school pack,” school lunch and nutritional supplements 
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provided by the Ministry of Education, and through expanding services 
provided by the Ministry of Health (Moore, 2009).  These are not, 
however, conditional cash transfer programs, and do not act directly to 
change the preferences of households. The shift in program focus 
signals a return to the preference for in-kind transfers that existed 
earlier in development history. 
Impact evaluators have noted that as with most major policy 
initiatives, buy-in from the government is essential (de la Briere & 
Rawlings, 2006; Farrington & Slater, 2006). Government officials are 
experts on the contexts of their own countries, can mobilize resources 
from the public sector and sometimes form an important mediatory 
role between the public and private sectors, as in the case of 
mobilizing health providers to perform the health functions of the 
Nicaraguan program.  Because conditional cash transfer programs 
require so much coordination between the federal government, 
municipal officials and citizens on the ground, as well as with external 
donors if they are providing large amounts of funding, they simply 
cannot be executed with less than a strong commitment at the 
national level. It is unclear how receptive the FSLN is to CCT 
programs. Officials have expressed distrust of them (Moore), and 
government internet materials show a bias against capitalist ideals and 
influences. Given the uncertainty of the political climate, it is very 
difficult to predict whether and how the concept of the conditional cash 
transfer program will again become a viable policy option in Nicaragua. 
 If a policy is able to pass through the other three stages of policy 
borrowing, it is in this final stage that the political mood becomes 
incredibly important.  This includes the political leanings of the 
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administration as well as the populace.  One of the noted appeals of 
the Mexican and Brazilian programs is that they were able to cross 
administrations, unlike many previous reforms, and so appeared to 
transcend politics.  The lesson that technical results can help to guard 
against political will was perhaps over-learned in Nicaragua. Moore 
(2009) suggested that those in charge of the design and pilot of the 
RPS program wrongly believed that the results of the program would 
stand on their own.  Moore argued that too little attention was paid to 
explaining the program to the public at large and mustering public 
support.  Thus it was allowed to slip through cracks in the budget in a 
way that it would not have had the public been more aware of the 
program. 
Compared to the disappointing fate of the RPS program, the 
success of the Colombian program is remarkable.  Despite far less 
clear-cut evidence that the program itself could be credited with 
improvements in school and health outcomes, the program has been 
lauded as a success.  (Program documentation, Accion Social).48 In 
Colombia, the government has embraced and “internalized” Familias 
en Acción. As stated in the first paragraph on the webpage, the 
program as now conceived: 
Es una iniciativa del Gobierno Nacional para entregar 
subsidios de nutrición o educación a los niños menores de 
años que pertenezcan a las familias pertenecientes al nivel 
                                   
48 Available at: 
http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=204&conID=157  
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1 del SISBEN, familias en condición de desplazamiento o 
familias indígenas.49 
It is considered an initiative of the national government itself, the 
largest social welfare program in the country; the government has 
taken ownership of the program, as well as to extend the benefits to 
displaced persons and to focused special attention on indigenous 
groups. The website defines and highlights conditionality on this first 
page of the program site.  One of the links available to the public 
contains 16 publications, including a series entitled “Library of the 
Mother Leader50”which provides information about the program, as 
well as to present social issues like intra-familial violence and nutrition 
in a way that is accessible to a public audience.   
The major implication to be drawn from the differential political 
outcomes in Nicaragua and Colombia is that as with most policies or 
programs, it is impossible to separate CCTs from the political climates 
that surround their implementation. At every phase of the decision 
making around adoption of conditional cash transfer programs, the 
policy fit must be evaluated not only against the constraints of poverty 
and infrastructure, but also of administrative and public policy 
preferences. The government and the populace must be aware of and 
must support the goals of the program. Lacking this fit, regardless of 
the program's technical results, long-term sustainability will be 
unlikely. 
  
                                   
49 Translation: “is an initiative of the national government to provide nutrition or 
education subsidies to the children of families belonging to SISBEN1, families that 
have been displaced, or indigenous families.” 
50 This role is similar to that of promotora in Mexico. 
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The United States context 
 In a rare case of policy borrowing from “South” to “North,” 
Mayor Bloomberg of New York City established a pilot CCT program in 
2007, modeled and named after Mexico's Oportunidades. Conceived 
out of an anti-poverty commission, the Bloomberg administration has 
presented Opportunity NYC as the core of its poverty reduction 
strategy (de Sá e Silva, 2008).  The introduction of the CCT to the 
United States has lent more immediate relevance to the current 
research. It has also provided another site for consideration of the 
replicability of the CCT model.  At one end of the spectrum we have 
extremely poor countries like Nicaragua, and at the other the 
extremely wealthy United States.  Bloomberg's pilot program has even 
drawn the attention of Great Britain.  Depending on the outcome of 
the pilot evaluation, conditional cash transfer programs may begin to 
be implemented at all points of the economic spectrum.  The United 
States, however, poses its own problems for widespread acceptance of 
the CCT model. 
UNICEF (2005) presented statistics on poverty in the OECD 
countries, particularly the percentage of children living in “relative” 
poverty, with income below 50% of the median income. Using this 
measure, the United States had 21.9% of children living in poverty, 
higher than any other industrialized nation besides Mexico (27.7%), a 
nation well-known for the inequality of its economic system.  
Among scholars, there is a good deal of literature on the link 
between poverty and education in the United States, with one of the 
earliest works highlighting the importance of socioeconomic status 
being The Coleman Report (1966). Some of the greatest current 
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concerns with educational and economic inequality in the United States 
are: a “gap” in achievement between “under-represented” minority 
students (e.g. Coleman, 1966, Brooks-Gunn, et. al. 1997), high drop-
out rate, especially upon Hispanic students (Haycock, 2001), high 
teenage pregnancy among minority populations, and high inter-
generational transmission of these effects (Corcoran & Adams, 1997). 
Duncan and Magnuson (2005) showed that reducing racial and ethnic 
differences in family income would decrease the achievement gap.  
Anyon (2005) cited a study in which income supplements of less than 
$4000 to working parents improved children's elementary school 
achievement by 10 to 15% of the average variation of the control 
group. Additionally, however, and less well-known to the public, 
discrepancies remain between nutrition, child mortality, and life 
expectancy between white and non-white Americans and especially 
among socioeconomic divisions (Korenman & Miller, 1997). Health 
related issues include ear infection-related hearing impairments 
(Centers for Disease Control, 2005); uncorrected poor vision; asthma 
(Books, 2000, NIH 1998 cited in Berliner, 2006); lead poisoning, 
untreated ADHD, premature births and low birth weight, anemia, 
diabetes and obesity.  
Differences in health practices among women in poor and 
affluent families also include breast feeding practices (less common 
among poor women) and nutrition of the mother during pregnancy. 
Nutritional deficiencies after birth are common among the poor in the 
United States, with implications for cognitive development and thus for 
academic achievement. In addition to these issues, obviously 
exacerbated where families have no access to health insurance, food 
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insecurity continues to be an issue for a segment of the American 
population (Rothstein, 2004, p. 45).  
 Adding to the health difficulties posed directly by lack of income, 
there are health concerns related to culture and differentials in 
knowledge among parents of different classes. Smoking during 
pregnancy, for instance, varies widely by region and city of residence 
(Census, 2000). Further, 25% of high school dropouts smoke while 
pregnant, 50% more than the rate for high school graduates 
(Rothstein, 2004). Not only does smoking during pregnancy increase 
the risk of cognitive deficiencies, the presence of smoke in a child’s 
environment after birth increases the incidence of asthma.  
  
American attitudes toward poverty 
A number of researchers have documented the perceptions of 
Americans regarding poverty within our own country and how these 
accord with reality. Socioeconomic differences and differential 
education levels affect poor children in the United States just as they 
do in the countries studied in this dissertation. As the above studies 
show, while the overall level of poverty in the United States is lower 
than that of the other nations, its incidence and effects remain 
significant, as does the inequality among groups  
Despite the availability of this information, much of the public 
(Berliner, 2006; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004) and many researchers 
(e.g. Rector and Johnson, 2004) deny the impact of poverty in the 
United States. Political scientists and critical researchers in particular 
credit the attitudes of many Americans, as well as the reluctance to 
enact redistributive policy, to the American ethic. Alesina and Glaeser 
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compared social policies in the United States and Europe51 and found 
that overall, public “policies that redistribute from the rich to the poor 
are much more limited than in continental Western Europe.” Income 
taxes are more progressive in Europe, and policies tend to favor labor 
over owners.  
 To explain this, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) pointed to 
differences in political economy: American federalism has left a legacy 
of government much more decentralized than anywhere but 
Switzerland. In Europe, proportional voting systems have allowed for 
the growth of socialist and communist parties that tend to favor 
redistributive policies and a comprehensive welfare system. The 
American two-party system, by contrast, is essentially stacked against 
fringe movements calling for radical change. This system was created 
in order to maintain dominance, to resist the overturning of the status 
quo. That historical footprint remains in the political and economic 
structures in place today. In addition to, and as a part of, these 
institutional factors, Alesina and Glaeser noted that many Americans 
believe American society to provide greater social mobility than it 
actually does. While American and European social mobility is roughly 
approximate, many more Americans than Europeans feel that their 
country allows for social mobility. In similar studies, Bjorklund and 
Jantti (1997) found intergenerational mobility and income equality to 
be higher in Sweden than in the United States, and Solon (1992) 
provided empirical evidence that intergenerational mobility in the 
United States is far less than commonly assumed by Americans.  
                                   
51 The authors excluded Britain because the country’s policies are more similar to 
those of the U.S. 
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In Culture and Pedagogy: International Comparisons in Primary 
Education, Alexander (2000) investigated not only the educational 
practices of a number of countries including Mexico and the United 
States, but also the philosophies underlying the pedagogy and policies 
of education in those countries.  With regard to primary education in 
the United States, he, like the above authors, highlighted the 
uniqueness of the American political system and the social system that 
is a part of it. He characterized the American educational system as 
extremely decentralized, and rife with tensions created by conflicting 
values that are especially acute in the United States. Although 
American clearly value equality, and emphasize that value in political 
and personal discussion, 
Cutting across [racial and demographic] differences are the 
dominant values of freedom, individualism, self-help and anti-
statism that demarcate the United States so sharply from the 
social democracies of Europe… A 1991 survey found that 72 
percent of Americans valued freedom above equality and only 20 
percent of Americans valued equality over freedom. Only Britain 
came close to matching the primacy of individual freedom found 
in the United States.  
The above arguments take a strong view of the commonality of 
American ideals and do not focus explicitly on issues of group 
inequality. However, to conclude their discussion, Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004) argued that the fact that our country has been historically 
much more ethnically diverse than Europe, and that “racial divisions 
and racial preferences appear to deter redistribution, especially when 
poverty is concentrated in minority groups” (p. 10), has led to a 
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greater resistance to redistributive policies in the U.S. The importance 
of American resistance to active redistribution has several implications 
for education and poverty. First, education has been viewed in the 
United States as the starting rung on the ladder of opportunity, the 
surest way to improve one’s own circumstances and those of one’s 
children; Americans have rarely, but for brief historical moments, been 
willing to devote major resources to broad-based social policy (e.g. 
Brewer, nd). 
Wells and Crain (1997) provided an exceptionally nuanced piece 
explaining the persistence of educational segregation by race, one of 
the United States’ most serious issues. While very much focused on 
the politics of segregation in schools, the authors defined the problem 
in terms of the core values of America. Noting that American attitudes 
towards problems of educational inequality are not primarily indicative 
of narrow calculating self-interest, they theorized the American 
attitude towards school equality as: 
• Meritocratic: “broad cultural themes as individual 
responsibility, materialism, unfettered competition, and 
undying belief in the economic system as fair and meritocratic 
despite evidence to the contrary” (p. 12); 
• Materialist: possessing a sense that material prosperity is the 
greatest measure of individual worth, with middle class 
people afraid of losing their edge to others if in support of 
active policy; and 
• Individualistic: possessed with a strong sense of “human 
agency,” Americans often have difficulty seeing the role of 
group interests at work.  
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There are many varieties of programs in place within the 
educational sector that purport to address the disparities in 
educational attainment and achievement by race and socioeconomic 
status. Yet there remains great ambivalence as to the specific nature 
and causes of these problems among the nation’s poor, as well as the 
aforementioned chasm between education and anti-poverty 
programming. Anyon (2005) echoed the call by development 
researchers around the world for more intertwined educational and 
social policy in the United States, including such initiatives as 
increased employment opportunities in poor communities and 
vocational programs in high schools linked with employers. 
Conditional cash transfers in the United States: Opportunity 
NYC 
 The concept of the conditional cash transfer program was 
introduced to New York City by members of Bloomberg's anti-poverty 
commission that had had international experience with the programs, 
and was championed particularly by the Rockefeller Foundation. de Sá 
e Silva (2008) has produced one of the first research pieces on the 
program, which is nearing the end of its pilot phase. de Sá e Silva and 
individuals she interviewed identified the role of the World Bank as 
“knowledge broker,” a central point of information and resources 
linking the CCT countries together, as well as a source for external 
validation of the program idea.  As in Brazil, Mayor Bloomberg and an 
associate traveled to Mexico to observe Oportunidades in action.  They 
then implemented a pilot based largely on the Mexican program, but 
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with several innovations considered relevant to the context of the 
United States, particularly New York. 
 The 2-year pilot was granted a budget of over $50 million, all 
privately donated (de Sá e Silva, 2008).  This is one of the chief 
differences from the other countries, in which the CCT programs were 
funded largely by external donors, but supplemented by the countries 
in which they were implemented.  The choice of private funding was 
largely to avoid entanglement with political factors, as the program 
was considered controversial.  The rationale was that private money 
could be used for the pilot, and if preliminary results proved favorable, 
the program would be taken before the public.  
 Opportunity NYC contains three major subprograms.  The first, 
called Family Rewards, contains the educational and health provisions 
most similar to the CCTs discussed in this dissertation, but also 
includes initiatives for workforce participation in job training.  The 
second sub-program, called Work Rewards, provides transfers to 
adults living in subsidized housing, for “enhanced workforce 
participation” and job training (de Sá e Silva, 2008).  The third 
program, Spark, provides transfers to fourth and seventh-grade 
public-school students based on their performance on achievement 
tests.  This focus on achievement is quite different than any of the 
other programs mentioned in this paper. The Spark program is 
managed separately by the Department of Education and the American 
Inequality lab, while the other programs are managed by the Center 
for Economic Opportunity, the Housing Authority, and the Department 
of Housing Preservation and Development.  So in addition to having 
added an achievement component, the CCT in New York City differs 
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from other CCT programs in that it did not involve a concerted effort to 
bring together the functions of education and poverty alleviation in one 
ministry. The mayor's office stated that it wanted to avoid confusing 
the Family Rewards program with other school level initiatives (de Sá e 
Silva).  The separation might also be considered to reflect the 
historical rupture in the United States between the systems of 
schooling and welfare (e.g. Brewer, nd).  
 The educational component has been divided between the Family 
Rewards and Spark programs, with the former targeted at the 
community district level, and the latter at the level of school. Sixty low 
performing schools were selected, with every student enrolled in fourth 
and seventh grades made eligible for the program, regardless of the 
socioeconomic statuses of the students themselves (de Sá e Silva, 
2008).  It will be interesting when the evaluation becomes available to 
see whether and how the different targeting affects the results, as 
compared to the CCT programs targeted at the household level. 
Going beyond the other programs, Opportunity NYC included as 
goals “children's superior school attendance, sustained high 
achievement or improved performance on standardized tests, and 
parental engagement in children's education” (de Sá e Silva, 2008, p. 
8). de Sá e Silva argued that in this, the program attempted to 
address some of the same things as other American educational 
reforms, only within the broader program of poverty reduction.  She 
critiqued the achievement rhetoric as implying a merit-based rationale 
different from what she considered the rights-based approach of other 
CCTs. An alternative reading of the importance of standardized testing 
in Opportunity NYC is that the achievement piece is necessary for 
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legitimacy in the American context, where accountability is currently 
our chief educational dialogue (e.g. Brewer, nd). Viewed in this light, it 
is simply greater evidence of how the political/policy context affects 
program replication. 
 Consistent with critiques by educators and other countries, the 
creation and implementation of opportunity NYC bypassed inclusion of 
school personnel including teachers and principals.  Local actors were 
also not much involved in the pilot.  Although much of this was 
strategic, it is unclear whether the program will be able to continue 
once held up for public scrutiny, as evidenced by the experience in 
Nicaragua (Moore, 2008).  The popular magazine The Economist 
(2007) argued that in implementing the pilot, Bloomberg was 
politically savvy. He avoided controversial terms in the educational and 
welfare circles, and use private funding for the pilot to secure results 
before approaching the public. The lack of civic mobilization by and 
around the program, however, may prove to be problematic, especially 
given the criticism of the program on the ideological front. 
 Opportunity NYC has drawn skepticism from a large segments of 
the population.  Some of the key arguments against the program are 
that: 
• paying children for academic performance undermines learning 
for its own sake 
• families should not be paid for what they should already be 
doing 
• selecting search and families and leaving out others could lead to 
resentment from other low income families who are not in the 
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program, causing them also to cut back on positive behaviors 
(de Sá e Silva, 2008) 
• using incentives to affect behavior is overly behaviorist; it 
removes human autonomy and introduces more and more new 
requirements for surveillance (Liebling, 2007) 
• the focus on standardized testing leads to propagation of the 
standardized test culture itself.   
 
One quotation which summarizes the way in which many Americans 
likely believe the United States to differ from other countries that have 
adopted CCTs was presented by Nicole Gelinas of the Manhattan 
Institute for Policy Research: 
Programs like Progresa serve a real purpose in a nation like 
Mexico, where it is economically rational, at least in the short-
term, for a parent to send a child to work in a field or a factory 
rather than to school. But there’s just no applicability to poor 
New York families, who don’t face the same opportunity costs in 
making decisions about the future… Bloomberg has misread the 
purpose of Third World conditional cash transfer programs, and 
thus has misread their applicability to New York… in New York, 
unlike in the Third World, where parents don't have to pay to 
send their children to school.  Nor do they face the tough choice 
of educating the kids or having enough money to put food on the 
table every night. Even when older children drop out, it's not 
because they're going to work instead. As Bloomberg's poverty 
report states, one of the biggest problems with chronically poor 
teens and young adults is idleness (Gelinas, 2006) 
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While it may seem a compelling critique to some, it is Gelinas that 
misreads the evidence of poverty in the United States, and misreads 
the theory of human capital that allows the program to be applied to 
the United States context. She presents the view that low school 
attainment is due to laziness rather then related at all to poverty.  
Laying aside the evidence presented above that links low educational 
outcomes with poverty, her statement about dropouts can be 
addressed from a purely theoretical standpoint.  
Even if opportunity cost is not the major stated reason for 
adolescents who drop out of high school, the argument presented by 
Gelinas does not rule out the possibility that returns to education 
might be at fault. Low returns to unskilled labor, compounded by low 
expected returns to education would certainly lead to the noted 
“idleness,” as adolescents’ experiences would dictate no real benefit to 
engaging in either task. In a providing a justification for the incentives 
in Opportunity NYC, Kahlenberg (2007) acknowledged the fact that 
where college is not an end in itself, especially when children do not 
have examples around them of the benefits to education, education 
must be incentivized in a different way. The issue of low returns still 
falls within the assumptions of human capital theory, but highlights a 
different part of the framework as the necessary focus in the United 
States, as opposed to Nicaragua and Colombia, where direct cost and 
work/opportunity cost are clearly the most important factors.   
Taken all together, this suggests that while in the design phase 
of interventions like these, it is crucial to pay attention to the reasons 
children, adolescents or families identify for not being in school, and 
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then to take these into account when designing the programs.  In the 
US case, policy synergies with CCTs might instead be designed around 
linkages to more traditional ways of showing children that school can 
pay off, perhaps as suggested above by tying school involvement were 
closely with vocational programs related directly to student coursework 
and that provide real economic payoffs in the short term. As a slightly 
more radical suggestion, it seems that at-risk students should be given 
the opportunity to escape the limited horizons that their own 
neighborhoods offer, and exposed to educational and employment 
opportunities outside the realm of their everyday experiences. 
De la Briere and Rawlings (2006) discussed the need to link 
social programs and programs that support labor market insertion and 
employment, as well as the need to coordinate better with supply-side 
programs.  Even when viewed purely from an educational perspective, 
increasing the employment prospects of potential students increases 
the returns on schooling; and therefore, would help to further increase 
demand for schooling in poor communities. 
“Internalization” of the CCT in the United States context 
 Many of the scholars cited in this dissertation (notably de la 
Briere & Rawlings, 2006; Molyneux, and Moore, 2009) have 
emphasized that massive social programs can only work with the 
population believes that society is responsible for ameliorating social 
conditions, and where it is perceived that societal barriers actually 
exist. The general attitude of Americans toward the poor, as well as 
some of the opposition to Opportunity NYC suggest that implementing 
conditional cash transfer programs on a large scale in the United 
States might pose ideological challenges for a significant portion of the 
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populace. This would likely hold true for those Western nations with 
similarly individualistic political cultures. The case of opportunity NYC 
will be lent to follow as it approaches the end of its pilot phase. 
 
Future research 
There are many possible avenues for future research related to 
conditional cash transfer programs, including the programs discussed 
at length in this dissertation. Those presented here are considered 
particularly relevant to the current study, and of greatest personal 
interest. There is much to be gained from increasing the corpus of 
work dedicated to using the comparative approach within CCT 
research, combining quantitative and qualitative data to form a richer 
understanding of contexts and the modifications required to adapt to 
those contexts. Instead of embarking on enormous, complex programs 
right away, this study indicates that it might be more helpful to 
conduct a number of smaller pilots in as diverse a collection of 
countries as possible.  Of the pilots currently being carried out, the 
most fruitful for adding to this particular research are those in nations 
in other regions with similar poverty profiles to Nicaragua, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter52.  
In addition to expanding focus across countries, the complexity 
of the interaction between variables dictates a place for narrowing the 
focus of research, devoting a significant amount of study to each 
particular outcome, e.g. in-depth study of enrollment. In particular, 
                                   
52 Cohen et al (2008) have conducted a feasibility study for CCTs in Haiti, but at this 
time none has been implemented in that country.  The authors did provide an 
interesting framework and methodology for conducting feasibility studies of CCTs in 
other poor countries. 
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since the focus in the evaluation studies was not on the educational 
process, there is not much data around schooling characteristics in 
either of the two data sets. It would be helpful to collect more data 
about children's experience in the schools and classrooms, teacher 
preparation and practice for the children involved in CCTs, to improve 
on the models for absenteeism and retention.  This would also help to 
clarify whether and how teachers’ behavior towards children might 
have changed as a result of the program. 
One phenomenon that was made explicit in the Colombian data 
was the gap between schooling desire and schooling expectations 
among the populations targeted for the program.  The disparity in 
particular between the percentage of boys and girls that wished to 
attend university and those that expected they will actually be able to 
do so affirms that low educational attainment in impoverished 
communities is not due mostly to a lack of value placed on education, 
but rather on other constraints. It would be useful as the program 
continues, and in other countries instituting programs to continue to 
measure desire, expectations and the link between those and actual 
attainment over time. For those children for whom a gap remains, 
what is still required in order to allow children to achieve the level of 
schooling desired? 
A notable deficiency in both the Nicaraguan and Colombian data 
is the lack of information pertaining to race or ethnicity.  Both 
Nicaragua and Columbia have some indigenous and African-
descendent populations, and poverty assessments have revealed the 
disparity between these groups and mestizo or white populations.  It 
may be that the regions chosen for the pilots did not contain 
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substantial proportions of these individuals, but it is useful to have the 
information.  It would also be a fruitful area of research in Colombia 
where the program is now operating in places with greater racial 
diversity.  Similarly, and actually possible with the available data, 
more systematic investigation of the differences in program impact 
between girls and boys is needed to ensure that program components 
are tailored to address the distinct needs of each gender. 
A common suggestion of researchers on program 
implementation is that multiple longer-term evaluations, to include 
both quantitative and qualitative studies, should be carried out over 
the life of these programs to the extent possible. The collection of 
panel data over a wide range of variables is optimal, but recognizably 
difficult in practice.  Yet the only way to determine whether results 
would diminish considerably over time or whether implementation is 
truly possible over the long term is to continue rigorous observation of 
the program past the pilot phase. As mentioned above, it is 
unfortunate that the Colombian program began before the 
establishment of a true baseline. However, as new dimensions are 
added to the program, it might be possible to launch smaller program 
evaluations of those distinct dimensions, with the plan established 
upfront to continue evaluation until the end of the program. 
Despite limitations and criticisms, CCTs have been embraced by 
many and are in some research circles being considered for expansion 
into new domains, such as the possibility of using conditional cash 
transfers to minimize “uninsured risk (de Janvry et al, 2006).  
Whereas currently CCTs are used more to address the chronic poor, 
there is some limited evidence that benefits can function to prevent 
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parents from removing children from school in the face of economic 
hardship. Using retrospective testing, researchers have found that 
some portion of the gains in schooling outcomes in Mexico (de Janvry 
et al.), Nicaragua (Maluccio, 2004) and Honduras have resulted not 
from encouraging parents to enroll children for the first time, but from 
encouraging them not to withdraw after economic shock. This has 
been shown to be true for RPS in response to the coffee sector prices 
and droughts and also in the Honduras program PRAF with regard to 
constrained coffee farmers.  
 Finally, once the data is made available for opportunity NYC and 
once it has been determined whether the program can be 
implemented full scale, it will make a fascinating case study for the 
future of CCTs in the developed world. 
 
Conclusion 
As in Mexico and Brazil, the findings from Nicaragua and 
Colombia presented here suggest that CCTs do increase enrollment 
and to a lesser extent decrease absenteeism and retention, at least in 
the short term. The results of this dissertation show that the program 
model can be effective in very different contexts, even in very poor 
countries and countries with some degree of civil unrest.53 
Policymakers should be able to implement such a program, with 
context-specific modifications, for many communities in which the 
direct and opportunity costs of schooling are a chief factor in dropout 
                                   
53 As discussed in the historical context, Colombia does have a long history of 
democratic rule even in the face of civil unrest.  It cannot be inferred that the CCT 
program would work in a country lacking both some level of basic infrastructure and 
a stable system of governance. 
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and non-attendance. This includes low income communities in 
developed countries. If designed carefully to reflect context, evaluated 
consistently and coupled with supply-side interventions where needed, 
CCTs can function even in places where there are very few resources.  
Conditional cash transfer programs should not be expected to 
accomplish more than they aim to do: to provide cash to subsidize the 
cost of human capital investment and incentivize households and 
individuals to make that investment. They should not be perceived as 
the sole measure for applying social assistance within a country, nor 
the only solution for reducing poverty in the short or long-term. 
Further, the results of this dissertation suggests that while CCTs do a 
good job at encouraging enrollment, i.e. getting children to the door of 
the schoolhouse, there remains a large gap in explanatory power once 
children are in school. In other words, this research in no way 
suggests that the programs replace other reforms focusing on 
curriculum and instruction, teacher preparation, school governance 
and other more traditional education reforms.  It does suggest, 
however, that CCTs might add a new dimension to the conversation 
around education and poverty.  They have already done this on the 
international front, and are beginning to do so in the Western world. 
Though a good deal of research has been done to date, CCTs remain a 








Individual and community percentage enrollment by treatment group 






Individuals    
            Nicaragua, Baseline (2000) 67 64 3  
            Nicaragua , 2002 75 89    14** 
            Colombia, 2001 (retrospective) 83 85          2 
            Colombia, Baseline 77 85     8** 
            Colombia, After Familias en Acción  77 85     8** 
Communities    
            Nicaragua, Baseline (2000) 76 74         -2 
            Nicaragua , 2002 83 95    12** 
            Colombia, 2001 (retrospective) 78 85          7* 
            Colombia, Baseline 76 82     6** 




Individual mean number of days missed by treatment group 
 Control  
 
Treatment  Difference  
(T-C) 
Individuals    
            Nicaragua, Baseline (2000) 2.6 3.1 0.5* 
            Nicaragua , 2002 1.6 0.6 -1.0** 
            Colombia, Baseline 4.1 3.3        
0.8** 




Individual retention rates by treatment group 






Individuals    
            Nicaragua, Baseline (2000) 13 12         -1 
            Nicaragua , 2002 15 8   -7** 
            Colombia, Baseline 21 18    3** 








Individual percentage of students with schooling expectations above primary 
school by treatment group 






Individuals    
            Nicaragua, Baseline (2000) 75 76 -1 
            Nicaragua , 2002 79 81 2 
            Colombia, Baseline 71 75     4** 
            Colombia, After Familias en Acción*  67 72     5** 
Note: Measurement at the end of the program was average estimation of the 
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     (1.12) 
0.049 
(1.050) 
   -0.059 
   
(0.149) 
  -0.280 
  (0.170) 
Work dummy -  1.920** 
(-1.92) 
-  2.146** 
(0.12) 






Age    1.528** 
(1.55) 
   3.031** 
(20.7) 






Age-squared -   0.074 ** 
(-0.07) 
-  0.145** 
(0.87) 
     0.012 
   (1.012) 




Secondary Expectations 0.216 
(0.13) 
  0.759** 
(2.14) 
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    (1.00) 
- - - 




  0.036** 





Mother present    -0.035 
    (0.24) 
    -0.056 
    (0.95) 
- - - 
Number of siblings    -0.023 
    (0.02) 
     0.037 
    (1.04) 
   -0.043 
  (0.958)  
   -0.041 
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    (1.03) 
-0.253** 






Community frequency of 
students in a multi-grade 




    -0.003 
    (0.99) 
0.755* 
   (2.213) 
    0.397 

















Number of cases 1689 1715 10,157 10,832 11,622 





Pseudo R2 0.13 0.2131 0.205 0.277 0.2419 

















Ln  pc total expenditure     0.081** 0.017   0.147*    0.155*      
0.207** 
Community mean (ln per 
capita educational 
expenditure) 
0.049 0.006 0.050 -0.074 -0.337 
Work dummy    -0.415**    -
0.245** 
    -
0.112** 
   -
0.217** 
   -
0.382** 
Age     0.249**      
0.155** 
   -0.074**    -
0.128** 
-0.031 
Age-squared    -0.012** -0.007 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
Secondary Expectations 0.035 0.039 0.146 0.225 0.003 
Community mean school 
distance 
0.000 0.000 - - - 
Mother’s educational level      
0.029** 
     
0.016** 
      
0.004** 
      
0.005** 
    0.004** 
Mother present -0.006 -0.003 - - - 
Number of siblings 0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 
Gender 0.017  0.001     -
0.025** 
   -
0.043** 
-0.014 
Community frequency of 
students in a multi-grade 
classroom/ Students per 
classroom 
0.000 -0.000  0.076 0.049 0.006 
RPS participation 
“Acceptance” 
-0.004     
0.073** 
0.026     0.098**    0.056** 
Number of cases 1689 1715 10,157 10,832 11,622 
















Ln  pc total expenditure    1.64** 1.39   1.162*   1.137*     1.172** 
Community mean (ln per 
capita educational 
expenditure) 
1.35 1.12 1.050 0.943 0.756 
Work dummy    0.15**    0.12**    0.426**    0.283**    0.131** 
Age    4.61**    20.7**    0.476**    0.353** 0.765 
Age-squared    0.93**    0.87** 1.012 1.020 0.993 
Secondary Expectations 1.25    2.14**     3.472**    4.783**    1.026** 
Community mean school 
distance 
1.00 1.00 - - - 
Mother’s educational level     1.19.**   1.37*     1.037**    1.041**    1.035** 
Mother present 0.97 0.95 - - - 
Number of siblings 1.02 1.04 0.958 0.960 0.995 
Gender 1.11 1.03    0.777**    0.699** 0.886 
Community frequency of 
students in a multi-grade 
classroom/ Students per 
classroom 
1.00 0.99   2.213* 1.488    1.051** 
RPS participation 
“Acceptance” 
0.98 3.90** 1.278    2.020**    1.602** 
Number of cases 1689 1715 10,157 10,832 11,622 















Ln Average total spending per 
capita 
     -3.868 






























































Community frequency of students 
in multigrade classrooms/ mean 









RPS Treatment or Control -1.593 
(0.718) 
   10.707** 





Number of cases 42 42 122 120 
F    5.52**        4.47**     12.367** 7.39** 
R Square 0.470 0.570       0.450 0.422 



































Work dummy     0.835** 
(0.282) 






























Community mean school 
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   0.092* 
(0.045) 
Community frequency of 
students in a multi-grade 











RPS participation “Acceptance” 0.267* 
(0.243) 






Number of cases 1291 1542 8381 9 ,368 
Wald chi2(13)      41.79**     65.37**    28.03**   31.66** 
Pseudo R2 0.030 0.0451 0.005 0.0165 













Ln  pc total expenditure   0.002  0.016 0.087 0.069 
Community mean (ln per capita 
educational expenditure) 
 -0.028 0.025 -0.054 -0.171 
Work dummy      
0.204** 
     
0.132** 
-0.001     
0.074** 
Age -0.051     -0.023 0.028    -0.014 
Age-squared 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Secondary Expectations -0.019 -0.030 -0.026 0.001 
Community mean school distance    -
0.001** 
0.000 - - 
Mother’s educational level -0.008 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 
Mother present 0.027 0.038 - - 
Number of siblings     -
0.015** 
0.001 0.001 0.005 
Gender -0.001 0.005  0.022*   0.016* 
Community frequency of students 
in a multi-grade classroom/ 
Students per classroom 
0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.008 
RPS participation “Acceptance”  0.113* -0.139**    -
0.061** 
-0.071 
Number of cases 1291 1542 8381 9368 
















Ln  pc total expenditure 1.010 1.138 1.052 1.036 
Community mean (ln per 
capita educational 
expenditure) 
0.885 1.213 0.971 0.910 
Work dummy     2.305**     2.262** 0.996     1.480** 
Age 0.803 0.835 1.170 0.921 
Age-squared 1.010 1.007 0.994 1.004 
Secondary Expectations 0.922 0.788 0.865 1.008 
Community mean school 
distance 
    0.996** 1.001 - - 
Mother’s educational level 0.965 0.944 0.992 0.997 
Mother present 1.123 1.393 - - 
Number of siblings     0.938** 1.007 1.007 1.032 
Gender 0.994 1.044   1.130*   1.096* 
Community frequency of 
students in a multi-grade 
classroom/ Students per 
classroom 
1.000 0.991 1.008 1.047 
RPS participation “Acceptance”   1.306* 0.347** 0.721** 0.669 
Number of cases 1291 1542 8381 9368 

















































































Community frequency of students 
in multigrade classrooms/ mean 

















Number of cases 42 42 127 118 
F 1.41 2.57* 1.036    3.08** 
R Square 0.222 0.383 0.075 0.107 































   -0.231** 
(0.058) 
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(0.713) 
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(0.237) 

























 -  0.016** 
(0.006) 















   -0.476** 
(0.177) 
    0.205** 
(0.060) 
        0.629 
(0.084) 
Community frequency of 
students in a multi-grade 


















Number of cases 1291 1542 8363 7173 
Wald chi2(13)   23.06*  49.01** 113.99**     105.40** 
Pseudo R2 0.0265 0.0753 0.031 0.0272 













Ln  pc total expenditure     -0.025 0.008 -0.011 0.071 
Community mean (ln per capita 
educational expenditure) 
0.018 -0.002 -0.183     
0.172** 
Work dummy -0.058 -0.038 0.038 0.002 
Age -0.023    -
0.229** 
   -
0.077** 
0.018 
Age-squared  0.001      
0.012** 
    0.003** -0.001 
Secondary Expectations      
0.055** 
    -0.017     -0.098 0.001 
Community mean school distance -0.000 0.000 - - 
Mother’s educational level 0.002 0.007 -0.002*     
0.001** 
Mother present  0.028 0.059 - - 
Number of siblings -0.000 0.002 0.007 0.006 
Gender -0.008    -
0.040** 
    0.028** -0.047 
Community frequency of students 
in a multi-grade classroom/ 
Students per classroom 
-0.001    -
0.002** 
-0.148* 0.000 
RPS participation “Acceptance” 0.012  0.040 -0.027 0.010 
Number of cases 1291 1542 8363 7173 
















Ln  pc total expenditure 0.79 1.09 0.991 1.087 
Community mean (ln per 
capita educational 
expenditure) 
1.19 0.98 0.879     1.259** 
Work dummy 0.62 0.67 1.289 1.036 
Age 0.80     0.06**     0.574** 1.267 
Age-squared 1.01     1.15**    1.022** 0.992 
Secondary Expectations      1.72** 0.81 0.523 1.008 
Community mean school 
distance 
0.10 1.00 - - 
Mother’s educational level 1.02 1.09   0.989*     1.016** 
Mother present 1.28 1.79 - - 
Number of siblings  0.10 1.02 1.054 1.038 
Gender 0.93 0.62**     1.227** 0.533 
Community frequency of 
students in a multi-grade 
classroom/ Students per 
classroom 
0.10 0.98**   0.345* 1.000 
RPS participation “Acceptance” 1.12 1.62 0.826 1.139 
Number of cases 1291 1542 8363 7173 
















































Community frequency of students 
in multigrade classrooms/ mean 









Number of cases 42 42 
F 0.65     7.42** 
R Square 0.118 0.473 













































































Community frequency of 
students in a multi-grade 














Number of cases 1291 1542 10,850 
Wald chi2(13)   17.42 13.45 113.69** 
Pseudo R2 0.0161 0.0125 0.0293 














Ln  pc total expenditure -0.019 -0.021     0.609** 
Community mean (ln per capita educational 
expenditure) 
 -0.038 -0.007 0.798 
Work dummy 0.026 0.099    -
0.162** 
Age -0.038 -0.036     0.109** 
Age-squared 0.002 0.001    -
0.004** 
Community mean school distance 0.001 -0.001 - 
Mother’s educational level -0.014 -0.004     0.004** 
Mother present -0.037 0.002 - 
Number of siblings -0.001  0.011 0.007 
Gender  -0.004 0.025     -
0.025** 
Community frequency of students in a multi-
grade classroom/ Students per classroom 
0.001  -0.000 0.011 
RPS participation “Acceptance”  -0.085 -0.037 0.034 
Number of cases 1291 1542 10,850 















Ln  pc total expenditure 0.93 0.918     1.309** 
Community mean (ln per 
capita educational 
expenditure) 
0.85 0.971 1.403 
Work dummy 1.11 1.492     0.514** 
Age 0.86 0.865     1.600** 
Age-squared 1.01 1.006     0.982** 
Community mean school 
distance 
1.00  0.998 - 
Mother’s educational level 0.94 0.985     1.020** 
Mother present 0.86  1.001 - 
Number of siblings 0.99 1.044 1.029 
Gender 0.99 1.103     0.897** 
Community frequency of 
students in a multi-grade 
classroom/ Students per 
classroom 
1.00 0.998 1.047 
RPS participation “Acceptance” 0.7 0.862 1.156  
Number of cases 1291 1542 10,850 







Individual Model. End of Implementation (2006). Effect of Familias en Acción on schooling 
expectations. 
 B S.E. 
(robust, 
clustered) 
Ln  pc total expenditure 2.116** 0.837 
Community mean ln per capita educational expenditure -7.865** 1.981 
Work dummy -5.971 6.060 
Age 0.853 4.122 
Age-squared -0.154 0.165 
Age mother left school 0.234** 0.076 
Number of siblings 0.192 0.457 
Gender -0.784 1.088 
Community mean number of students per classroom 1.227** 0.252 
Program participation (treatment) 5.420** 1.984 







































































































          
   
                














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The two departments collected for the RPS pilot program are 
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